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Abstract
This work takes as its starting point D Kendall’s CANdle/bCANdle algebraic
framework for formal modelling and specification of broadcasting embedded
systems based on CAN networks. Checking real-time properties of such sys-
tems is beset by problems of state-space explosion and so a scheme is given for
recasting systems specified in Kendall’s framework as parallel compositions
of timed automata; a CAN network channel is modelled as an automaton.
This recasting is shown to be bi-similar to the original bCANdle model.
In the recast framework,“compositionality” theorems allow one to infer
that a model of a system is simulated by some abstraction of the model, and
hence that properties of the model expressible in ACTL can be inferred from
analogous properties of the abstraction.
These theorems are reminiscent of “assume-guarantee” reasoning allow-
ing one to build simulations component-wise although, unfortunately, com-
ponents participating in a “broadcast” are required to be abstracted “atom-
ically”. Case studies are presented to show how this can be used in practice,
and how systems which take impossibly long to model-check can tackled by
compositional methods.
The work is of broader interest also, as the models are built as UPPAAL
systems and the compositionality theorems apply to any UPPAAL system
in which the components do not share local variables. The method could for
instance extend to systems using some network other than CAN, provided
it can be modelled by timed automata. Possibilities also exist for building
it into an automated tool, complementing other methods such as counter-
example-guided abstraction refinement.
iii
iv
Contents
1 Introduction and Overview 1
1.1 Embedded Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Model Checking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Scope of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4 Contribution of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.5 Organisation of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2 A Survey of Basic Concepts 13
2.1 Temporal Logics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1.1 Syntax of CTL* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1.2 Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1.3 CTL, LTL and µ-Calculus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2 Timed Automata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.1 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2.2 Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2.3 Parallel Composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2.4 An Extended Timed Automaton . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3 Model Checking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3.1 Algorithms for Model-checking CTL*, CTL, LTL . . . 24
2.3.2 Symbolic Model Checking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3.3 Automata and Model Checking . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3.4 Partial-order Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3.5 Modelling and Model Checking with Timed Automata 33
2.4 Simulation and Bisimulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
v
vi CONTENTS
2.4.1 Strong Bisimulation and Strong Equivalence . . . . . . 36
2.4.2 Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3 Modelling Embedded Systems 39
3.1 The Controller Area Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2 Broadcasting Embedded Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2.1 CANdle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2.2 bCANdle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3 Other Work on Model Checking Timed Automata . . . . . . . 46
3.3.1 Timed Automata and State Spaces . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3.2 Timed Temporal Logics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.4 Compositionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.4.1 Assume-Guarantee Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.4.2 Assume-Guarantee Reasoning and Reactive Modules . 54
3.4.3 Assume-Guarantee Reasoning and Timed I/O Automata 57
3.5 Abstraction and Abstraction Refinement . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.5.1 Programs and Existential Abstraction . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.5.2 Generating an Abstraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.5.3 Spurious Counterexamples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.5.4 Refining the Abstraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4 bCANdle 73
4.1 The Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.2 The Network Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.3 The Process Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.3.1 Rules for Atomic Process Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.3.2 Rules for Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.3.3 Rules for Sequential Composition . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.3.4 Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.3.5 Recursion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.3.6 Interrupt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.3.7 Parallel Composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.3.8 A Note on Recursion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
CONTENTS vii
4.3.9 Equational Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5 Modelling bCANdle with Automata 87
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.2 UPPAAL and Timed Automata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.2.1 UPPAAL Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.2.2 UPPAAL Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.3 A CAN channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.3.1 A Simple Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.3.2 Example – UPPAAL Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.3.3 A Broadcast Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.4 A Compositional Model of bCANdle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.4.1 Clocked Process Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.4.2 An Automaton Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.4.2.1 The Invariant Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.4.2.2 The Transition Relation . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.4.3 Strong Bisimulation and Strong Equivalence in bCANdle109
5.5 bCANdle as a Parallel Product . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.5.1 Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.5.2 Construction and Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6 Composition without Shared Variables 115
6.1 Another CAN Channel Automaton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
6.2 The Equivalence of the Two CAN Models . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.2.1 Definition - Weak Bisimulation of UPPAAL Systems . 123
6.2.2 The bisimulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.2.3 Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
6.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
7 Compositionality Theorems 129
7.1 Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
7.2 Timed Automata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
7.2.1 KLSV Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
viii CONTENTS
7.2.2 Timed Automata and KLSV Structures . . . . . . . . . 132
7.2.3 Composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
7.2.4 UPPAAL Automata as KLSV Structures . . . . . . . . 135
7.3 An Assume-Guarantee Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
7.3.1 Implementation Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
7.3.2 Simulation and Trace Inclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
7.3.3 An Assume-Guarantee Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
7.3.4 UPPAAL Templates as TIOA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
7.3.4.1 Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
7.4 A Compositionality Theorem for Our Timed Automata . . . . 143
7.4.1 Runs, Traces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
7.4.2 Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
7.5 Compositionality Theorem for UPPAAL Automata . . . . . . 149
7.5.1 Runs of the UPPAAL System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
7.5.2 Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
7.6 Further Composition Theorems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
7.6.1 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
7.6.2 Proposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
7.6.3 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
7.6.4 Proposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
7.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
7.7.1 Hybrid Automata, UPPAAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
7.7.2 The  Relation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
7.7.3 Decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
8 Compositional Model Checking in Practice 163
8.1 A Translation Tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
8.2 A First Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
8.3 Using Assume-Guarantee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
8.3.1 Another Control System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
8.3.2 Broadcasting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
8.4 Working with bCANdle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
8.5 Scope and Limits of the Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
CONTENTS ix
8.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
9 Conclusions and Further Work 191
9.1 Model Checking Broadcasting Embedded Systems . . . . . . . 191
9.2 Model Checking More Generally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
9.3 Further Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
9.3.1 Counterexample-guided Abstraction Refinement . . . . 194
9.3.2 Stopwatch and Hybrid Automata . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
9.3.3 Hybrid I/O Automata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
9.3.4 Separation Logic and Rely-Guarantee Reasoning . . . . 197
9.3.5 Practical Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
9.3.6 Heuristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
9.3.7 Assume-Guarantee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
A Glossary of Symbols 215
B Bisimulation Proof Details 221
B.1 Lemmas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
B.1.1 Lemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
B.1.2 Lemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
B.1.3 Lemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
B.1.4 Lemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
B.1.5 Lemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
B.1.6 Lemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
B.1.7 Lemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
B.1.8 Lemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
B.2 The Bisimulation – Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
B.3 A Transition in bCANdle is Simulated in the TA Formalism . 225
B.4 A Transition in the TA Formalism is Simulated in bCANdle . 235
C CANGen Generated Code for a CAN Channel 243
D Using CANGen 249
D.1 Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
x CONTENTS
D.2 Input Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
D.3 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
D.3.1 Input File . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
D.3.2 Generated UPPAAL Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
E A First Example – source 257
E.1 System with a single sensor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
E.2 System which averages two sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
F Using Assume-Guarantee – sources 263
F.1 The concrete system model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
F.2 The abstraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
Acknowledgements
I should like to acknowledge the support of my colleagues and supervisors
David Kendall (on whose work I have built), William Henderson and Adrian
Robson for their unstinting support throughout the period of my work on
this thesis. Not only have they given much valuable and wise advice, but
they have been there to challenge me to explain myself – so many things
have become clear to me after that.
Thanks also to the School of Computing, Engineering and Information
Sciences (and formerly, the School of Informatics) of Northumbria University
for meeting my costs, and to all my colleagues in the School for all their
encouragement and advice.
I am grateful, last but not least, to my family, especially Rosie, Rob,
Josy and Barbara for their loving support and encouragement during the
many times my work has spilled over into their lives, and for their constant
reminder that there is life outside academia.
xi
xii CONTENTS
Declaration
I declare that the work contained in this thesis has not been submitted for
any other award and that it is all my own work.
xiii
xiv CONTENTS
Chapter 1
Introduction and Overview
1.1 Embedded Systems
Embedded Systems are electronically controlled appliances which include a
computer – usually termed a microcontroller in the electronic engineering
community – or several such computing nodes in communication over one
or more networks. In the latter case one may speak of a distributed embed-
ded system or, when (as is often the case) the communication is broadcast
rather than point-to-point, a broadcasting embedded system. Such appli-
ances abound: examples include toys, electronic games, home appliances,
Hi-Fi, TV and DVD equipment, computer peripherals and mobile phones.
Cars employ a network of microcontrollers for engine management, anti-lock
breaking and the like, and distributed embedded systems are common in
industry (controlling production lines for instance) and in medicine, science
and high technology. Statistically almost all (97-99%) manufacture of com-
puter CPUs is for embedded systems rather than for “traditional” computing
systems.
These systems do not look like computing equipment to the casual ob-
server. The computers are in the background. They boot when the appliance
is switched on and their software is expected to run reliably, “seamlessly” un-
til it is switched off. Their software generally includes a number of concurrent
duty cycles, each a repeating loop in which inputs are obtained from elec-
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tronic sensors, computation is performed, and outputs delivered to electronic
actuators.
The outputs are generally required to meet real-time deadlines and often,
also to perform at high speed. A multimedia system, for example, must
process megabytes of data every second. Failure of the multimedia system to
meet a real-time deadline may not be a disaster, however: it may just mean a
degradation in output quality. This is an example of a soft real-time system.
A hard real-time system is one in which failure to meet a deadline implies
a total failure of the system. This may be a mission-critical failure in the
case of an industrial robot, a communications satellite or a rover deployed
on Mars; or worse, a safety-critical failure, as in the case of nuclear reactor
control system, a medial radio-therapy machine, or and anti-lock breaking
system of a car.
Such a failure may not be a simple consequence of too-slow sensing, com-
munication or computing other such inadequate provision of hardware re-
sources, and also may not be a straightforward consequence of algorithmic
complexity. If we assume the hardware is adequate to the task, concurrent
software might fail because of unforseen interference between the concurrent
tasks. A flaw in the logical design could in certain circumstances lead to
unsafe behaviour or to deadlock or some other failure of liveness. How can
one be sure of having thoroughly tested for such flaws? Techniques exists
for investigating the stochastic behaviour of these systems, for measuring the
probability of such failure; but in a safety critical system, we would like to
know whether a failure is possible at all, and if so, what combinations of
circumstances lead to failure.
1.2 Model Checking
Formal methods have a role to play in this. Constructs of a mathematical
character may be employed to aid the construction of precise requirements
statements while analysis proceeds informally. Greater rigour than this is
possible if a formal language or process algebra is employed to model the
system or some part of it, and to express specifications, desired properties.
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Software tools may then be employed to check syntax, data types and to
simulate or animate the system. Greater rigour still is possible if the formal
language has rigorously defined semantics which can be checked with software
tools. Wolper [114] has argued for this level of rigour even at the cost of
limited applicability.
A well established method is to model a software system as a “state ma-
chine” or automaton and employ model-checking software to explore the state
space of the automaton, checking for deadlock or unsafe states or behaviours.
Desirable or undesirable behaviours can be expressed as automata and their
composition with the system model checked for their necessity, contingency,
possibility or impossibility. Behaviours can be expressed as formulae in a
variety of modal temporal logics from which the checking software tools can
generate the composite model and check it. An introduction to temporal
logics and model checking tools and techniques is given by [26], and a more
advanced account in [45].
The work outlined in this thesis aims to show how such model-checking
can be aided by compositional techniques. Models of real systems are gen-
erally compositions of several parallel, concurrent component processes and
while the system model as a whole may be too complex to check, it is possible
to infer properties of the whole from verifiable properties of its components.
Concurrent system models which do not contain explicit reference to time
are straightforward to check: there are established methods for keeping the
computational complexity of the state space search within reasonable bounds.
More problematic are models where time plays an explicit role. These can be
modelled with timed automata (§2.2) which feature not only control locations
and transitions between locations, but also one or more clock variables and,
at each location, an invariant, a predicate on the clock variables which must
be true there, and, for each transition, a guard: a predicate that must be
satisfied for the transition to be enabled.
A simple example is depicted in figure 1.1, in which there are two locations
A,B, a clock variable h and another discrete variable x. The process begins
at location A having initialised h, x both to 0. The predicates in braces are
invariants: the process may reside at location A where clock h <= 10 time
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A{h <= 10} B {h <= 5}
h = 0; x = 0
(h >= 5) h = 0; x = 0
(h >= 10) h = 0; x = 1
Figure 1.1: A simple timed automaton
units. The transition A → B may be taken as soon as clock h reaches a
value of 10, and when it is taken, the effect is to reset h to 0 and update x to
1. Thus, the running process alternates between A,B; variable x alternates
between values 0, 1 for 10, 5 time units respectively. Non-determinacy results
if, for instance, the invariant at A is relaxed to h <= 15 and the A→ B guard
to h >= 5.
Many properties of timed automata are decidable, although the compu-
tational complexity of the decision may grow unacceptably fast. However,
decision problems become harder with stopwatch automata [43] where clocks
may start and stop running – these are needed, for instance, to model pre-
emptive scheduling – and with hybrid automata [42, 67] which carry data
variables in addition to clocks. Data variables suffer updates on discrete ac-
tion transitions and vary according to some rate of change as time passes at
some location. See, for instance, [67].
Software tools exist, even so, for verifying properties of such structures.
We use UPPAAL [50, 89]; other tools in which I have been/am interested
include CMC [87], Thao Dang’s [49] tool “d/dt”, CADP [58, 59] (supporting
timed extensions to LOTOS [92]), and process-algebra-based tools such as
the Edinburgh Concurrency Work-bench.
David Kendall [79] developed a modelling method and language, bCAN-
dle, particularly suited to modelling broadcasting embedded control systems
communicating via controller area networks (CAN). The particular interest
in CAN derives from the development of this network technology for the
automotive industry and its subsequent spread to other industrial control
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applications. The method derives a timed transition system from a model
defined in the bCANdle language and an associated tool is able to check
safety and liveness properties against it. He shows that a model in bCANdle
is semantically equivalent to a timed automaton.
The challenge is to scale up to “industrial”-sized models. All these tools
work for small problems and models, but the computational complexity ex-
plodes as we scale up.
One way to combat the “state space explosion” problem is to model larger
systems as composites of smaller systems in parallel and to examine how
properties of a composite might be inferred from properties of its components
– see §3.4. The work of the present thesis is to investigate such compositional
approaches and to apply them to bCANdle.
The bCANdle framework is recast so that a model is, semantically, not a
single monolithic timed automaton as originally proposed, but rather, a par-
allel composite of processes. The CAN network channels appear as processes
running in parallel with the processes defined by the system.
This recasting is shown to be semantically equivalent to the original
bCANdle, and the parallel components are devised in such a way that com-
positional methods, such as assume-guarantee reasoning may be employed to
infer properties of modelled system from properties of the components, or of
systems in which components of the original system are replaced by simpler
abstractions.
We thus show how, in general, the behaviour of broadcasting embedded
systems modelled in bCANdle may be reasoned about by inferring from be-
haviour of components. We show, indeed, that by using such compositional
reasoning, checks can be performed using less processing time than was possi-
ble in the non-compositional approach, in some cases even succeeding where
a non-compositional check fails to terminate. Broadcasting embedded sys-
tems communicating by CAN is a special case deemed by Kendall sufficiently
important to merit the development of his CANdle modelling framework; but
the work presented here in fact applies not just to CAN-communicating sys-
tems but, more generally, to any systems that can be modelled as parallel
composites of timed automata, whether or not a network is involved (and
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whether or not is is a CAN network).
As far as we are aware, this is the first time such compositional ap-
proaches have been applied to broadcasting embedded systems. At any rate,
a compositional methodology which allows us to reason about broadcasting
embedded systems seems a worthwhile addition to bCANdle.
A parallel-composite model derived in this way from a bCANdle descrip-
tion is readily checked by the UPPAAL model-checking tool and indeed the
compositional rendering of bCANdle developed in this thesis makes sense as
a composite of UPPAAL-style timed automata.
In the course of deriving this compositional recasting of bCANdle, it
became apparent that one could develop UPPAAL (or timed automaton)
based models of broadcasting embedded systems by developing the automata
directly rather than going via bCANdle, and making use of an automaton
representing a CAN channel. The examples discussed in chapter 8 were
developed in this way, and indeed this turned out to be the most natural way
to make the abstractions employed in so-called assume-guarantee reasoning.
See sections 3.4.1, 3.4.2, 3.4.3 for a brief introduction to this component-wise
method of reasoning about composite systems.
The compositionality theorems employed here apply to any parallel com-
posite of timed automata. This work therefore has potentially broader ap-
plication than just to CAN-based broadcasting embedded systems: to any
systems modellable in UPPAAL, in fact, or in analogous formalisms to which
assume-guarantee theorems apply. A suitable model of a CAN channel is pro-
vided and could, if desired, be extended or modified (or replaced altogether)
to model other network or interprocess communication protocols.
Of course, for CAN-based systems, starting with bCANdle is still an op-
tion. An interesting future project is to develop a software tool, perhaps to
use counterexample-guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR, §3.5, §9.3.1) to
generate abstractions. bCANdle is then a good candidate for an input lan-
guage if we are concentrating on CAN-based systems, although other ways
of specifying timed automata are also possible. In the present work, a sim-
ple language was developed, based on the UPPAAL .xta format, in which
automaton-based models of CAN-based systems can easily be specified. A
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simple tool expands these specifications to full .xta format which can be
input to the UPPAAL verifier. Future work is to devise software to integrate
this approach and incorporate CEGAR.
We do not yet have such an “automatic” tool; the present work is done
by hand. However, the compositional approach has been proved in principle
and can evidently be applied to any concurrent real-time system modellable
by timed automata.
1.3 Scope of the Thesis
The focus of the thesis is on the real-time behaviour of broadcasting em-
bedded systems which communicate via controller area networks (CAN) –
the subject matter of bCANdle – although the work could be extended to
systems using other communications technologies.
Timed automata provide a model of concurrency in terms of the arbi-
trary interleaving of actions: concurrent actions a, b are modelled as a non-
deterministic choice of a followed by b and b followed by a. Arguments are
made for alternative methods, such as Petri nets or the event structures de-
scribed by Bowman and Gomez [29] which model “true” concurrency. It is
sometimes argued (see, e.g. Bowman and Gomez [29] chap 4) that modelling
true concurrency gets one closer to the physical implementation of an embed-
ded system and to the fine structure of its decomposition into components,
possibly allowing the modelling of questions of the causal independence or
autonomy of the concurrent actions a, b, for instance. In general, an “inter-
leaving” view of concurrency abstracts away from the “physical” distribution
or disposition of the embedded system and provides an emphasis on observ-
able behaviour and a “global” view while a true-concurrent model makes
possible a more “local” view of the system. One can view a model based
on interleaving concurrency semantics as a “black box” view, while a model
based on true concurrency affords a “white box” view. Both types of model
have their strengths and are appropriate at different levels of abstraction.
Thus, interleaving concurrency is most appropriate at early stages of sys-
tem design where global system requirements are being identified, while true
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concurrency is more applicable where when system components are being
identified and implemented.
The work of this thesis adopts the former, an abstract view of the systems.
We are looking at observable behaviour; we are not looking at user interfaces;
nor are we necessarily concerned with every computational detail. We are
interested in timed behaviour of models of systems in which detail has been
abstracted away. We are interested in, for instance, questions such as whether
a value of a variable is guaranteed to be communicated within a real-time
deadline; whether a feedback or closed-loop control system is effective in
keeping some quantity within safe bound; whether a specified timed property
of a composite, concurrent, distributed system is guaranteed.
We take an abstract view of such properties also. These will be formally
expressible in temporal logic – in particular, in CTL (see §2.1.3). Safety
properties can considered by expressing them contrapositively in the form
“for all system executions, at all times, ϕ”, where ϕ expresses safety in terms
of system variables. Liveness (livelock freedom) similarly can be expressed
in the form “for all system executions, at some time, ϕ”.
It is key to the work that such properties, and more general ones such
as starvation freedom or fairness, can be expressed in ACTL, the universally
quantified fragment of CTL.
We are not directly concerned with system performance in general (other
than safety, liveness and the like), nor with stochastic behaviours.
The major task of the thesis is to extend Kendall’s bCANdle formalism
and model-checking techniques by recasting bCANdle in a compositional
style and showing how compositional techniques might then be employed in
reasoning about bCANdle models of CAN-broadcasting embedded systems.
Although other formalisms and techniques are available (surveyed in chap-
ter 3), we concentrate pretty much on the timed automata and timed tran-
sition systems that underpin bCANdle. As chapter 8 shows, compositional
techniques such as assume-guarantee reasoning do afford means of checking
of models for properties by software tools more quickly than would the case
with a “direct” check and perhaps, feasible where a direct attack would run
out of memory.
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1.4 Contribution of the Thesis
Kendall’s bCANdle (§3.2.2) is a very useful framework for modelling, spec-
ifying and checking CAN-based embedded real-time systems. The present
work extends it by recasting it in a semantically equivalent form as a parallel
product of timed automata.
This allows us to apply compositional reasoning techniques, such as assume-
guarantee reasoning (§3.4).
The timed-automata modelling approach has been extended to work with
UPPAAL “systems” of “processes” – essentially parallel products of timed
automata.
Theorems have been developed allowing one to infer a simulation (§2.4)
relationship between such a parallel product and some abstraction of it from
simulations that exist between the components of the product and abstrac-
tions of them. The benefit of this is that a property of the product may then
be inferred from the same property of the abstraction, provided the property
is expressible in terms of universal quantification over execution traces – for
instance, properties expressible in ACTL and their timed analogues. This is
useful if the abstraction has a smaller state space than the original model:
the check of the property on the abstraction will then be faster than the
same check on the full model, and perhaps feasible on the abstraction whilst
infeasible (due, say to memory demands) on the full model.
Small case studies of this are presented, showing the kinds of abstraction
and simulation that are useful.
In a timed setting, many properties – safety, liveness, livelock freedom,
freedom from starvation – may be cast as reachability properties in a form
amenable to this method.
Thus, compositional methods are applied to Kendall’s bCANdle frame-
work.
One feature of the present work is that a CAN channel is modelled as an
automaton, a “process” in UPPAAL terms. The method is general: it may
be applied to systems that do not use CAN at all, subject to the restrictions
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share variables, and communicate by discrete synchronisations). The method
could be adapted to some other network technology via a time-automaton
model of the process of transmitting a message.
Although the compositionality theorems have been developed specifically
for time automata and for UPPAAL systems, the possibility exists of adapt-
ing the method to use other model checking tools and variations on timed-
automata semantics.
1.5 Organisation of the Thesis
After an account of controller area networks and of some relevant basic mod-
elling and model-checking concepts (chapter 2), chapter 3 surveys work in
this area in more detail, particularly work which informs the present project
to develop a compositional bCANdle.
The two chapters following this describe in some detail work on develop-
ing bCANdle models into an equivalent form which lends itself to a compo-
sitional approach. Chapter 4 recapitulates bCANdle and chapter 5 develops
an equivalent formalism in terms of parallel composites of timed automata
which can be modelled in UPPAAL, and shows it is semantically equivalent
(bisimilar) to the “original” bCANdle modelling.
This formalism exhibits a CAN channel in a natural way as a process
which shares variables with processes wishing to communicate via the chan-
nel. As will be seen in the sequel, “compositionality” theorems (i.e. which
allow the component-wise inference of properties) are easiest to derive when
we can presume the components do not share variables. It is therefore ex-
pedient to recast the rather natural modelling developed in chapter 5 into
a form with no variables shared between the component automata. This is
done in chapter 6 where the no-shared-variables model is shown to be equiv-
alent to the original, and the implications of programming the models as
UPPAAL systems and processes are explored.
In chapter 7 are developed compositionality theorems for timed automata
which form the basis for compositional reasoning about the behaviour of
broadcasting embedded systems modelled in bCANdle. Chapter 8 develops
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the methodology for this via a number of examples in which we also show
the benefits in terms of processor time and space requirements of composi-
tional reasoning. This practical work involves software tools for generating
UPPAAL source code from higher-level model definitions.
Chapter 9 summarises the main conclusions of this work (§9.1) and then
discusses some possible future directions for research, both theoretical and
practical. Possibilities exist to refine the present work by making use of some
of the theoretical work surveyed in chapter 3. While the work outlined in
this thesis proves the concept of a compositional model-checking method for
broadcasting embedded systems, it also motivates the practical development
of one or more software tools to assist it.
Appendices contain the details of proof of the compositional reformulation
of bCANdle, details of CANGen, a tool written to assist with of the formulation
of no-shared-variables models, and source code of the examples discussed in
chapter 8.
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Chapter 2
A Survey of Basic Concepts
This chapter outlines a number of model-checking concepts and definitions
which will inform or be used in later work in the thesis.
2.1 Temporal Logics
The texts by Be´rard, Bidoit, Finkel, Laroussinie, Petit, Petrucci, Schnoebelen
and McKenzie [26] and by Clarke, Grumberg and Peled [45] develop the
theory of timed automata in ways similar to this, although definitions vary
in detail and we shall meet some other interestingly variant definitions in the
sequel. They also describe a number of formal logics which can be used to
express properties of automata and, through them, properties of systems.
[45], §3.1 (summarised in Clarke and Schlingloff [46]) and [26], §2.1 de-
scribe the Computation Tree Logic CTL*. This is a formal logic whose se-
mantics are based on Kripke structures: very loosely, these are trees (acyclic
directed graphs) similar to the labelled transition systems which model au-
tomata, and carrying a set of atomic propositions at each node. The nodes
represent instants of (discrete) time or stages of a computation or run.
2.1.1 Syntax of CTL*
The language is based on an initial set of atomic formulae and features modal
temporal operators such as ©ϕ (meaning, informally, ϕ will be true at the
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“next” instant), ♦ϕ (ϕ true “now” or at some later time), ϕ (ϕ true now and
at all later times), ϕUψ (ψ true now or later; meanwhile ϕ is true), its weak
version ϕWψ (ϕ is true now and until ψ becomes true) and its dual ϕRψ (ψ
holds until ϕ first becomes true). Most of these are derivable from others –
e.g. ♦ϕ , trueUϕ, ϕ , ¬♦¬ϕ, ϕWψ , ϕUψ ∨ ♦ϕ, ϕRψ , ¬(¬ϕU¬ψ).
Computation Tree Logic envisages a tree-like structure for time. From
any instant, multiple alternative futures may branch out. Accordingly the
syntax features path quantifiers ∀ (for all paths ...) and ∃ (for some path ...).
Two classes of formulae are defined thus -
• An atomic formula is a state formula;
• A boolean combination of state formulae, ϕ ∧ ψ or ϕ ∨ ψ or ¬ϕ, is a
state formula;
• A state formula is also a path formula;
• Boolean combinations of path formulae are again path formulae;
• If ρ is a path formula, ∀ρ and ∃ρ are state formulae.
• If ρ, χ are path formulae, ©ρ, ♦ρ, ρ, ρUχ, ρWχ, ρRχ are path
formulae.
2.1.2 Semantics
Branching time can be represented formally by Kripke structures – see, e.g.,
[45]. A Kripke structure for a CTL* logic is a triple 〈S,R, L〉 where S is a
set of time “nodes” or “instants”, and R ⊆ S × S is a total binary relation
on S defining the “connectivity” of time instants: (s, s′) ∈ R means s′ is “in
the future of” s. A path in 〈S,R, L〉 is an infinite sequence 〈s0, s1, s2, ...〉 of
states such that ∀n(sn, sn+1) ∈ R. In the sequel this sequence is denoted
−→s for short. L is a function mapping each state to the set L(s) of atomic
propositions true there.
One can interpret a CTL* over a Kripke structure 〈S,R, L〉. If s ∈ S
and −→s = 〈s0, s1, s2, ...〉 is a path in the structure, the following clauses define
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recursively what it means for a state formula to be true at s and a path
formula to be true on−→s . −→s k denotes the tail of−→s , the sequence 〈sk, sk+1, ...〉.
−→s is a path from s′ iff s0 = s′. α denotes an atomic formula, ϕ, ψ state
formulae, ρ, χ path formulae.
• s |= α iff α ∈ L(s);
• s |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff s |= ϕ and s |= ψ; s |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff s |= ϕ or s |= ψ;
s |= ¬ϕ iff s 2 ϕ.
• −→s |= ϕ iff s0 |= ϕ;
• −→s |= ρ ∧ χ iff −→s |= ρ and −→s |= χ; −→s |= ρ ∨ χ iff −→s |= ρ or −→s |= χ;
−→s |= ¬ρ iff −→s 2 ρ;
• s |= ∃ρ iff for some path −→s from s, −→s |= ρ;
s |= ∀ρ iff for every path −→s from s, −→s |= ρ;
• −→s |=©ρ iff −→s 1 |= ρ;
−→s |= ♦ρ iff (∃k)−→s k |= ρ; −→s |= ρ iff (∀k)−→s k |= ρ;
−→s |= ρUχ iff (∃k)(−→s k |= χ and (∀j < k)−→s j |= ρ); and analogously for
ρWχ, ρRχ.
One can add to a Kripke structure 〈S,R, L〉 a distinguished initial state,
s0, and say the resulting Kripke model satisfies ϕ, 〈S, s0, R, L〉 |= ϕ, iff s0 |= ϕ
as defined above.
Labelled Transition Systems A labelled transition system (LTS) is a
structure that is slightly richer than the Kripke structure: 〈Σ, σ0, A,→〉. Σ
is a set of states and σ0 an initial state, A a set of action labels (the action
alphabet) and →⊆ Σ × A× Σ the transition relation. Notice the suggestive
terminology: the states may represent states of some system, and the labelled
transitions changes of state the system might undergo. One writes
σ1
λ→ σ2
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to mean (σ1, λ, σ2) ∈→: state σ1 evolves into state σ2 on undergoing an
action (transition) labelled λ.
A path or run of the system is a sequence
σ0
λ0→ σ1 λ1→ σ2 λ2→ ...
which may be infinite or may terminate at a state σn. The length of the
run/path is this n. A state σ is reachable from σ0 iff for some run from σ0,
for some n, σ = σn.
Usually we are interested in runs from σ0 = σ
0.
If the system has properties expressible in a suitable formal language, one
can add a semantic function L as above and evaluate a CTL* formula over
the LTS.
Thus if σ is a state of a labelled transition system or node of a Kripke
structure, σ |= ∀ϕ iff ϕ is true at all nodes of the subtree rooted at σ;
σ |= ∃ © ϕ iff ϕ is true at some child node of σ, and σ |= ∃(ϕUψ) iff some
path σ = σ0, σ1, ..., σk, σk |= ψ and σi |= ϕ for i < k.
2.1.3 CTL, LTL and µ-Calculus
Actually all these examples are drawn from the sub-logic CTL in which
temporal operators must be preceded immediately by ∀ or ∃. This logic is
sufficiently expressive of “branching time” properties for most purposes and
is (more or less) the logic used by the tool UPPAAL ([50][89]; see also the
“help” bundled with the tool) for expressing properties of models built of
timed automata enriched with data variables.
Essentially, CTL deals only with state formulae, which are atomic formu-
lae; boolean combinations of state formulae; and, for state formulae ϕ, ψ, the
formulae ∀ © ϕ, ∃ © ϕ, ∀♦ϕ, ∃♦ϕ, ∀ϕ, ∃ϕ, ∀(ϕUψ), ∃(ϕUψ), ∀(ϕRψ),
∃(ϕRψ). Combinations of ¬, ∨, ∃©, ∃ and ∃( U ) suffice, for in addition
to de Morgan’s laws, the following equivalences can easily be checked using
the semantics outlined above: ∀ © ϕ ⇐⇒ ¬∃© ¬ϕ, ∀♦ϕ ⇐⇒ ¬∃¬ϕ,
∃♦ϕ ⇐⇒ ∃(trueUϕ), ∀ϕ ⇐⇒ ¬∃♦¬ϕ, ∀(ϕUψ) ⇐⇒ ¬∃(¬ψU(¬ϕ ∧
¬ψ))∧¬∃¬ψ, ∀(ϕRψ) ⇐⇒ ¬∃(¬ϕU¬ψ) and ∃(ϕRψ) ⇐⇒ ¬∀(¬ϕU¬ψ).
2.1. TEMPORAL LOGICS 17
Defining ∀( W ), ∃( W ) is left as an exercise.
Another interesting sublogic of CTL* is linear time logic, LTL: essentially
the fragment of formulae of the form ∀ϕ where ϕ is a boolean and/or tem-
poral combination of atomic formulae. The semantics of LTL is captured
by computation paths with no branching. LTL is the logic underlying the
model-checking tool SPIN and associated modelling language PROMELA
developed by Gerhard Holzmann: see Holzmann [71, 72]. Alas this lan-
guage and tool do not support models with explicit time in the way that
timed-automata-based models do. [26] and §2.4 briefly discusses differences
in expressiveness of CTL, LTL, CTL*.
As [45], §6.1 explains, each CTL operator can be defined in terms of
the least or greatest fixed point of some monotonic predicate transformer.
We are interested here in predicates on the states/nodes of some Kripke
structure – subsets of the set S of all such. A mapping f : ℘(S) → ℘(S) is
monotonic iff X ⊆ Y ⇒ f(X) ⊆ f(Y ). An X such that f(X) = X is a fixed
point of f . Because ℘(S) is a complete lattice it turns out that that every
monotonic mapping f has a least fixed point (⊆ every other fixed point)
denoted µX.f(X) and a greatest (⊇ every other fixed point) one, denoted
νX.f(X)1.
If we identify a formula ϕ with its “truth set”, the predicate {σ ∈ S|σ |=
ϕ} then
• ∀♦ϕ “is” µX.(ϕ ∨ ∀©X), and ∃♦ϕ “is” µX.(ϕ ∨ ∃©X),
• ∀ϕ “is” νX.(ϕ ∧ ∀©X), and ∃ϕ “is” νX.(ϕ ∧ ∃©X),
• ∀(ϕUψ) “is” µX.(ψ∨(ϕ∧∀©X)) and ∃(ϕUψ) “is” µX.(ψ∨(ϕ∧∃©X))
• ∀(ϕRψ) “is” νX.(ψ∧(ϕ∨∀©X)) and ∃(ϕRψ) “is” νX.(ψ∧(ϕ∨∃©X))
and so on.
1If M = {X|f(X) ⊆ X} and m = ∩M and N = {X|X ⊆ f(X)} and n = ∪N then it
is easy lattice algebra to infer that M ∩N is precisely the set of fixed points of f ; m, n
are fixed points, and any fixed point z satisfies m ⊆ z ⊆ n. Thus m = µX.f(X) and
n = νX.f(X). By more easy lattice algebra fk(∅), k = 1, 2, ... is monotonic increasing
and converges to µX.f(X), and fk(S), k = 1, 2, ... is monotonic decreasing and converges
to νX.f(X); if S is finite, the sequences converge after finitely many steps.
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Thus, these temporal logics are relatives of the modal µ-calculus of which
a good general account is given by J Bradfield and C Stirling in [30]. More
general µ-calculi include modalities of the form [a]ϕ, 〈a〉ϕ, where a is an
action label (say, from the alphabet of some automaton). These are true at
state σ iff every (some) transition labelled a leading from σ leads to a state
where ϕ is true.
A brief account of µ-calculus is also given by F Laroussinie and K G
Larsen [87], who use it with their model checking tool CMC, and by R
Mateescu and M Sighireanu[95], also in a symbolic model-checking setting.
2.2 Timed Automata
The automaton is a computing abstraction that has been around for a long
time (see, e.g., [73]) and comes in a number of variations which have in com-
mon the idea of a set L of locations or states, a set A of labelled transitions
between states, and rules determining what transitions are possible, formu-
lated perhaps as a relation E ⊆ L× A× L. The labelled transition systems
described above provide a semantic framework for these automata, in which
possible runs of an automaton (sequences of states interspersed with labels
of a possible transition from each state) are exhibited.
When used to study real-time systems, runs (in a labelled transition sys-
tem) describe possible behaviours of the system modelled by the automaton.
Hypotheses about the system are formulated in a formal language such as
CTL*, and their validity or satisfiability checked within the semantic frame-
work described above.
A finite state automaton can be pictured as a directed graph with vertices
L and edges E labelled by A. (l, a, l′) ∈ E is denoted graphically -
l
a−→ l′
.
The automaton can be declared to have a distinguished initial loca-
tion/state l0 ∈ L and perhaps also a subset F ⊆ L of “desirable” final states.
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One can enquire whether states in F are reachable; whether all possible runs
end on a state in F (if finite) or visit F “infinitely often” (if infinite). The
latter case refers to a run in whose sequence of visited states, every state lk
is followed eventually by a state ln ∈ F , n > k. One speaks in this of Bu¨chi
acceptance of the run and from this notions of fairness of system behaviour
have been developed – see, e.g. Clarke et al. [45], §3.3.
The timed automaton is a variation much used in the study of real-time
systems where it is desired to model time more explicitly than seen so far.
2.2.1 Definition
The timed automaton can be defined in a number of ways; see, for instance,
Alur and Dill [7]. To establish specifics and notation it is defined here to be a
structure (L, l0, A,H, E, I) where as before, L is a set of locations, E a set of
transition edges and A a set of labels for discrete actions. A timed automaton
has in addition a set H of clock variables. An atomic clock constraint is an
inequality between a clock variable or a difference of two clock variables and
a real time; let Z(H) denote the set of clock zones – conjunctions of atomic
clock constraints. The transition relation E of a timed automaton has the
form E ⊆ L × Z(H) × A × ℘(H) × L: a transition from l ∈ L to l′ ∈ L
is labelled by an action a ∈ A and also by a guard ζ ∈ Z(H) which must
be satisfied for the transition to be taken, and subset of clocks which will
be reset to 0 when the transition is taken. I is a function which associates
to each l ∈ L an invariant I(l) ∈ Z(H) which must be satisfied for the
automaton to “be” at location l.
An transition edge (l, ζ, a,H, l′) ∈ E (where l, l′ ∈ L, ζ ∈ Z(H), H ⊆ H)
is denoted graphically -
l
ζ,a,H−→ l′
2.2.2 Semantics
The semantics of such a timed automaton is given by a timed transition sys-
tem (cf. Alur, Dill [7], §3.4). This is a development of the labelled transition
system 〈Σ, σ0, A,→〉 described above. The elements of Σ are states (and σ0
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an initial state) and the elements of A are transition labels as before: these
are discrete action transitions. There are also time passage transitions t ∈ R
(R unless otherwise stated denotes the non-negative reals) and the set of
action labels is A ∪ R. We assume A ∩ R = ∅ and require that time passage
be
• deterministic – if t ∈ R and σ1 t→ σ2 and σ1 t→ σ′2 then σ2 = σ′2;
• additive – if σ1 t1+t2−→ σ2 then for some state σ′, σ1 t1→ σ′ t2→ σ2.
Given a timed automaton (L, l0, A,H, E, I), a timed transition system
(TTS) (Σ, σ0, A ∪ R,→) is defined as follows. Σ = L × RH: the states are
pairs (l, v) consisting of a location l and a clock valuation v : H → R, an
assignment of values to the clocks. The initial state σ0 = (l0, 0) (all clocks are
initially set to 0); transitions are labelled by A action labels or real numbers.
The transition relation →⊆ Σ × (A ∪ R) × Σ is written (l, v) a→ (l′, v′) for
((l, v), a, (l′.v′)) ∈→, and contains all
• discrete action transitions (l, v) a→ (l′, v[H := 0]) where (l, ζ, a,H, l′) ∈
E and v |= ζ and v[H := 0] |= I(l′). Here, v[H := 0] denotes the clock
valuation which assigns value 0 to all clocks in subset H and otherwise
agrees with v; v |= ζ means ζ is true for the clock values assigned by v.
• time-elapse transitions (l, v) t→ (l, v + t) where t ∈ R and for all t′ ∈
[0, t] : v + t′ |= I(l). Here, v + t denotes the valuation h 7→ v(h) + t.
2.2.3 Parallel Composition
To model concurrent real-time systems naturally entails the composition of
timed automata. There are a number of ways of doing this; Be´rard et al. [26]
§1.5 give a rather general construction. A particular case used in bCANdle
work [79] is as follows. Given two timed automataAi = (Li, l0i , Ai,Hi, Ei, Ii), i =
1, 2, define
A1 ‖ A2 = (L1 × L2, (l01, l02), A1 ∪ A2,H1 ∪H2, E, I)
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where
I(l1, l2) = I1(l1) ∧ I2(l2) and
(l1, l2), ζ, a,H, (l
′
1, l
′
2) ∈ E iff one of the following obtains for some
(l1, ζ1, a,H1, l
′
1) ∈ E1 and/or some (l2, ζ2, a,H2, l′2) ∈ E2:
• a ∈ A1 ∩A2, ζ = ζ1 ∧ ζ2, H = H1 ∪H2. In this case a is a synchronised
action of the two automata acting in step.
• a ∈ A1 − A2, ζ = ζ1, H = H1, l2 = l′2; or
• a ∈ A2−A1, ζ = ζ2, H = H2, l1 = l′1. In these cases, a is an interleaving
transition: one automaton acts while the other waits.
A
l
{h <= 5}
B
m2m1
a
a {h’ <= 5}
b (h’ >=3)
h’=0
h’=0
(h >=5)
a
h=0
Figure 2.1: Example: two parallel Timed Automata
Example Figure 2.1 shows a simple example of a system comprising two
parallel processes represented by timed automata A, B. LA = {l}, l0A = l,
AA = {a}, HA = {h}, EA = {(l, “h >= 5”, a, {h}, l)}, IA(l) = “h <= 5”.
LB = {m1,m2}, l0B = m1, etc. IB(m1) = true, IB(m2) = “h′ <= 5”.
In the product system, the two components perform an a-action every 5
time units, in step: the logic of A forces this. B may (non-deterministically)
move by a b-action from location m2 to m1 3 to 5 time units after arriving at
m2: so the a-action in B is non-deterministically one of the edges depicted.
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Parallel Product of Several Timed Automata This construction gen-
eralises to any number of component automata. Given a set of timed au-
tomata Ai = (Li, l0i , Ai,Hi, Ei, Ii), i = 1...n, where the components in the
parentheses are respectively the location set, the initial location, the action
alphabet, the set of clocks, the edge (transition) relation and the invariant
function, the product is ‖ni=1 Ai = A1 ‖ ... ‖ An = (L, l0, A,H, E, I) where
L = L1 × ...× Ln
l0 = (l01, ..., l
0
n)
A = A1 ∪ ... ∪ An
H = H1 ∪ ... ∪Hn
I(l1, ..., ln) = I1(l1) ∧ ... ∧ In(ln)
... and E has, for ζ ∈ Z(H), a ∈ A,H ⊆ H,
(l1, ..., ln)
ζ,a,H−→ (l′1, ..., l′n)
iff either (∃k)(∀i 6= k)li = l′i and lk ζ,a,H−→ l′k
or (∀i)li 6= l′i ⇒ li ζi,a,Hi−→ l′i where ζ = ∧ni=1ζi and H = ∪ni=1Hi.
The first of these disjuncts is an action on a single component while
nothing happens on the other components, while the second is a synchronised
action on several components.
2.2.4 An Extended Timed Automaton
It will be useful in the sequel to have a slightly extended timed automaton
construction.
• In addition to clocks, the automaton may have variables of various data
types – boolean, integer, real, including arrays and structures.
• Guards on transitions may include in their conjunctions equality and
inequality tests on variables as well as clocks;
• The clock reset set associated with a transition becomes a set of updates
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which includes clock resets as well as updates of other variables, such as
setting a variable to a value, incrementing or decrementing a variable.
• The semantics extend in a natural way: a state of the timed transi-
tion system includes a valuation of all the variables, not just the clocks
(although only the clocks adjust their values in a “time passage” tran-
sition).
• The parallel product likewise extends naturally: an action transition
in the product involves a conjunction of the guards on the component
transitions when two or more synchronise, and an update set which is
the union of the component update sets.
It is possible for the product to have variables shared between the compo-
nents. The model-checking tool UPPAAL [50][89] supports extended timed
automata like this, offering a C++-like syntax for updates, subrange types
as well as a full integer type, arrays and (most recently) structured data
types. Some restrictions are placed on the ways clock variables may figure in
updates, but simple resets are always permitted.
UPPAAL offers particular kinds of synchronised action which will turn
out to be useful to us. Binary synchronisation involves just two components
(UPPAAL defines one of these as “offering” the synchronisation, the other as
“receiving” it). This synchronisation may be defined as “urgent”, meaning
that the action occurs as soon as the semantics permit: no time delay is
allowed even if state invariants permit.
UPPAAL broadcast synchronisation involves two or more components:
again one is deemed to be offering” the synchronisation; the other com-
ponents receiving it. The sender may act as soon as it is able; receiving
components synchronise as defined formally above §2.2.3 if they are ready.
The synchronised action occurs as soon as the sender is ready.
These synchronisation types are discussed further in the sequel (§5.3).
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2.3 Model Checking
The basic endeavour is, having formulated a model of some system as some
sort of automaton, to check by a search of its state space whether some
property expressed in a temporal logic or µ-calculus is satisfied by some run,
or by all runs. Interesting special cases are: whether or not a state or set of
states is reachable (a safety property) or whether, say, all runs are bound to
visit a state in the set (a “liveness” property). One might check a “fairness”
property – whether all runs visit a state (or perform an action), infinitely
often in the sense that, where σ0, σ1, σ2, ..., σn, ... is the sequence of the states
in a run, ∀n∃k > n : σk is in the set.
The state space will in general be very large and so will be searched by a
software tool. UPPAAL [50][89] and CMC [87] work in this way and texts by
Clarke et al. [45], Clarke and Schlingloff [46] and Be´rard et al. [26] describe
ways of doing this. The remainder of this section will briefly review the main
algorithms and data structures employed.
2.3.1 Algorithms for Model-checking CTL*, CTL, LTL
Clark et al. [45] describe an algorithm for checking a CTL state formula over
a Kripke structure 〈S,R, L〉. In brief, suppose the formula ϕ to be checked is
expressed entirely in terms of ¬,∨,∃©,∃( U ),∃♦ (since every CTL formula
is equivalent to one built of these connectives). For each s ∈ S one builds a
set lbl(s) of sub-formulae of ϕ as follows.
Initially, lbl(s) = L(s).
Then, the algorithm adds sub-formulae of ϕ to the sets lbl(s), s ∈ S,
by proceeding recursively on the complexity of the sub-formulae using the
following cases:
• For each s ∈ S, if ¬ψ is a sub-formula and ψ /∈ lbl(s), add ¬ψ to lbl(s);
• If ψ∨θ is a sub-formula and ψ ∈ lbl(s) or θ ∈ lbl(s), add ψ∨θ to lbl(s);
• If ∃© ψ is a sub-formula and ψ ∈ lbl(s′) and (s.s′) ∈ R, add ∃© ψ to
lbl(s);
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• To decide whether to add a sub-formula ∃(ψUθ) to each lbl(s): first
determine the set T = {s ∈ S|θ ∈ lbl(s)}; then add ∃(ψUθ) to lbl(s′)
for all s′ such that s′ = s0Rs1R...Rsn ∈ T and ψ ∈ lbl(s0)∩ ...∩ lbl(sn).
Very neat pseudo-code for this is given in [45] §4.1.
• To decide whether to add a sub-formula ∃ψ to each lbl(s), first, com-
pute S ′ = {s ∈ S|ψ ∈ lbl(s)} and let R′, L′ be the restrictions to
S ′ of R, L, and let T be the set of nodes which lie in a non-trivial
strongly connected component of the graph (S ′, R′)2. The construction
of T has algorithmic time complexity of order |S ′|+ |R′|. Add ∃ψ to
lbl(s′) for all s′ such that s′ = s0R
′s1R
′...R′sn ∈ T . Again this is neatly
pseudocoded in [45] §4.1.
At the end of the algorithm, ϕ holds at those s ∈ S for which ϕ ∈ lbl(s).
The subalgorithms of the last two bullet points each have time complexity
O(|S| + |R|), so the complexity of checking algorithm is of the order of the
size of ϕ × this.
It is CTL that will be of most interest to us in the sequel; however both
[45] and [26] discuss model-checking LTL and CTL* briefly. The former
describes an algorithm for constructing, given an LTL (path) formula ρ and
a Kripke structure 〈S,R, L〉, a tableau against which (for s ∈ S) s |= ∃ρ can
be checked. This is a directed graph each node of which is an atom, (s,K),
s ∈ S and K a maximal consistent set of formulae whose truth values can
influence that of ρ and which are also consistent with L(s). s |= ∃ρ iff there
exists a node (s,K) with ρ ∈ K and a path into a certain strongly connected
component of the graph. The computational complexity of checking this is
linear in the size of the Kripke model but exponential in the size of ρ. The
tableau idea and the use of maximal consistent set s of formulae is reminiscent
of the methods in mathematical logic of canonical model construction.
[45] goes on to outline briefly an extension of this tableau method to
a method for checking CTL* formulae: ρ is permitted to have arbitrary
state sub-formulae, not just atomic ones, and a multi-stage check working
2a ⊆-maximal R′-path-connected subgraph, excluding trivial ones with just one node
without a self-loop
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recursively over the complexity of state sub-formulae (cf. the CTL algorithm
described above) is done. This combination of the two approaches has the
same complexity as the LTL checking algorithm.
2.3.2 Symbolic Model Checking
The CTL checking algorithm seen above has complexity linear in the size of
the transition graph and in the size of the formula. A problem is that the
graph (the transition system) may “explode” in size.
In symbolic model checking approaches, a large number of states that
need not be distinguished for the purpose of the property being checked are
represented by a single symbol. [45], chapter 6 and [26], chapter 4 describe
a method of symbolic model checking in which the symbols are the boolean
formulae at the nodes of a Kripke structure.
Ordered binary decision diagrams are used to represent boolean func-
tions and by extension other set-theoretic entities, including Kripke struc-
tures and formulae, very compactly, and operate on them and check them
for equivalence very efficiently.
By boolean function we mean a function 2n → 2 (2 , {0, 1}) for some
n ∈ N. A binary decision diagram (BDD) for a boolean function is an acyclic
directed graph, a tree, which has vertices of two types:
- a terminal vertex is labelled with a value 0 or 1 and has no edges pointing
to any “child” vertices;
- a non-terminal is labelled with an “independent variable” to the function,
and has two edges to child vertices, labelled 0, 1.
Suppose the independent variables are {x1, ..., xn}. The (sub)tree rooted
at vertex v generates a function fv(x1, ..., xn) defined recursively as follows.
- If v is terminal, return its value;
- Otherwise let xi denote the variable labelling v, and say v
0→ v0, v 1→ v1
[v0, v1 are the roots of the two sub-trees pointed to by v] and suppose the re-
turn values of fv0 and fv1 are determined already; return (¬xi∧fv0(x1, ..., xn))∨
(xi ∧ fv1(x1, ..., xn)).
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In this way a BDD determines a boolean function. A boolean function
corresponds to several BDDs in general, but it turns out (Clarke et al.[45],
Bryant [39] [40]) that that a boolean function corresponds to just one BDD in
canonical form in which the variables labelling non-terminal nodes appear in
the same order along each path from the root, and there are no isomorphic or
redundant sub-trees. An ordered binary decision diagram, OBBD, is made,
given a strict total ordering of the variables, by first building a BDD with
nodes in depth-order, than transforming it by (1) eliminating all but one
terminal node labelled 0 and all but one labelled 1, and redirecting edges to
these; (2) whenever two non-terminal nodes have the same variable label and
the same children, eliminate the duplicate(s) and redirect incoming edges to
the remaining one; (3) whenever a node has child 0 = child 1, eliminate the
node and redirect its incoming edges to the child node. The emphReduce
algorithm of Bryant applies (1-3) repeatedly until no further reduction in the
size of the graph results.
The OBDD provides, in general, a compact representation of boolean
functions, although the size of the graph can vary greatly with the ordering
of variables [45] and finding the optimal ordering is an NP-complete problem
(Bryant [41]).
Boolean operations between boolean functions are efficiently implemented
using OBDD too. If • denotes one of the 16 possible two-argument opera-
tions, f • f ′ is computed as follows (Bryant [39]). Let v, v′ denote the root
nodes of OBBDs for f.f ′, and x, x′ the variables labeling v, v′. If x ≡ x′ the
equation
f • f ′ = (¬x ∧ (f |x←0 • f ′|x←0)) ∨ (x ∧ (f |x←1 • f ′|x←1))
where f |x←b is the function resulting from substitution of the constant bit b
for variable x in f , breaks the calculation recursively into two sub-problems
computable by smaller OBDD. If x < x′ in the canonical ordering of variables,
f ′|x←b = f ′, so the equation f•f ′ = (¬x∧(f |x←0•f ′))∨(x∧(f |x←1•f ′)) serves,
and the case x > x′ is symmetrical to this. At the base of the recursion are
OBDD consisting of just a terminal root node, in which case the associated
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value is returned.
A naive implementation of this recursion would have exponential com-
plexity, but by caching results of sub-computations (subgraphs of OBDD)
the complexity can be kept to a linear function of the sizes of the OBDD for
f, f ′. Of course, some boolean operations are simple as OBDD operations:
for instance negation is just a matter of interchanging the 0- and 1-terminal
nodes.
Representing Kripke Structures by OBBD. Clarke et al. [45] suggest
doing this as follows. Let 〈S,R, L〉 be a Kripke structure and assume without
loss of generality that S has 2m states. Encode these as boolean vectors−→
b = (b1...bm). Then S may be represented by the OBBD of its characteristic
function χS : 2
m → 2, and similarly R by the OBBD of its characteristic
function χR : 2
m × 2m = 22m → 2. L, the mapping of states to the sets of
atomic propositions which hold there, may equivalently be as a mapping of
each atomic proposition to the set of states where it holds. We can represent
this by, for each atomic proposition, an OBBD for the (characteristic function
of) the set of states.
Symbolic Model Checking with OBDD. Suppose a Kripke structure
represented by OBDD as explained above. Sets of states are represented by
OBBD of boolean functions 2m → 2, and each such boolean function may
also be thought of as a formula. The fundamental idea of symbolic model
checking is to reason about or compute with symbols (formulae) or sets of
states rather than individual states. To this end, a suitable calculus of these
formulae/boolean functions/sets of states is useful. [45] suggests a calculus
of quantified boolean formulae (QBF) for this purpose.
One starts with a set of m propositional variables V = {v1, ..., vm} cor-
responding to the independent variables of the boolean functions. A QBF
formula is a propositional variable; or ¬f or f ∨ g or f ∧ g where f, g are
QBF formulae; or ∃vf or ∀vf where v is a propositional variable and f a
QBF formula.
Truth assignments are elements σ ∈ 2V . If b ∈ 2 is a bit, σ[v ← b] is the
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truth assignment like σ except v 7→ b. For truth assignments σ and QBF
formulae f a relation σ |= f is defined recursively by:
– σ |= v iff σ(v) = 1;
– σ |= ¬f iff σ 2 f ;
– σ |= f ∨ g iff σ |= f or σ |= g; σ |= f ∧ g iff σ |= f and σ |= g;
– σ |= ∃vf iff σ[v ← 0] |= f or σ[v ← 1] |= f ;
– σ |= ∀vf iff σ[v ← 0] |= f and σ[v ← 1] |= f .
With the aid of this calculus, an algorithm for computing the (OBDD of
the characteristic boolean function of the) set of states of the Kripke structure
where a CTL formula is valid can be defined recursively, remembering that
a CTL formula can be considered atomic or ¬ϕ or ϕ∧ψ or ∃©ϕ or ∃(ϕUψ)
or ∃ϕ, where ϕ, ψ are CTL formulae.
• If a is an atomic formula, the set of states satisfying a is given directly
by the specification of the Kripke structure.
• The (OBDD of) the set of states satisfying ¬ϕ, or ϕ ∧ ψ, is computed
from the (OBDDs of) the sets of states satisfying ϕ, ψ using the OBDD
algorithms for computing meets and complements of boolean functions.
• To compute the set of states satisfying ∃©ϕ given f(−→v ), the character-
istic function of the truth set of ϕ, compute the OBBD of ∃−→v′ (f(−→v′ )∧
R(−→v ,−→v′ )).
• To compute the set of states satisfying ∃(ϕUψ) (given the truth sets of
ϕ, ψ), use the fixed-point representation introduced in §2.1.3 of the set
of states satisfying the formula. This is µX.(ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧ ∃ ©X)) where
we read ϕ, ψ as the (OBDD for the) boolean characteristic functions of
the truth sets of the respective CTL formulae. Since the set of states is
finite, the minimum fixed point of any monotonic function f on subsets
of states (and, in particular, that implied by X 7→ ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧ ∃ © X))
is the limit of the monotonic increasing sequence of iterates of f on ∅:⋃∞
k=1 f
k(∅), and this is computable in a finite number of iterations as
the fk(∅) agree from some k0 on. Clark et al. [45] give an algorithm
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for this (§6.1), and of course f is computed via the OBDD boolean
function algorithms of Bryant.
• To compute the set of states satisfying ∃ϕ (given the truth set of ϕ),
proceed as in the previous case, starting from the fixed-point represen-
tation introduced in §2.1.3 for the truth set of the formula: νX.(ϕ ∧
∃©X) where ϕ is understood as the (OBDD for the) boolean charac-
teristic functions of the truth set of the CTL formula ϕ. Again, since S
is finite, the maximum fixed point of this monotonic function f is the
limit of the decreasing sequence fk(S):
⋂∞
k=1 f
k(S) which is similarly
to the previous case computable in finitely many steps – again, see [45]
§6.1.
In view of the representation of temporal operators as fixed points of
monotonic predicate transformers used in the last two items, this approach
to model-checking extends in a natural way to µ-calculus formulae, and [45],
chapter 7 develops this.
2.3.3 Automata and Model Checking
The constructs described so far for Kripke structures apply, of course, equally
well to automata, and Clark et al. show how an automaton can be made cor-
responding to a Kripke structure by labelling edges with the propositions true
at their target locations. Alternatively, and this is the way UPPAAL [50][89]
works, for example, one can continue simply to attach atomic propositions
to automaton locations.
Be´rard et al. ([26] chapter 4) develop symbolic model checking in a way
similar to the ideas above, but in terms of automata. In the sequel, our
system models will be essentially automata, in particular timed automata.
In these terms, the basic model checking problem takes one of the forms:
• Reachability properties: ∃♦ϕ – can the system reach a state where ϕ
is the case?
• Safety properties: The dual of the above: ∀¬ϕ – The (generally
undesirable) situation described by ϕ can never occur. A variant is
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something like ∀¬ϕWψ; the situation ϕ cannot occur until ψ has
occurred.
• Liveness properties: some desirable situation ϕ will eventually occur:
∀♦ϕ or ∀(ψUϕ).
• Freedom from deadlock - a special property meaning that the system
will never be in a state from which no progress is possible: ∀¬deadlock.
Think of this as a kind of safety property.
Related to liveness is bounded liveness where one asks whether the desir-
able situation will occur within a given time bound, and fairness. One can,
for a Kripke structure or transition system, define a collection F of sets of
states and call an (infinite) run s0 → s1 → s2 → ... fair iff for every P ∈ F
there is a state s ∈ P which occurs infinitely often in the run: ∀m∃n.sn = s.
Intuitively each P in F is a set of states which we would hope to be realised
infinitely often in any run. This generalises the idea of the Bu¨chi automaton
which has designated a “final” location (or set of final locations) which we
expect to be visited infinitely often in any run.
These may be tricky to express in CTL, but we shall look at case studies
in the sequel where models are constructed in order to examine fairness.
We are often interested in the question of whether a system model meets a
specification. A common approach is to express the model as an automaton,
the specification as another automaton, or rather its complement, modelling
failure to meet the specification, and model-check the composition of this
with the system model in order to see what pathological behaviours are
possible. In this way meeting of specification becomes a kind of reachability
problem.
2.3.4 Partial-order Reduction
This is family of techniques which aim to reduce the size of the state space
search tree by exploiting the fact that two or more paths of execution may
be indistinguishable as far as the property being checked is concerned: there
is an equivalence relation among behaviours which is a congruence as far as
32 CHAPTER 2. A SURVEY OF BASIC CONCEPTS
exhibiting the property is concerned – see, e.g., [45], chapter 10. The search
tree need contain only one member each equivalence class.
For the sake of definiteness, [45] works with execution paths in a labelled
transition system 〈S, T, S0, L〉 where S is a set of states, S0 ⊆ S a subset of
initial states, L a function assigning each state a set L(s) of atomic propo-
sitions true there. Thus far, we have a Kripke structure, except that T is
not a single relation ⊆ S × S, but rather a set of relations: T ⊆ ℘(S × S).
This yields in effect a labelled transition system in which the elements α ∈ T
function as labels: s
α→ s′ iff (s, s′) ∈ α.
An execution path is a finite or infinite sequence s0
α0→ s1 α1→ s2 α2→ ....
Model-checking some property ϕ consists of constructing the transition
system as a tree which will be depth-first searched for a state where ϕ is
satisfied. A standard recursive algorithm will do this, using, for each state s,
the set {α ∈ T |∃s′.(s, s′) ∈ α} of (labelled) transitions enabled at s; except
that in partial-order reduction, we construct the tree using a (hopefully)
small subset (which [45] denotes ample(s)) of the enabled set at s, leaving
out the transitions not distinguished by ϕ.
One way of doing this is explored by [45], assuming the transitions are
deterministic: s
α→ s′ for at most one s′, denoted α(s). This is to construct,
given ϕ, a relation I ⊆ T × T which is symmetric, irreflexive and has the
properties that whenever (α, β) ∈ I and α, β are enabled at s, α is enabled at
β(s) (and by symmetry, vice versa), and α(β(s)) = β(α(s)). This expresses
the notion that α and β are “independent” actions which commute with one
another. The idea is that clearly if (α, β) /∈ I, they are “dependent” and one
could not be in ample(s) without the other; but hopefully, if α ∈ ample(s)
and (α, β) ∈ I, β can be omitted from ample(s).
There are problems with this: for instance, one may have s
α→ s1 β→ s′
and s
β→ s2 α→ s′ with (α, β) ∈ I, but ϕ might be sensitive to the choice of
s1 or s2; or s1, s2 may have other successors besides s
′ which matter to ϕ.
One can define a transition α to be invisible with respect to a set A of
atomic propositions iff ∀s.L(s) ∩ A = L(α(s)) ∩ A, and two infinite paths
s0
α0→ s1 α1→ s2 α2→ ..., t0 β0→ t1 β1→ t2 β2→ ... to be stuttering equivalent if they can
each be divided into blocks of finite length such that for all k, all the states
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in the kth blocks of both paths have the same proposition labels L(s). The
blocks need not be of equal length.
One can define two transition systems on a state set S to be stuttering
equivalent iff they have the same initial states, and for any path in one
system from an initial state, there is a stuttering equivalent path from the
same initial state in the other system. One is then led to properties that are
invariant under stuttering ; [45] explores ways of tightening the procedure for
discarding transitions from ample(s) making sure that only “invisible” states
and stuttering equivalent paths are “lost”. This is explored in particular for
LTL properties which are invariant under stuttering.
2.3.5 Modelling and Model Checking with Timed Au-
tomata
For systems with continuous real time, timed automata (§2.2.1) provide useful
models: their semantics (§2.2.2) give rise to timed transition systems, exten-
sions of the transition systems considered in the foregoing sections. There is
a problem, however: there are infinitely many clock valuations if clock values
are unbounded or if time is continuous. One solution is clock regions. An
equivalence relation is defined between clock valuations: v ≃ v′ iff
1. for every clock h, if ch is the largest value h is compared with in a guard
or invariant, either v(h), v′(h) both ≥ ch; or ⌊v(h)⌋ = ⌊v′(h)⌋′;
2. for every two clocks h, k such that v(h) ≤ ch, v(k) ≤ ck, v, v′ agree on
ordering of fractional parts: {v(h)} ≤ {v(k)} ⇔ {v′(h)} ≤ {v′(k)};
3. for every clock h such that v(h) ≤ ch, v(h) is integral iff v′(h) is.
This relation is stable with respect to
– adding a constant: if v ≃ v′ then v + t ≃ v′ + t,
– clock reset: if v ≃ v′ then v[h := 0] ≃ v′[h := 0], and
– satisfaction of clock constraints: if v ≃ v′ and v |= ζ then v′ |= ζ.
Further, if, in the timed transition system, state (s1, v1) evolves to state
(s2, v2) by a time delay followed by an action of the underlying automaton,
34 CHAPTER 2. A SURVEY OF BASIC CONCEPTS
and v1 ≃ v′1 then there exists v′2 ≃ v2 such that also state (s1, v′1) evolves to
state (s2, v
′
2) by a time delay followed by an action.
Now the the state space divides into finitely many clock regions, ≃-
equivalence classes; a state is a location v together with a clock region. [26],
§5.5 and [45], §17.4 describe this approach and the latter shows that,
• The graph of clock regions, considered as a transition system, is bisim-
ilar or strongly equivalent (see §2.4 below) to the original semantic
transition system;
• Where H is the set of clock variables, the number of regions is ≤
|H|!.2|H|.∏h∈H(2ch + 2).
This approach was formalised by R Alur, C Courcoubetis and D Dill
[16][17].
Another approach employs clock zones – recall the set Z(H) from subsec-
tion 2.2.1. These we think of as sets of clock valuations which have a symbolic
representation as conjunctions of atomic clock constraints: identify such a
conjunction ζ with a set of valuations {v|v |= ζ}. Clarke et al. [45], §17.5,6
shows how these provide a useful symbolic state space, with operations on
clock valuations “lifting” to clock zones ζ ∈ Z(H):
• ζ + t , {v + t|v |= ζ} where t ∈ R,
• ζ[H := 0] , {v[H := 0]|v |= ζ} where H ⊆ H.
The right hand sides of these definitions need to be shown to be ac-
tual clock zones: symbolically representable by conjunctions of atomic con-
straints. [45] does this by first showing any zone ζ (formula) on clocks x1, ...xn
has the form
(x0 = 0) ∧
∧
0≤i6=j≤n
(xi − xj ≺ij cij) (2.1)
where each ≺ij is ≤ or <, and x0 is a special extra clock “always zero”, giving
a tidy uniform notation for the two types of clock constraint.
Then the formula ∃xnζ is equivalent to
(x0 = 0) ∧
∧
0≤i6=j<n
(xi − xj ≺ij cij) ∧
∧
0≤i6=j<n
(xi − xj ≺ij cin + cnj)
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From this it follows that for any clock zone ζ on clock variable x (among
others), ∃xζ is a well–defined clock zone. The definition of ζ[x := 0] is
equivalent to ∃xζ ∧ x = 0 and ζ[H := 0] is a conjunction of such.
Similarly, the set of valuations v + t for some t ≥ 0, v |= ζ can be shown
to be symbolically representable, and hence the definition of ζ + t is sound.
From this, we get a finite zone graph equivalent to the original transition
system. This finite state space is explored by means of an algorithm of the
form (see, e.g., Larsen et al [88]) -
PASSED:=∅
WAITING:=(l0, ζ0)
repeat
begin
get (l, ζ) from WAITING
if (l, ζ) |= ϕ then return “yes”
else if ζ * ζ ′ for all (l, ζ ′) ∈ PASSED then
begin
add (l, ζ) to PASSED
for all (l′, ζ ′) which are successors to (l, ζ), ζ ′ 6= ∅,
put (l′, ζ ′) to WAITING
end
end
until WAITING=∅
return “no”
The algorithm explores the space of clock zones by representing them as
data structures called difference bound matrices, devised by D Dill [51]. If
there are k clocks, a difference-bound matrix is a (k + 1) × (k + 1) matrix
D in which D0i(Di0) gives the lower (upper) bound on clock hi, and Dij the
upper bound on hi−hj. Each entry is the symbol∞, meaning no bound, or
a pair of data – a number and an indication of whether the bound is strict or
non-strict. The syntactic counterpart of this is, of course, the formula (2.1)
above, in which the (cij) correspond to the entries Dij of the difference-bound
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matrix.
Larsen et al. [88] develop a way of doing this efficiently by representing
a difference-bound matrix as a directed graph. The clocks are vertices and
the weight of an edge from xi to xj is the (ij)-entry of the matrix (these au-
thors consider comparison only of type ≤ or ≥). They then develop efficient
algorithms for minimizing the size of a graph required to represent a DBM
and hence a clock zone, and also minimizing the number of symbolic states
(l, ζ) needing to be stored in the set PASSED. This in turn leads to efficient
(in time and in memory requirement, at worst O(n3) for n clocks) ways of
determining when ζ * ζ ′ and when ζ ′ 6= ∅ in the algorithm above. These
predicates, of course, are essential for ensuring the algorithm terminates, and
that the PASSED set is correctly maintained so as ensure successor states are
not unnecessarily explored multiple times. Larsen et al. have implemented
their efficient zone-based symbolic model checking over their extended timed
automata – cf. §2.2.4 above.
2.4 Simulation and Bisimulation
This section develops the definitions needed for determining when two tran-
sition systems are in some sense equivalent, or when one system’s behaviour
is subsumed or simulated by another.
2.4.1 Strong Bisimulation and Strong Equivalence
These apply to labelled transition systems (S,A,→) consisting of a set S
of states, a set A of transition or action labels, and a transition relation
→⊆ S × A× S.
Milner [98] defines a strong bisimulation on the system to be a relation
R ⊆ S × S such that whenever (s1, s2) ∈ R, for all a ∈ A,
• s1 a→ s′1 implies (∃s′2)(s′1, s′2) ∈ R and s2 a→ s′2; and
• s2 a→ s′2 implies (∃s′1)(s′1, s′2) ∈ R and s1 a→ s′1
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It is routine to check that the diagonal (identity) relation on S is a strong
bisimulation, and that the converse, the composite and any union of strong
bisimulations is a strong bisimulation. In particular, the union of all strong
bisimulations is a strong bisimulation, the maximal or “largest” strong bisim-
ulation on S, and this is an equivalence relation on S, termed strong equiva-
lence: s1 ≃ s2 iff for some strong bisimulation R, (s1, s2) ∈ R.
A strong bisimulation up to ≃ is defined as above, but with the com-
posite ≃ R ≃ in lieu of R in the two bulleted conditions. Milner shows
straightforwardly that s1 ≃ s2 iff for some strong bisimulation up to ≃, R,
(s1, s2) ∈ R.
Intuitively, s1 ≃ s2 means that there is a one to one correspondence
between runs a0, a1, a2, ... from s1 and runs (with the same sequence of action
labels) from s2.
The definitions make sense when s1 and s2 are from two transition systems
(S1, A,→1), (S2, A,→2) with a common action label alphabet. One then
defines the transition systems to be strongly equivalent,
(S1, S
0
1 , A,→1) ≃ (S2, S02 , A,→2)
iff their initial states are strongly equivalent – to be precise, there is a strong
bisimulation R ⊆ S1 × S2 such that ∀s01 ∈ S01 .∃s02 ∈ S02 .(s01, s02) ∈ R and
∀s02 ∈ S02 .∃s01 ∈ S01 .(s01, s02) ∈ R, where S01 , S02 denote the respective initial
state subsets.
The labelled transition systems considered here include the Kripke struc-
tures, generalised Kripke structures of §2.3.4, and timed transition systems
(§2.2.2).
In structures in which states s are labelled by sets L(s) of atomic propo-
sitions, we require additionally of a strong bisimulation R that R(s1, s2) ⇒
L(s1) = L(s2).
Clarke et al. [45] show that, given two strongly equivalent structures,
corresponding states satisfy the same CTL* state formulae, and correspond-
ing paths (i.e. whose states correspond term-wise under the bisimulation)
satisfy the same CTL* path formulae.
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2.4.2 Simulation
A simulation is a “one-sided” version of a bisimulation: a binary relation
R between states such that whenever (s1, s2) ∈ R, for all a ∈ A, s1 a→ s′1
implies (∃s′2)(s′1, s′2) ∈ R and s2 a→ s′2.
This is most useful as a relation between structures or transition systems
(S1, S
0
1 , A,→1), (S2, S02 , A,→2) with initial state sets S0i and a common action
label alphabet. One defines that system 2 simulates system 1,
(S1, S
0
1 , A,→1)  (S2, S02 , A,→2)
iff there is a simulation R ⊆ S1×S2 such that ∀s01 ∈ S01 .∃s02 ∈ S02 .(s01, s02) ∈ R.
In systems which label states with sets of atomic propositions, for a sim-
ulation R ⊆ S1×S2 from (S1, S01 , A,→1, L1) to (S2, S02 , A,→2, L2) we require
that the atomic propositions of system 1 include the atomic propositions of
system 2, and that whenever (s1, s2) ∈ R,
• The restriction of L1(s1) to the atomic propositions of system 2 is
precisely L2(s2);
• s1 a→ s′1 implies (∃s′2)(s′1, s′2) ∈ R and s2 a→ s′2.
Then, again, system 2 simulates system 1,
(S1, S
0
1 , A,→1)  (S2, S02 , A,→2) iff there is a simulation R (in the stronger
sense) such that ∀s01 ∈ S01 .∃s02 ∈ S02 .(s01, s02) ∈ R.
Note that as a relation between transition systems,  is reflexive and
transitive, a preorder.
Clarke et al. [45] show that when system 1 is simulated by system 2
in this sense, an ACTL* formula satisfied by system 2 is also satisfied by
system 1. ACTL* is the fragment of CTL* which uses only universal (∀)
path quantifiers.
Chapter 3
Modelling Embedded Systems
As was discussed in chapter 1, hard real-time systems often include a com-
munications network linking computing nodes, require a software design that
guarantees message transmission and response times, and the Controller Area
Network is a popular choice in view of its deterministic collision avoidance
strategy. This chapter therefore begins with a description of the Controller
Area Network before moving on to a survey of embedded system modelling
and model-checking techniques.
3.1 The Controller Area Network
Henceforth abbreviated CAN, this was originally devised by Bosch GmbH
for use in automotive control applications [60, 74] where there was identi-
fied a need for high reliability in a noisy electromagnetic environment with
data speeds of up to 1 Mbit/s and distances of up to a few tens of metres.
Since then, CAN has become widely used in many hard-real-time systems,
in medical and industrial applications including robotics.
Briefly, a CAN is a broadcast carrier-sense, multiple-access (CSMA-CA)
network with a deterministic collision-avoidance strategy for medium access
arbitration. It is a multi-master network: any node on the network may send
a message. The message does not carry a destination address but is broadcast
and may be received by any node interested in receiving it, in a sense which
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will be explained further below.
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Figure 3.1: A CAN data frame
Messages passing over the network take the form of CAN data frames with
the structure depicted in figure 3.1. From the point of view of communicating
applications, the important elements are the 11-bit or 29-bit message iden-
tifier and the data pay-load of up to 8 bytes. We shall confine our attention
to 11-bit identifiers in the rest of this section. The remaining elements are
control bits and a cyclic redundancy check field used by lower level software
to ensure a frame is correctly read from the network. The bits are physically
encoded in NRZ.
The message identifier is not a unique sequence number but in fact plays
two roles.
First, it expresses a message priority. Thought of as an integer, the lower
its value, the higher the message priority. From this follows the deterministic
procedure for arbitrating access to the network medium. A node may start
to transmit a frame onto the network at any time. Nodes that wish to
transmit monitor the medium while sending successive bits of their message
identifier. As long as the competing nodes all send the same bit they remain
in contention but as soon as a node sends a 1 bit while another node sends
a 0 bit, the sender(s) of the 0 outbids the sender(s) of the 1 and the latter
drops out of contention. One may speak of the 0 bit as “dominant” and of
the 1 bit as “recessive”. This bidding process repeats for all 11 bits of the
identifier and provided two two nodes attempt to send a message with the
same identifier at the same time there is a unique winner of the arbitration
process – the message with the identifier with the smallest integer value1.
1This implies that the message identifier is a big-endian integer, as the most significant
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This scenario depends on clocks at the different nodes remaining in syn-
chronisation with one another and also on the ability of a node writing an
arbitration bit to sense when a “dominant” (0) bit is already on the bus and
for the dominant bit to “win”. These are provided in a straightforward way
by the electronics on the CAN bus although this will not be described in
detail here.
The second role performed by the message identifier is to announce a par-
ticular “type” of message. CAN messages are not addressed to a particular
recipient – they are all broadcast ; but a potential receiving node may choose
to receive a frame of a particular type. A receiving node acts to receive a
messages with a particular identifier value.
In a node a CAN controller senses the bus at all times and (typically)
interrupts the host processor when a frame is sensed with an identifier iden-
tifying it as a frame which the node “wishes” to receive. Interrupt serving
then consists of buffering the data of the frame.
In chapter 4, especially §4.2 and its sequel we shall adopt a rather ab-
stract view of CAN frames/messages and their sending and receipt. The
network will be viewed as divided in separate CAN channels. A message in a
channel will be viewed as a pair consisting of an identifier and a data value,
corresponding to the 11-bit identifier and 0-8 byte data value of figure 3.1.
In §4.2 it is explained how a message-in-transit has an early pre-acceptance
phase corresponding to medium access arbitration, a post-acceptance phase
during which the message is “in” the medium and available to receivers,
and an acceptance point which is the boundary between these. The network
channel will also have a status recording whether it is free or, if it is handling
a message, the progress of the message through its phases.
3.2 Broadcasting Embedded Systems
Steven Bradley, David Kendall, William Henderson and Adrian Robson have
been particularly interested in modelling software systems distributed across
bit is presented first.
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embedded hardware and communicating by broadcast – specifically, across
controller area networks (CAN), initially developing a timed process algebra
AORTA [36, 33, 32, 31, 37, 35, 34] and a response-time analysis tool XRTA
[66, 38, 65].
More recent work has led to the modelling language CANdle and its
underpinning process algebra bCANdle [79, 80, 82, 81, 83, 84, 85]. This will
be reviewed in some detail as it provides the point of departure for some of
my work. [79] contains the most detail; the other works cited are papers
summarising various aspects of this work.
3.2.1 CANdle
This is a high-level language for programming or modelling distributed real-
time systems whose components communicate with CAN. A CANdle pro-
gram consists of a number of modules : for instance ([79], p158):
module FlowRegulator is
behaviour
Flow[Msecs(10)/PERIOD] | Valve[y/x]
end module
This defines a module in terms of instances of two other modules running in
parallel ([79], p147, p155).
module Flow is module Valve is
const type
PERIOD : duration flow_rdng
type procedure
flow_rdng AdjustValve(flow_rdng)
procedure channel
ReadSensor(out flow_rdng) k : (flow.flow_rdng)
channel var
k : (flow.flow_rdng) x : flow_rdng
var behaviour
x : flow_rdng loop do
behaviour rcv(k, flow.x);
every PERIOD do AdjustValve(x)
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ReadSensor(x); end loop
snd(k,flow.x) end module
end every
end module
These module definitions show the the standard headings required by the
language. The data types declared under heading type are defined separately
– [79] provides a separate Simple Data Modelling Language (SDML) for this.
The heading channel in each case declares a CAN channel with a message
template consisting of identifier flow and data payload of type flow rdng.
The behaviour sections exemplify two iteration constructs and the com-
bination of actions (primitives, snd, rcv or procedure calls) in sequence (;).
Actions can also be combined in parallel (|), as in the previous example and
there are also constructs for conditional action, non-deterministic choice and
trapping and handling of run-time exceptions.
The details of the procedures declared under procedure are abstracted
out, although bounds on their execution time are needed for model-checking.
3.2.2 bCANdle
Chapter 6 of [79] goes on to describe how from a CANdle program is algo-
rithmically generated a bCANdle system. bCANdle is a low-level process
algebra used to provide a formal representation of these systems for model
checking purposes.
A bCANdle system ([79], chapter 3; [81]) is made of three components:
a process term, a network model, and a data model.
A data model over a given set of variables, a set of operation symbols and
a set of predicate symbols consists of:
• a typing function assigning a set of values to each variable;
• a valuation - a mapping of variables to values;
• an assignment to each operation symbol of an operation on valuations
of appropriate “arity”; and
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• an assignment to each predicate symbol of a set of valuations.
If D is a data model and γ a predicate symbol, D |= γ means that the
valuation of D lies in the set which interprets γ. D[x := v] is a data model
like D except for assigning value v to variable x. If ω is an operation symbol,
the relation D →ωd D′ means D′ is the model like D except its valuation is
the result of applying (the interpretation of) ω of D’s valuation. One can
thus see a data model changing state.
A network model consists of a set of broadcast channels. A channel
consists of:
• a set of possible messages, each an identifier together with a data value
• a strict total ordering between messages (denoting priority);
• an assignment of upper and lower time bounds on the pre-acceptance
phase and the post-acceptance phase of transmission of each message;
• a queue of waiting messages;
• a state: one of four: (1) free; or (2) in pre-acceptance phase of transmis-
sion of message m, with bounds l, u on time to completion; or (3) at ac-
ceptance point of transmission of message m; or (4) in post-acceptance
phase of transmission of m, with bounds l, u on time to completion;
Rules are given for changes of state of the network, generating a timed tran-
sition system with network models at the nodes. The static parts of these
network models are all the same; the dynamic parts - the queue and the state
of the channel(s) - change as time passes or discrete actions occur. See [81],
figure 3, or [79] §3.4.2.
The process terms are defined as follows. The style is that of Robin
Milner’s process algebra [98].
• k!i.x and k?i.x are process terms (transmission/reception of message
i.x through channel k);
• Where ω is an operation symbol and t1, t2 ∈ R ∪ {∞}, [ω : t1, t2] is a
process term (performance of an operation within given time bounds);
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• Where γ is a predicate symbol and P a process term, γ → P is a
process term (evaluate the guard and do P if satisfied);
• Where P,Q are process terms, P ;Q, P + Q, P [> Q, P |Q are pro-
cess terms (do in sequence, non-deterministic choice, interrupt, do in
parallel);
• A process variable X is a process term;
• recX.P is a process term (recursion).
Milner[98] develops a theory of equivalence (bisimilarity) of process terms
and shows how how the recursion construct represents iterative (looping)
processes, and how any process term may generate an automaton. The lo-
cations are process terms, the generating term is the initial location, and a
transition a : P → Q, say, whenever P is able, in some sense, to perform ac-
tion a and then must behave like Q, formalising the idea of a process algebra
as a “list of things to do”.
An analogous notion of bisimilarity equivalence is developed for bCANdle,
based on rules for transition of a bCANdle system (P,N,D) into another,
(P ′, N ′, D′) whenever passage of time or some action has caused P to evolve
in a fashion analogous to that described in the previous paragraph, or the
network or data to change state. For instance, the process term P = k!i.x;P ′
might evolve into P ′ and N to an N ′ that is like N but with message i.x
added to the queue, while D = D′. Another example: N = N ′, the state of
N is at acceptance point of i.x, P = k?i.x;P ′, and D′ is like D except the
valuation has the value of variable x updated with the data just read.
The rules are stated in full in [79], §3.6, [81] figures 5 - 9 and explained
in more detail in chapter 4.
A clock is added to each network channel ([79], chapter 4) to make a
clocked network, Nˆ , and to define from a process term P a clocked process
term Pˆ by adding clocks to operations and building up using the same gram-
mar as before. A clocked bCANdle system ([79]§4.2.4) is then a clocked
process term, a clocked network and a data model. The automaton con-
struction can then be strengthened to a timed automaton G(Pˆ , Nˆ ,D) which
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represents the possible behaviours of of the clocked bCANdle system starting
from initial state (Pˆ , Nˆ ,D). Guards on transitions, for instance, ensure that
time bounds on operations and on network behaviour are respected. The
formal rules for generating the transitions of this timed automaton are given
in [79], §4.3 and it is proved that the timed transition system which gives
the operational semantics for it is strongly equivalent to that given by the
bCANdle semantics previously defined.
We now have a formal translation of bCANdle systems into timed au-
tomata and the tools for analysing, checking timed automata can in theory
be applied.
This work goes on to develop more algorithmically efficient ways to trans-
late a bCANdle system, and indeed, to develop software to verify properties
of a bCANdle system on the fly – without generating the equivalent timed
automaton in its entirety. In my own studies, however, I have particularly
been interested in the passage from bCANdle system to timed automaton
and, using the detail just described, will describe my work with this in chap-
ter 5.
3.3 Other Work on Model Checking Timed
Automata
In this section a selection of papers are mentioned briefly. Much of this work
is effectively summarised in the texts of Be´rard et al. [26], Clarke et al. [45],
Clark and Schlingloff [46].
3.3.1 Timed Automata and State Spaces
R Alur’s and D L Dill’s A Theory of Timed Automata [7] and Automata-
Theoretic Verification of Real-Time Systems [8] describe some early work on
getting time into finite automata. By comparison with §2.2, their automata
include in the definition a subset F ⊆ L of acceptance states, as in the
“traditional” theory [73] where the actions form an alphabet, a word over the
alphabet is accepted by an automaton if a run finishes at a location ∈ F
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after the sequence of actions in the word. A classic theorem is that words
accepted by finite automata over an alphabet A are precisely the regular
expressions over A. Alur and Dill build time into this theory. They define
a timed word as a sequence of letters (actions) with a matching sequence
of time stamps and develop a notion of timed automaton similar to ours -
a transition corresponding to a timed word can he taken if its time stamp
satisfies a guard. Bu¨chi acceptance is defined for timed runs: an ω-word (an
infinite sequence of letters) is accepted if a location in F is visited infinitely
often along the run. They also consider more general Muller acceptance,
where a family of sets of locations is given and an ω-word is accepted if the
set of locations visited infinitely often is in the family. Bu¨chi acceptance is a
special case of this.
This leads to a theory of timed regular languages, a natural generalisa-
tion of the regular languages of classical automata theory. They develop a
PSPACE algorithm for checking the emptiness of the language accepted by a
timed automaton and discuss other decision problems associated with their
constructions. They show that timed Muller Automata and timed Bu¨chi au-
tomata are equally expressive and properly include the language accepted by
deterministic timed Muller Automata, which properly includes the language
accepted by deterministic timed Bu¨chi Automata.
Finally they apply their timed automaton construction of verifying safety
and liveness properties of a real-time systems.
[8] discusses briefly the use of clock zones for efficient representation of
the state space.
Alur, Courcoubetis, Halbwachs, Dill and Wong-Toi in [2] expound region
equivalence as a way obtaining a finite state space, and develop an algorithm
for constructing a minimal region graph for a timed automaton, and an
algorithm for model-checking formulae of TCTL (see next section). Alur,
Courcoubetis and Henzinger [4] develop the region graph construction further
in order to obtain a solution to the duration-bounded reachability problem:
where the timed automaton has a duration measure to decide whether there
is a run satisfying a given upper bound on it.
Alur’s paper Timed Automata [15] has developed the earlier theory into
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essentially the same timed automaton formalism as that set out above in
§§2.2, 2.2.3. In the course of a discussion of reachability analysis he develops
the notion of region equivalence as described in §2.3 and shows that in a
timed automaton of n locations and k clocks, in which every clock constraint
constant is ≤ c, the reachability problem can be solved in time n.2O(klog(kc)).
In considering implementation, he discusses the symbolic state space repre-
sentation based on clock zones (§2.3) and their efficient representation using
difference-bound matrices. Alur discusses again the timed language theory
outlined in the previous paper and reviews a couple of tools, including UP-
PAAL.
J Bengtsson, B Jonsson, J Lilius and W Yi, [22] explore partial-order
reduction of state-space search in the case of a parallel composite of timed
automata, using a construct they call a network of timed automata instead
of parallel composition as above. This allows them to define a local time
semantics, a variation of the usual semantics of a parallel composition (see
§2.2.3) according to which the components of a composite run independently;
their clocks are not presumed to be synchronised except when a synchronizing
transition is taken, when clocks are resynchronised. They develop from this
a version of clock zone based symbolic states and a reachability algorithm
with partial order reduction based on their local time semantics.
K G Larsen, F Larsson, P Pettersson and W Yi [88], [91] present timed
automata as used in UPPAAL [50][89] (essentially as defined here) but with
networks of timed automata as in the previous paragraph, symbolic semantics
and difference bound matrices. They then obtain a number of results allow-
ing non-minimal-weight edges to be dropped from the region graph without
affecting the semantics. They develop an O(n3) algorithm for implementing
this and also a method for reducing the number of symbolic states in the
global PASSED list (see §2.3), and present a number of experimental results
using UPPAAL.
The UPPAAL specification language is a subset of CTL that permits no
nesting of ∀, ∃, ∀♦, ∃♦ modalities apart from that implied by its “leads
to” construct, equivalent to ∀(ϕ ⇒ ∀♦ψ). This apparent limitation of
UPPAAL is rescued by the use of test automata, which allow specifications
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to be checked which cannot be expressed directly in the property language.
L Aceto, P Bouyer, A Burgueno and K G Larsen [1] describe the method of
test automata. A test automaton is essentially a timed automaton in which
some locations are deemed “reject states”. A test automaton T expressing
(the negation of) some specification is combined in parallel with an UPPAAL
system which “passes the test” T if no timed state of the combined system
which includes a reject location of T . This appears to be a way of using
UPPAAL that goes beyond simple checking of properties expressed in its
property (or specification) language. Aceto et al. go on to develop a powerful
temporal logic L∀S which augments a timed-automaton specification with
extra boolean atomic formulae and clocks and expresses properties which
can be reduced to reachability in this sense.
K G Larsen, C Weise, W Yi and J Pearson [90] develop clock difference
diagrams, data structures inspired by binary decision diagrams ([45], ch 5)
to provide an efficient representation of polyhedra such as clock zones.
G Behrmann, T Hune and F Vaandrager [20] explore running UPPAAL
on parallel processors, distributing model-checking across processing nodes.
This results in a search that is globally neither breadth-first (queue-organised
search list) nor depth-first (stack-organised) but which approximates depth-
first as the number of nodes increases. In fact, breadth-first is more optimal
(and produces the shortest path to the pathological state in the case of a
property failing); a prioritised queue of states to search is used to make
distributed breadth-first search order closer to breadth-first search order.
The speed-up in model-checking found in experiments was generally linear
in the number of processing nodes, sometimes better.
E Fersman, L Mokrushin, P Pettersson and W Yi [54] consider the schedu-
lability problem given a fixed-priority scheduling strategy, modelling a sys-
tem of concurrent real-time processes as as a timed automaton with a set
of tasks running at each location - a method of modelling different from the
approaches considered so far. They show the problem of deciding whether a
given task set encoded as a timed automaton in this way is schedulable can
be solved by reachability analysis if two clocks are added to the automaton.
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3.3.2 Timed Temporal Logics
Subsection 2.1 briefly reviewed some temporal logics used to express formally
properties of real-time systems. There are many more – I feel I have barely
scratched the surface and this is an area I might well return to in future
work.
Rajeev Alur, Costas Courcoubetis and David Dill [17] extend computa-
tion tree logic, CTL, to a timed logic, TCTL. This logic has the ability to
suffix the temporal operators ,♦,U with a time bound ∼ c, where ∼ is one
of <,≤,=,≥, > and c ∈ R. Thus, for instance, ∃♦≤5ϕ says: on some path, ϕ
will be true in (up to) 5 time units; ∀(ϕU<20ψ) says: on all paths, ψ will be
true less than 20 time units from now and in the mean time, ϕ is true. Their
time line is continuous, not discrete, and their semantics replaces the discrete
computation tree (timed transition graph) where each state has a discrete
set of “next” states, with a continuous path through each state parametrised
by time. They develop an algorithm based on clock zones and region graphs
for checking TCTL formulae, and argue that having a dense rather than
discrete time domain does not significantly increase the complexity of the
model-checking problem.
T A Henzinger, Z Manna and A Pnueli [68] construct a similar timed
extension to linear time logic (LTL or PTL) and show that for a large class
of systems, checking a property over the continuous time domain can be
reduced to a check over a discrete domain of a possibly modified property.
R Alur, K Etessami, S La Torre and D Peled [9] develop the logic of
parametrised temporal operators further into a logic they call parametric
temporal logic, PLTL. They note that some parametrised temporal operators
are upward monotone in the intended interpretation, for instance ♦≤mϕ ⇒
♦≤m+1ϕ and >mϕ ⇒ >m+1ϕ; while their duals are downward monotone:
e.g. ≤m+1ϕ⇒ ≤mϕ, ♦>m+1ϕ⇒ ♦>mϕ. This motivates them to carry two
disjoint sets of parametric variables, one for upward and one for downward
monotone operators. They develop model-checking for PLTL and sublogics
based on Kripke structures.
Alur and Henzinger [10], [11] further discuss bounded temporal operators
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in Timed PTL – (ϕ → ♦[0,3]ψ), (ϕ → ♦≤3ψ) and so forth. They also
introduce freeze quantification in which, for instance in x(ϕ→ ♦y(ψ ∧ y ≤
x + 3), x, y are time variables bound to the time where the subformula in
the scope of the temporal operator is evaluated. This formula says “in every
state with time x, if ϕ, then there is a later state with time y such that
ψ ∧ y ≤ x + 3). They compare these two logical constructs with a third
syntax, quantification over explicit clock variables: for instance compare the
previous formula with: ∀x((ϕ∧ T = x)→ ♦(ψ ∧ T ≤ x+ 3). [11] develops
a tableau-based decision procedure for TPTL.
T Henzinger, X Nicollin, J Sifakis and S Yovine [69], develop a semantics
of real-time systems somewhat different from the automaton-based seman-
tics we have been working with, and a version of TCTL using explicit clock
variables rather than parametrised temporal operators, and also a timed ex-
tension of the µ-calculus. They do a lot of work comparing the expressiveness
of the two logics, concluding that they are not comparable in general, but
that TCTL requirements of a sufficiently large class of real-time systems can
be expressed in timed µ-calculus.
Alur and Henzinger have more recently been exploring game theoretic ap-
proaches to real-time system modelling and model-checking. Their approach
(and also that O Kupferman [13]) develops models as games (the formal
structure is a natural extension the automaton) in which the system and the
environment alternate moves. They introduce a variety of temporal logic
more general than LTL or CTL which they call alternating time temporal
logic, ATL, which features a “selective” path quantifier 〈〈A〉〉, where A is a
set of players of the game. A formula 〈〈A〉〉ϕ, say, is evaluated at a state
q of the game by considering a computation path forward from q in which
repeatedly a protagonist chooses a move for every a ∈ A, then a antagonist
chooses a move for every a ∈ Ac, and the state is updated with these moves.
The authors argue that while LTL and CTL are suitable specification lan-
guages for closed systems, ATL is more natural for specifying open systems.
They develop and examine the complexity of model-checking algorithms for
ATL.
Alur and Peled [14] describe causal or partial order semantics which con-
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trasts with the interleaving or total order models which we have been working
with. The latter presume some kind of order between any two concurrent
events, which the former allows that some pairs of events may in principle be
incomparable as to causal order. They show that satisfiability in a number
of temporal logics based on partial order semantics is undecidable.
3.4 Compositionality
If we aim to translate a bCANdle system into a parallel composite of stop-
watch or hybrid automata, another avenue of enquiry suggests itself: how
might compositional reasoning apply?
3.4.1 Assume-Guarantee Reasoning
Clarke et al. in [45] and [46] provide a brief introduction to this methodology,
introduced more fully in Jones [75], Misra & Chandy [99], and Pnueli [104].
The basic idea is that one is aiming to verify a property of a composite
system by inferring it from properties of components of the system. For
instance, to verify that a communications protocol ensures that a message
always gets from its source to its destination, one might separately verify
(1) that a message always gets from its source onto the network, (2) that
a message propagates through the network, and (3) that a message on the
network is received by a “destination” process.
The assume-guarantee approach focuses on a number of processes, the as-
sumptions made by each process about its environment, and the propositions
guaranteed to be satisfied when the assumptions are met. The processes are
expressed as formal models – process algebras, automata or other transition
systems ([45] uses Kripke structures); the assumptions and guarantees are
also expressed formally in some temporal logic such as CTL or its “univer-
sal” fragment, ACTL.
In the notation of Pnueli, 〈ϕ〉M〈ψ〉 is a formula intended to mean “when-
everM is part of a system which satisfies assumption ϕ, the system guaran-
tees that ψ is also satisfied”.
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A simple correctness proof is, for example,
〈ϕ〉M′〈ψ〉
〈true〉M〈ϕ〉
〈true〉M||M′〈ψ〉
A typical assume-guarantee proof, however, will involve system compo-
nentsM,M′ whose behaviour is mutually interdependent, and aim to specify
assumptions to be satisfied byM′ in order to guarantee the correctness ofM
and at the same time, specify assumptions to be satisfied by M in order to
guarantee the correctness of M′. To show that an appropriate combination
of assumed and guaranteed properties of M, M′ guarantees the correctness
of M||M′ might involve an inference of the form (see e.g. [46] p1767)
〈ϕ1〉M1〈ψ1〉
〈ϕ2〉M2〈ψ2〉
ξ1 ∧ ψ1 ⊢ ϕ2
ξ1 ∧ ψ2 ⊢ ϕ1
ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ⊢ ξ2
〈ξ1〉M1||M2〈ξ2〉
This sort of inference can be seen to be potentially circular if used care-
lessly [46]. Pnueli [104] discusses this and suggests indexing formulae with a
well-founded set and allowing a formula to be deduced only from formulae
with “lower” indices.
[46] mentions further discussion of this approach by Stephan Merz [97],
B Josko [76], Long [93], Grumberg and Long [63].
Clark et al. [45] show how inferences such as these can be justified logi-
cally. They focus on systems with properties expressed in ACTL, the “uni-
versal” fragment of CTL which has a semantics over “fair” Kripke structures.
The latter are Kripke structures with an additional family F of sets of states
to define fairness: a run is fair iff at least one set in F is visited infinitely
often by it. The parallel composition construction extends to fair structures
in a natural way. They define M |=F ϕ to mean ϕ is satisfied by the fair
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Kripke structure M, and extend the preorder  of 2.4.2 to version F for
fair structures. This preorder has number of convenient properties:
– MF M′ |= ϕ implies M |= ϕ
– MF M′ implies M||M′′ F M′||M′′
– MF M||M and M||M′ F M
– Parallel composition is associative and commutative up to isomorphism.
– For each ϕ ∈ ACTL there is a tableau or “canonical” model Tϕ such that
M |= ϕ iff MF Tϕ.
From these it is straightforward to render the Pnueli-style inferences il-
lustrated above into ordinary logical inferences from these properties.
3.4.2 Assume-Guarantee Reasoning and Reactive Mod-
ules
This technique for deducing properties of a composite system from properties
of its components is described in T A Henzinger, S Qadeer and S K Rajamani
[70] in terms of a relation P  Q meaning trace containment – all traces or
runs of P are (possible) traces of Q. They describe this relation in terms of
reactive modules, described by R Alur and Henzinger in [12], although the
technique can just as easily be thought of in terms of hybrid automata. It is
useful to think of the relation as “P refines Q” or “P implements Q”: Q is
a specification, P a proposed implementation.
A reactive module P carries a set of variables XP , partitioned into three
subsets: private, interface and external variables. Observable variables are
interface or external and are read by the module; controlled variables are
interface or private and are set by the module. The interface variables are
shared by several modules comprising a system.
Execution proceeds in rounds : the modules making up a system execute
in round-robin fashion. Within a round, the latched values of the variables –
values inherited from the previous round – are denoted x, y, ...; the updated
values (set in the present round, usually by another module in the round-
robin) by primes, x′, y′, ....
A module’s procedures consist of atoms : every controlled variable is con-
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trolled by an atom, which sets its values. An atom is defined by a sequence
of guarded variable updates. Two simple examples from [12] should give the
idea:
module Not
external in:B
interface out:B
atom out awaits in
init update
[] in’ = 0 -> out’ := 1
[] in’ = 1 -> out’ := 0
module Latch
external set,reset:B
interface out:B
private state:B
atom out reads state
[] true -> out’ := state
atom state awaits set, reset, out
[] set’ = 0 ^ reset’ = 0 -> state’ := out’
[] set’ = 1 -> state’ := 1
[] reset’ = 1 -> state’ := 0
Notice each atom corresponds to a controlled variable of the same name;
reads means the atom works with a latched value of the variable; awaits
means it works with an updated value. Clearly reactive modules are modellable
at a lower level by hybrid automata. [12] describes an operational seman-
tics in terms of states (valuations of the variables) and a successor relation
between states, leading to a transition graph. A trace is the restriction to
observable variables of a trajectory in the graph.
In terms of reactive modules, Q is refinable by P iff every interface vari-
able of Q is an interface variable of P , and every external variable of Q is
observable in P ; P  Q iff these conditions are satisfied and every trace of P ,
restricted to Q, is a trace of Q. Q is projection refinable by P iff in addition,
Q has no private variables.
These authors’ assume-guarantee technique has the following outline. We
would like, say, to show P1 ‖ P2  Q, but the state space of P1 ‖ P2 is too
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large. Na¨ıvely, we might show P1  Q, P2  Q and draw our conclusion;
but in practice these are strong premisses: normally P1  Q only in pres-
ence of suitable constraining assumptions about P2. We construct A2, an
abstraction of P2 encapsulating these constraints, and similarly A1, an ab-
stract description of P1, and show P1 ‖ A2  A1 ‖ Q and A1 ‖ P2  Q ‖ A2.
An assume-guarantee theorem allows us to infer P1 ‖ P2  Q from these.
To show P ′ = P1 ‖ A2  A1 ‖ Q = Q′ is still PSPACE-hard in the size of
the state space of Q′; however if the variables of Q′ are all present in P ′ (Q′
is projection refinable by P ′) then the complexity of the check is linear in
the sizes of the state spaces of P ′, Q′. To contrive this, Henzinger et al [70]
introduce a witness module to make explicit the way the hidden (private)
variables of Q′ depend on the state of P ′. Then ([70] proposition 2), Q′ is
projection-refinable by P ′ ‖ W and P ′ ‖ W  Q′ implies P ′  Q′.
The human creativity required is to construct suitable abstraction and
witness modules.
The generalised assume-guarantee rule ([70] proposition 3) runs as follows.
Two reactive modules are said to be compatible is (1) their respective sets
of controlled variables are disjoint, and (2) they do not jointly contain any
cyclic await dependencies. An await dependency of a variable on one or more
others is a dependency of an initial (or new) value of it on the initial (or new)
values of other variables in the same round.
Now, say P = P1 ‖ ... ‖ Pn and say Q = Q1 ‖ ... ‖ Qn, refinable by P
and for i = 1...n, Γi is a composition of compatible Pj, Qk(k 6= i). If Γi  Qi
for i = 1...n then P  Q. To use this, one decomposes Q into suitable
components Q1 ‖ ... ‖ Qn and for each Qi, finds a suitable Γi, hopefully
with a smaller state space than P . In general Γi is a composite of essential
modules, Pj whose interface variables include all those of Qi, and constraining
modules, chosen from Pj, Qk(k 6= i) to make sure external variables of Q are
all observable in Γi. The Qks are a better choice than the Pjs – specification
modules usually have smaller state spaces – but they may not provide enough
constraints on the external variables of Γi and abstraction modules need to
be added to provide these. One then appeals to ([70] proposition 4): If Q is
refinable by P and P  Q ‖ A, then P  Q.
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A detailed account of an application of these propositions is given in [70],
sections 4 and 5.
3.4.3 Assume-Guarantee Reasoning and Timed I/O Au-
tomata
D Kaynar, N Lynch, F Vaandrager and R Segala [78, 77] develop an assume-
guarantee reasoning technique rather similar to this, but formulated in terms
of their timed I/O automata. This work has inspired an assume-guarantee
theorem for UPPAAL timed automata described in chapter 7. Chapter 7
describes some of the detail of the constructions of Kaynar, Lynch et al.;
here an overview of their overall approach is given, in some detail as they
define many interesting concepts and constructions which inform the present
work and possible future work following from it.
These authors start with a fairly standard definition of an (untimed)
automaton, different only in that the set A of action labels is partitioned
into external and internal actions: A = E ∪ H. They develop this into a
structure which they call a “timed automaton”, which incorporates timed
behaviour and is in fact an analogue not of our timed automaton, but rather
of the timed transition system derived from it. This is defined below in §7.2.1
(page 131ff) where we have used the term “KLSV structure” to distinguish
it from our timed automaton.
Interestingly, the KLSV structure focuses on states, i.e. valuations of
variables, with no mention of control locations of an underlying automaton.
A set X of variables is given, and the states are a designated subset Q of
the valuations of X. A state q may change by a discrete action a ∈ E ∪H,
q
a→ q′, or by evolution in time, along a trajectory, a function τ : J → Q
where J is an interval of the time line (usually R) of the form [0, b] or [0, b)
or [0,∞). Sets Θ ⊆ Q of initial states, D ⊆ Q × (E ∪ H) × Q of possible
discrete actions, and T of possible trajectories define the possible executions
of the structure.
A trajectory τ is from q if τ(0) = q. A closed trajectory is one with
domain of the form [0, b] and is from τ(0) to τ(b). An execution fragment
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is an alternating sequence τ0a1τ1a2τ2a3... of trajectories and discrete actions,
starting with a trajectory and running to∞ or else finishing with a trajectory;
the trajectories apart from the last one of a finite fragment are closed and τk
is from ak to ak+1. The execution fragment is closed if the sequence is finite
and the final trajectory is closed. The execution fragment is admissible if,
where τk has domain [0, bk],
∑∞
k=1 bk = ∞, and is zeno this sum converges
to a finite value. An execution is a fragment that starts from a state in Θ.
Kaynar, Lynch et al. define operations for obtain a prefix and a suffix of both
a trajectory and an execution fragment, and for concatenating trajectories,
execution fragments. The set T is required to be closed under taking prefixes,
suffixes and concatenation.
Given an execution (fragment) τ0a1τ1a2τ2a3... one can derive the under-
lying trace (fragment) by restricting valuations at each state to the empty
set of variables, so that only the the amount of time elapsing figures, and
restricting to external actions. If, for instance, action ak drops out of the
sequence, τk, τk+1 are concatenated.
[77] explains that the timed transition system of an automaton of our
type (which the authors call an “Alur-Dill automaton”) can be modelled
with these structures if X includes its clocks plus a variable loc to track
the current location of the automaton. Θ consists just of the valuation that
zeros all clocks and sets loc to the initial location of the automaton. A =
E ∪ H is the action alphabet of the automaton; one can make E = the
automaton actions, H = ∅, or vice versa, or put synchronising actions in E
and internal actions in H. The sets D and T are defined so as to respect
the timed-transition semantics, and to ensure valuations of clocks have unit
rate of change on a trajectory, and that valuations of loc are constant on a
trajectory. See §7.2.2 for more detail.
Implementation relation. Kaynar, Lynch et al. call two structures Ai =
(Xi, Qi,Θi, Ei, Hi,Di, Ti), i = 1, 2 comparable if they have the same external
actions, E1 = E2. In this case, it makes sense compare their external real-
time behaviour as exhibited by traces. Accordingly, they say A1 implements
A2, A1  A2 if the traces (from initial states) of A1 are included among those
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of A2. They show that
• If every closed trace of A1 is in A2 and A2 has finite non-determinism
(Θ2 is finite and for every state x and trace fragment β from x, there
only finitely many states reachable by execution fragments from x
which restrict to β) then A1  A2.
• If every admissible trace of A1 is in A2 and A1 is feasible (from every
state there is an admissible execution fragment) then every closed trace
of A1 is a trace of A2.
• If every admissible trace of A1 is a trace of A2, A1 is feasible and A2
has finite non-determinism, then A1  A2.
Two sorts of simulation are defined in [77]. A forward simulation is
analogous to ours of 2.4.2: a relation R ⊆ Q1×Q2 such that ∀x1 ∈ Θ1∃x2 ∈
Θ2 : (x1, x2) ∈ R, and such that whenever (x1, x2) ∈ R and x1 α1→ y1 is
an execution fragment consisting of either a single discrete action (with a
“point” trajectory at each end) or a single closed trajectory, then there is
a closed execution fragment x2
α2→ y2 with (y1, y2) ∈ R and α2 has the
same trace as α1. It follows as a theorem that whenever (x1, x2) ∈ R, any
trace fragment from x1 is a trace fragment from x2; so that the existence
of a forward simulation from A1 to A2 implies A1  A2. A composition of
forward simulation relations is a forward simulation; a refinement is defined
to be a forward simulation that is functional; a composition of refinements
is a refinement. An isomorphism is a refinement whose inverse is also a
refinement.
A backward simulation from A1 to A2 is defined by [77] to be a total
(∀x1 ∈ Q1∃x2 ∈ Q2 : (x1, x2) ∈ R) relation R ⊆ Q1 × Q2 such that ∀x1 ∈
Θ1∀x2 ∈ Q2 : (x1, x2) ∈ R ⇒ x2 ∈ Θ2, and such that whenever (y1, y2) ∈ R
and x1
α1→ y1 is an execution fragment consisting of either a single discrete
action or a single closed trajectory, then there is a closed execution fragment
x2
α2→ y2 with (x1, x2) ∈ R and α2 has the same trace as α1. Backward
simulations compose as relations, and the existence of a backward simulation
from A1 to A2 implies inclusion of closed traces.
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The authors define a history relation from A1 to A2 as a forward simula-
tion whose inverse is a refinement from A2 to A1 and they explore building
an implementation relationship by adding history variables to A1 to make
A2, so that X1 ⊆ X2, all states in Q2 restrict to states in Q1 and the relation
{(y ↾ X1, y)|y ∈ Q2} is a history relation. Similarly they define a prophecy
relation as a backward simulation whose inverse is a refinement and they ex-
plore building an implementation relationship by adding prophecy variables
in the same way.
Composition. Kaynar, Lynch et al. define a parallel composition of com-
patible structures (disjoint sets of variables, each external action set disjoint
from all other actions) which we describe in detail below in §7.2.3 (page
133ff) where we also show that it respects the parallel composition we have
defined for our timed automata. They show that their construction is sound
with regard to traces: a trace of A1 ‖ A2 projects to a trace of Ai.
They show that
• If A1, A2 have the same external actions and are each compatible with
B, then A1  A2 implies A1 ‖ B  A2 ‖ B.
• If A1, A2 have the same external actions, B1, B2 have the same external
actions, and each Ai compatible with each Bj, then A1  A2, B1  B2
imply A1 ‖ B1  A2 ‖ B2.
• If A1, A2 have the same external actions, B1, B2 have the same external
actions, and each Ai compatible with each Bj, then A1 ‖ B2  A2 ‖ B2,
B1  B2 imply A1 ‖ B1  A2 ‖ B2.
Unfortunately, a desirable “assume-guarantee” result such as, under the
same hypotheses as above, A1 ‖ B2  A2 ‖ B2, A2 ‖ B1  A2 ‖ B2 imply
A1 ‖ B1  A2 ‖ B2 is not possible ([77] gives a counterexample, their pp
62-63) without further assumptions on the environments of the structures,
which the authors address in constructing their “timed I/O automata”.
Kaynar, Lynch et al. define other operations on their structures, such as
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• Hiding, essentially moving a prescribed subset of E to H (the set of
internal actions), which they show is monotonic with respect to their
implementation relation .
• Adding lower and upper time bounds for a task, a designated subset
of E ∪ H to an automaton, resulting in a stucture whose traces are
included among those of the original.
• “Untiming” – quotienting states by a congruence relation to make a
“plain old” automaton. This construction is reminiscent of symbolic
state semantics and they employ it to prove a theorem slightly more
general than that asserting the soundness of of symbolic state semantics
for “Alur-Dill” automata.
Properties. In terms of KLSV structures, a property in [77] is set of ex-
ecution fragments. In particular, a safety property is a set closed under
prefixes and limits, corresponding to a requirement that needs to be main-
tained throughout an execution, and a liveness property P is such that every
closed execution fragment can be concatenated with another to make a frag-
ment ∈ P . The authors say A satisfies a safety property S if S contains
every execution of A, and a liveness property L if L contains every maximal
(with respect to prefix) execution of A. They show that any property which
is both a safety and a liveness property contains all the execution fragments
of A and that any property can be expressed as the intersection of a safety
and a liveness property.
The authors develop a notion of fairness within this framework. If C is
some set of actions of A (C ⊆ E ∪H), and x a state, say C is enabled in x
if ∃a ∈ C∃y ∈ Q : x a→ y, otherwise say C is disabled in x. They define an
execution fragment α to be weakly fair for C if α contains infinitely many
events from C OR α has no suffix in all states of which C is enabled; if α has
the stronger property that C is disabled in all states of some suffix, they say
α is strongly fair for C. The set of strongly fair fragments for C is a liveness
property, as is the set of weakly fair fragments.
They augment their structure: their timed automata with properties are
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pairs (A, P ) consisting of a KLSV structure and a property, the idea being to
focus on executions of A that are in P . They develop a preorder (A1, P1) 
(A2, P2) (the traces of A1 that are in P1 are traces of comparable A2 in P2)
and prove that if P1 is a liveness property, it follows from this that closed
traces of A1 are traces of A2.
Given sets of actions Ci ⊆ Ei ∪ Ai, i = 1, 2, they define a fair forward
simulation from A1 to (comparable) A2 as a relation R ⊆ Q1×Q2 such that
(1): ∀x1 ∈ Θ1∃x2 ∈ Θ2 : (x1, x2) ∈ R and if C1 is disabled in x1, C2 is disabled
in x2; and (2): Whenever (x1, x2) ∈ R and x1 α1→ y1 by either a single action
surrounded by point trajectories or a single closed trajectory, there is a closed
fragment x2
α2→ y2 with the same trace as α1, (y1, y2) ∈ R; and α2 satisfies
certain additional constraints relating enabledness/disabledness of C2 in α2
to enabledness/disabledness of C1 in α1: see [77]. It follows that the sets Li of
strongly fair executions of Ai are liveness properties and (A1, L1)  (A2, L2),
and likewise when Li are the sets of weakly fair executions of Ai.
The authors similarly extend their parallel composition operation. Given
properties Pi of Ai, i = 1, 2, then define P1 ‖ P2 to be the set of fragments of
A1 ‖ A2 which for each i restrict on variables and actions of Ai to fragments
in Pi. Then they define (A1, P1) ‖ (A2, P2) as (A1 ‖ A2, P1 ‖ P2) and extend
previous substitutivity theorems, such as
• When A1, A2 have the same external actions and are each compatible
with B, (A1, P1)  (A2, P2) implies (A1, P1) ‖ (B, Q)  (A2, P2) ‖
(B, Q)
• When A1, A2 have the same external actions and B1, B2 have the same
external actions and each Ai is compatible with each Bj, (A1, P1) 
(A2, P2) and (B1, Q1)  (B2, Q2) imply (A1, P1) ‖ (B1, Q1)  (A2, P2) ‖
(B2, Q2).
Timed I/O Automata Kaynar, Lynch et al. enhance their model by
partitioning the external actions set E into input actions I and output actions
O (H ∪ O comprise the locally controlled actions) and requiring that input
actions are always enabled – ∀x ∈ Q∀a ∈ I∃y : x a→ y – and time passage
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is always enabled – from every state there is a trajectory which is either
defined on [0.∞) or closed, but some locally controlled action is enabled at
the terminal state.
Executions, traces are defined as usual; a TIOA is feasible if the underly-
ing timed automaton structure is, and I/O-feasible if its executions accom-
modate arbitrary input actions at arbitrary times. A TIOA A is progressive
iff there are no zeno fragments of locally controlled actions, and receptive if
it has a progressive strategy – an A′ like A but with a subset of transitions
(D′ ⊆ D) and trajectories (T ′ ⊆ T ). The authors show that a receptive
TIOA is I/O-feasible.
The authors define two TIOAs to be comparable if the underlying struc-
tures are comparable and the O sets coincide and the I sets coincide.  is
then the usual trace-inclusion, and is implied by the existence of a forward
simulation.
Composition of compatible structures A1,A2 is defined as before, with
O = O1 ∪O2 and I = (I1 ∪ I2)−O in the product. Substitutivity results are
derived for TIOA essentially like the bulleted items on page 60 -
• If A1, A2 are comparable TIOA compatible with B, then A1  A2
implies A1 ‖ B  A2 ‖ B.
• If A1, A2 are comparable TIOA, B1, B2 are comparable TIOA, and each
Ai compatible with each Bj, then A1  A2, B1  B2 imply A1 ‖ B1 
A2 ‖ B2.
• If A1, A2 are comparable, B1, B2 are comparable, and each Ai com-
patible with each Bj, then A1 ‖ B2  A2 ‖ B2, B1  B2 imply
A1 ‖ B1  A2 ‖ B2.
Most interestingly, there is now the assume-guarantee theorem that was
not possible with the earlier KLSV structures: if A1, A2 are comparable,
B1, B2 are comparable, and each Ai compatible with each Bj, under certain
additional assumptions (about traces in A2 B2), A1 ‖ B2  A2 ‖ B2, A2 ‖
B1  A2 ‖ B2 imply A1 ‖ B1  A2 ‖ B2. A careful statement of this theorem
appears in §7.3.3.
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There are limitations – for instance an example is given of a composition
of I/O-feasible TIOAs which is not I/O-feasible; but a composition of pro-
gressive TIOAs is progressive and a composition of strategies is a strategy
for the composite.
3.5 Abstraction and Abstraction Refinement
The sections above explore ways of reasoning about models of systems by
way of a simulation or trace containment relation A  A′ and rules for
deducing a such a relation between composite models. Given such a relation,
we can infer any universally quantified property (expressible, say, in ACTL
or ACTL*) of A from that same property of A′.
What is needed to complement this is a method for generating abstract
models. Suppose it is wished to check a property ϕ, a formula in ACTL* of
the form ∀ψ, over a model A. The present section explores an approach to
generating an abstraction of A – a model A′ such that A  A′ – and in the
event that ϕ fails in A′, of determining whether the trace in A′ providing the
counterexample corresponds to a counterexample to ϕ in A, or whether it
is a spurious counterexample, an artefact of the abstraction that produced
A′. In the latter case, the approach derives a refinement of the abstraction
tailored to eliminating the counterexample.
This approach, accordingly called counterexample-guided abstraction re-
finement (CEGAR) is developed by E Clarke, O Grumberg, S Jha, Y Lu and
H Veith in [44].
These authors develop the method with reference to Kripke structures –
see §§ 2.1.2, 2.3.1.
3.5.1 Programs and Existential Abstraction
Clark et al. derive their Kripke structures from “concurrent programs”. A
program consists of a set of variables {v1, ..., vn}, variable vi having a domain
Di. The Cartesian product S = D1 × ... × Dn forms the state space of the
Kripke structure.
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Arithmetic expressions are formed of arithmetic operators, variables and
constants from the Di; atomic formulae from expressions and relation sym-
bols (<,≤,=,≥, > etc) and predicates from boolean combinations of atomic
formulae. If d = (d1, ..., dn) ∈ S and ϕ is a predicate, d |= ϕ means ϕ holds
when (for each i) di is substituted for vi.
A “concurrent program” is formed by, for each i, a transition block de-
scribing the evolution of values of vi:
init(vi) := Ii
next(vi) := case
C1i : A
1
i
· · ·
Cmi : A
m
i
esac
where Ii ⊆ Di, declaring the possible initial values of vi, the Cki (k =
1...m) are predicates and the Aki expressions. The A
k
i describe changes of
state guarded by Cki .
The derived Kripke structure (S, I, R, L) has initial state set I = I1 ×
... × In and the transition relation R ⊆ S × S derived from the next(vi)
clauses. Recall that L is a function which associates with each state a set
of predicates “true there”. In the present case, assuming in addition to the
program a predicate ϕ to be checked, L(d) (d ∈ S) is the subset of “atoms of
the program” (atomic formulae which occur positively or negatively in the
Cki or in ϕ) α such that d |= α.
Clark et al. define an existential abstraction of such a program or Kripke
model in terms of a surjective function on the set of states S. Equivalently,
this can be defined as an equivalence relation ≡ on S. The abstraction of
M = (S, I, R, L) is then defined as a Kripke structure Mˆ with state set
Sˆ = S/ ≡ = {sˆ : s ∈ S}2. The initial states of the abstraction are Iˆ = I/ ≡
and the abstract transition relation Rˆ = {(sˆ, tˆ) ∈ Sˆ × Sˆ : R(s, t)}. The
abstract labelling function is
2sˆ , {s′ ∈ S : s ≡ s′}, the ≡-equivalence class determined by s.
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Lˆ(sˆ) =
⋃
s′∈sˆ
L(s′)
It is assumed that the abstraction relation ≡ is appropriate for ϕ in
that related states agree as to the truth of all sub-formulae of ϕ. Lˆ labels
abstract states consistently. This assumption guarantees that the abstraction
produces no “false positives”; it simulates the base model – M  M′ and
M′ |= ϕ⇒M |= ϕ.
3.5.2 Generating an Abstraction
For any set F of formulae, an equivalence relation between states is defined
by s ≡F t iff for every ψ ∈ F , s |= ψ ⇔ t |= ψ. Given a concurrent program P
and specification to be checked, ϕ, Clarke et al. define an initial abstraction
relation relative to the atoms of P, ϕ: s ≡init t iff for every atom α of P, ϕ,
s |= α⇔ t |= α.
Clarke et al. ([44], §4.2) state that whereas there are many possible
equivalence relations on S = D1× ...×Dn, hence many possible abstractions
of the initial model, the “interesting” ones are generally made component-
wise. The most extreme way of doing this is by constructing the equivalence
from component equivalences ≡i on Di i = 1...n; (d1, ..., dn) ≡ (e1, ...., en) iff∧n
i=1 di ≡i ei.
They explore a generalisation of this based on what they call formula
clusters and variable clusters. They say that two formulae interfere if they
have a variable in common. The formula clusters are the equivalence classes
of the reflexive transitive closure of the interference relation between atoms.
They then define vi ≡ vj iff the variables appear in atomic formulae in the
same formula cluster; the variable clusters are the equivalence classes of this
relation.
Where F1, ..., Fm are the formula clusters and V1, ..., Vm the variable clus-
ters so defined, let Sk ,
∏
i:vi∈Vk
Di. An equivalence is defined on Sk: for
d, e ∈ Sk, d ≡k e iff
∧
α∈Fk
(d |= α ⇔ e |= α). These equivalences, by con-
struction, “glue together” to make an equivalence relation on the full state
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space S.
Clarke et al. show ([44], §4.2.3, their theorem 4.8) that the abstraction
induced by this equivalence relation is isomorphic to the abstraction defined
by the relation ≡init defined above, at the beginning of this subsection.
They also remark that it is in general computationally cheaper for a
model-checking software tool to compute an over-approximation to the ab-
straction: M˜ = (S˜, I˜ , R˜, L˜) where S˜ = Sˆ, L˜ = Lˆ, but I˜ ⊇ Iˆ, R˜ ⊇ Rˆ. This in
general coarsens the abstraction: M  Mˆ  M˜ but this is not a problem and
the next stage of their technique is iterated refinement of the abstraction.
3.5.3 Spurious Counterexamples
When M  Mˆ and Mˆ |= ϕ one can infer M |= ϕ assuming ϕ is universally
quantified – e.g. an ACTL* formula. However, if Mˆ 6|= ϕ, the counterexample
trace in Mˆ may be spurious, not corresponding to a counterexample in M.
Clarke et al. show that such spuriousness arises as follows.
The abstract trace will have the form sˆ0, sˆ1, ..., sˆN , a finite sequence of
equivalence classes on concrete states, where (∀i < N)(sˆi, sˆi+1) ∈ Rˆ. Now, Rˆ
relates abstract states sˆ, tˆ whenever they, as equivalence classes, have mem-
bers s′ ∈ sˆ, t′ ∈ tˆ related by R.
b
i
ts
s^ t^d^
d
Figure 3.2: Part of a spurious counterexample
It is possible, therefore that the counterexample contains a sequence sˆ, dˆ, tˆ
like that depicted in figure 3.2. The ovals represent abstract states (equiva-
lence classes of concrete states) and the arrows denote related concrete states:
for instance, s → d indicates (s, d) ∈ R. State d has transition to it but no
transitions from it: it is a dead-end state. The abstract trace sˆ → dˆ → tˆ is
possible because there exists a state b ∈ dˆ (i.e. b ≡ d) with a transition to a
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state t ∈ tˆ.
State b is a bad state. It raises the possibility of a transition sequence
sˆ → dˆ → tˆ corresponding to no transition sequence s′ → d′ → t′ between
concrete states s ∈ sˆ, d ∈ dˆ, t ∈ tˆ. The trace is spurious because of the
existence of a bad state in the same equivalence class as a dead-end state,
spuriously connecting two execution sequences which would be disconnected
in the concrete model.
State i is an irrelevant state – its existence and relatedness to other states
is neither “good” nor “bad” for the counterexample.
Clark et al. argue ([44], §3) that such a spurious counterexample can be
eliminated by refining the abstraction relation by splitting the equivalence
class that contains the dead-end and the bad state, so that these states end
up in different equivalence classes. In the method they develop this process
is iterated until ϕ is verified, or until a counterexample is found that is not
spurious, and can be pulled back into the concrete model.
The authors develop algorithms for identifying spurious counterexam-
ples, implementable (using data representations such as OBDDs) in model-
checking software. Their lemma 4.10 [44] shows that an abstract counterex-
ample (sˆ1, ..., sˆn) corresponds to a concrete counterexample (s1, ..., sn)
3 iff
the sets Σ1, ...,Σn of concrete states defined recursively by Σ1 = sˆ1 ∩ I,
Σi = sˆi ∩ R(Σi−1) are all non-empty4. Indeed, when (sˆ1, ..., sˆn) does cor-
respond to an concrete path (s1, ..., sn) which is a counterexample, si ∈ Σi
for i = 1, ..., n while conversely if all the Σi are non-empty, a concrete coun-
terexample can be constructed by starting with a state in Σn and working
backwards inductively: from si ∈ Σi = sˆi ∩R(Σi−1) we infer an R-pre image
si−1 ∈ Σi−1 ⊆ sˆi−1 and so build up (s1, ..., sn).
Their algorithm SplitPATH ([44], §4.3.1) is based on this. Given a finite
3s1 ∈ I; for i = 2, ..., n (si−1, si) ∈ R; si ∈ sˆi, i.e. sˆi is the equivalence class determined
by si;
4R(Σ) , {s ∈ S : ∃t ∈ Σ : R(t, s)}, the image under R of Σ.
3.5. ABSTRACTION AND ABSTRACTION REFINEMENT 69
abstract path (sˆ1, ..., sˆn) in Mˆ,
Σ := sˆ1 ∩ I
i = 1
while(Σ 6= ∅ ∧ i < n)
i := i+ 1
Σprev := Σ
Σ := R(Σ) ∩ sˆi
if (Σ 6= ∅) output “counterexample exists”
else output i,Σprev
The algorithm computes whether there is a concrete path (s′1, ..., s
′
n) in
M which maps to the abstract path5: From their lemma 4.10 [44], Clarke
et al. deduce that if the counterexample is spurious, SplitPATH terminates
with the smallest i for which the set Σ is empty, and Σprev contains dead-
end states, for in this case Σ is an empty Σi in the notation of the previous
paragraph, and Σprev is the corresponding Σi−1.
Before seeing how these data are used, they consider the alternative pos-
sibility that the abstract counterexample is a loop: (sˆ1, ..., sˆk)(sˆk+1, ..., sˆn)
∗.
Their analysis of this possibility shows ([44], §4.3.2) that the loop portion of
it needs to be “unwound” at most a polynomial number of times and that
the abstract counterexample pulls back to a concrete counterexample or is
spurious according to whether the “unwound” finite trace does/is.
Their algorithm SplitLOOP does this. First the minimum of the sizes
of the equivalence classes sˆk+1, ..., sˆn is computed, then (this minimum + 1)
unwindings of the abstract loop counterexample is computed and SplitPATH
applied to the result. If this yields a concrete counterexample this result
is returned. Otherwise, SplitPATH has returned an index number i and the
dead-end set Σprev. Indices in the original loop counterexample corresponding
to i, i+ 1 are computed and returned along with Σprev.
Iterated abstraction refinement follows these steps.
5(∀i)s′i ∈ sˆi and (∀i < n)(s′i, s′i+1) ∈ R
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3.5.4 Refining the Abstraction
Algorithm SplitPATH returns, in the case of a spurious counterexample, a set
Σprev of dead-end (concrete) states reachable (compatibly with the abstract
trace) from I. It also returns the index number i of a state sˆi of the abstract
trace, such that Σprev ⊆ sˆi−1 but R(Σprev) ∩ sˆi = ∅. There is, however, an
abstract transition Rˆ : sˆi−1 → sˆi (spurious!), so the set ΣB , {s ∈ sˆi−1 :
∃s′ ∈ sˆi : (s, s′) ∈ R} is non-empty
This subset of sˆi−1 is a set of bad states and is disjoint from ΣD , Σprev,
a set of dead-end states. Defining ΣI , sˆi−1 − ΣD − ΣB yields a partition
sˆi−1 = ΣD ⊔ ΣB ⊔ ΣI .
The aim of the refinement step is to find the coarsest refinement of the
abstraction relation ≡ which separates ΣD,ΣB.
Recalling that the concrete state space S has the form D1× ...×Dn, the
set of n-tuples of values of the variables, Clark et al. express the relation ≡ as
a “composite” of equivalence relations ≡i on Di (i.e., (d1, ..., dn) ≡ (e1, ..., en)
iff
∧n
i=1 di ≡i ei) and write the equivalence class sˆi−1 to be split as a product
E1 × ... × En of ≡i-equivalence classes. They then give a polynomial-time
algorithm PolyRefine to construct a refinement ≡′i of each ≡i:
for (i := 1 to m)
≡′i := ≡i
for (a, b ∈ Ei)
if (proj(ΣD, i, a) 6= proj(ΣD, i, b))
≡′i := ≡′i −{(a, b)}
Here, proj(ΣD, i, a) denotes the set of (n − 1)-tuples which yield an n-
tuple in ΣD when a is inserted in position i. Clarke et al. show ([44], lemma
4.19 and corollaries) that the relation ≡′ made by composing the ≡′i is an
equivalence relation on states S, is a refinement of ≡, and is the coarsest one
which separates ΣD and ΣB. It does in fact separate ΣD from ΣB ∪ ΣI .
The refinement procedure for a loop counterexample is analogous. The
refinement procedure is performed repeatedly until either a concrete coun-
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terexample is found or the property ϕ is verified. Partitioning must terminate
because every equivalence class contain at least one element.
The method described here was developed by Clark et al. for implemen-
tation in a software tool using symbolic states and OBDDs; but it will be
interesting to investigate how aspects of the method may be used to refine
our compositional models.
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Chapter 4
bCANdle
This chapter gives, for convenient reference, the key definitions of bCANdle,
[79], a framework for modelling broadcasting embedded systems as timed
transition systems. The following two chapters will develop from this a se-
mantically equivalent compositional modelling framework.
A bCANdle system comprises three components: a data model, a com-
munication model, and a process model.
4.1 The Data Model
Fix V , a set of data values, and Var , a (finite) set of data variables.
• A valuation is a total mapping V ar −→ V .
• An operation is a binary relation between valuations, total but not
necessarily one-to-one. (Operations need not be deterministic.)
• A predicate is a set of valuations.
Given, in addition to V ar, finite sets Ω of operation names and Γ of predi-
cate names, a data environment over V ar,Ω,Γ is a tuple
D = (type, op, pred, val) where
• typemaps each variable name to a subset of V . If x ∈ V ar, type(x) ⊆ V
is the “universe” of values of x.
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• op maps each operation name to an operation. If ω ∈ Ω, op(ω) ⊆
V V ar × V V ar.
• pred maps each predicate name to a set of valuations. For γ ∈ Γ,
pred(γ) ⊆ V V ar is the “extension” of γ.
• val : V ar −→ V gives each x ∈ V ar its “current” value: val(x) ∈
type(x).
If the data environment needs to be made explicit, one writes D.type,
D.op, etc. For x ∈ V ar, D.x is an abbreviation for D.val(x).
D[x := v] denotes a data environment D′ like D except D′.x = v; i.e.
D′.y = D.y for all y ∈ V ar − {x}.
For ω ∈ Ω, the notation D ω−→d D′ defines a relation describing how a
data environment may evolve: it denotes the condition D.type = D′.type ∧
D.op = D′.op ∧ D.pred = D′.pred ∧ (D.val,D′.val) ∈ D.op(ω). In short,
D
ω−→d D′ says that D′ is “D after operation ω has run”.
Ω contains a symbol ID which is always interpreted as the identity rela-
tion between valuations.
For γ ∈ Γ, D |= γ abbreviates D.val ∈ D.pred(γ).
Two data environments are compatible if they agree apart possibly from
their val components.
4.2 The Network Model
This section describes an abstract representation of a controller area network
as described in §3.1.
A (CAN) network consists of a number of broadcast channels through
which messages pass.
Assume given a finite set I of message identifiers and a finite set V of data
values. The identifiers correspond to the arbitration bits of a physical CAN
frame – they express message priority as far as medium access is concerned
while, from the point of view of application software, they can be thought off
as identifying message type. The data values correspond to the data payload
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of the CAN frame. In the present abstract formulation, a message is defined
formally as pair (i, v), i ∈ I, v ∈ V ; this is also denoted i.v. I is presumed
to be equipped with a strict total ordering i 4 i′ defining priority ordering
between messages. m = (i, v) 4 (i′, v′) = m′ iff i 4 i′.
A message in transit has an early pre-acceptance phase during which the
sender is negotiating for access to the network medium, followed by a post-
acceptance phase during which the message is “in” the medium and available
to receivers. The acceptance point is the boundary between these phases.
✲
time
acceptancestart channel free
pre-acceptance post-acceptance
The transmission latency is the elapsed time from the start of transmis-
sion until the channel is free again. A transmission latency function assigns
to a message m = i.v a vector of four real numbers δ(m) = (l, u, L, U), which
are time bounds on the durations of the phases: l ≤ preacceptance ≤ u,
L ≤ postacceptance ≤ U .
A channel delivers messages. Let M be a set of messages and δ a trans-
mission latency function as above. A channel, at any time, has a status,
denoted by one of the following symbols:
• ↓ - the channel is free;
• t1,t2❀ m - the channel is in pre-acceptance phase ofm, with lower bound t1
and upper bound t2 on time to completion (m ∈M, 0 ≤ t1 ≤ l(m), 0 ≤
t2 ≤ u(m), t2 − t1 ≤ u(m)− l(m) with equality when t1 > 0);
• ↑ m - the channel at acceptance point of message m;
• m t1,t2❀ - channel is in post-acceptance phase of m, with lower bound t1
and upper bound t2 on time to completion (m ∈M, 0 ≤ t1 ≤ L(m), 0 ≤
t2 ≤ U(m), t2 − t1 ≤ U(m)− L(m) with equality when t1 > 0);
A message queue is a sequence of messages in priority order: j < k
implies mj ≺ mj and (when j 6= k) mj,mk have distinct identifier (type)
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values. There is thus at most one message in a queue with a given identifier
value. Since I is finite, it follows that a queue always has finite length. The
notation m : u denotes a queue which is u with message m at the “head”
and u as the “tail”.
A message may be inserted into a queue: if u is a message queue and i.v
a message, u" i.v is the queue state which is the result of inserting i.v into
u in correct position (overwriting any message with identifier i already in u).
To summarise, a channel is a set of messages with a priority ordering, a
latency function, a status as defined above, and a message queue. While the
other components are fixed, the status s and queue u are dynamic, varying
as the system evolves: so the channel may simply be denoted (s, u).
A network N is an indexed set of channels, Nk : k ∈ K. The notation
N [k := η] denotes an updated network N ′ such that N ′k = η and N
′
j for j 6= k.
Network behaviour can now be defined by means of a relation −→n. A
network N (a set of channels each in particular state) may evolve into N ′
on passage of an interval of time t ∈ R: this is denoted N t−→n N ′. N may
evolve into N ′ on the occurrence of a discrete action a: denoted N
a−→n N ′.
The set An of discrete actions consists of the union of the following, where K
indexes the channels of the network, I is the set of message identifiers, and
V the set of data values.
• { k ❀ i.v : k ∈ K, i ∈ I, v ∈ V } - enter pre-acceptance phase of
message i.v on channel k;
• { k ↑ i.v : k ∈ K, i ∈ I, v ∈ V } - acceptance of message i.v in channel
k;
• { i.v ❀ k : k ∈ K, i ∈ I, v ∈ V } - enter post-acceptance phase of
message i.v on channel k;
• { k ↓: k ∈ K } - channel k becomes free;
Changes of network state, N −→n N ′, resulting from these discrete ac-
tions, are now defined precisely by the following rules of inference.
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Nk = (↓,m : u)
N
k❀m−→n N [k := (l(m),u(m)❀ m,u)]
(N1)
If Nk is a free channel with a non-empty queue, the network may enter the
pre-acceptance phase on channel k, de-queuing the message.
Nk = (
0,t
❀ m,u)
N
k↑m−→n N [k := (↑ m,u)]
(N2)
When the lower bound on time to completion of the pre-acceptance phase of
transmission of a message becomes 0, the network may accept it.
Nk = (↑ m,u)
N
m❀k−→n N [k := (m L(m),U(m)❀ , u)]
(N3)
From the state of acceptance of message m, channel k may enter the post-
acceptance phase, with bounds L(m), U(m) on time to completion.
Nk = (m
0,t
❀, u)
N
k↓−→n N [k := (↓, u)]
(N4)
When the lower bound on time to completion of the post-acceptance phase
of transmission of a message becomes 0, the channel may become free.
These four rules specify the changes of state of a network effected by the
four types of discrete action. It remains to to provide a rule for change of
state due to passage of time.
To assist in formulating his rule, let tcp(s, u) denote the maximum time
progress allowed to a channel in state (s, u). tcp(↓, u) = ∞ if queue u
is empty, otherwise 0. For t0, t ∈ R, tcp(t0,t❀ m,u) = tcp(m t0,t❀, u) = t.
Lastly, tcp(↑ m,u) = 0. For a complete network state N , define tcp(N) =
minktcp(Nk).
The effect of time progress is to transform a channel state (s, u) to a state
(s, u) + t defined thus:
• (↓, u) + t = (↓, u) if u is empty or if t = 0; otherwise it is undefined ;
• (t1,t2❀ m,u) + t = (t
′
1
,t′
2
❀ m,u) if t ≤ t2; otherwise it is undefined;
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t′1 = max(t1 − t, 0) and t′2 = t2 − t;
• (↑ m,u) + t = (↑ m,u) if t = 0, otherwise it is undefined;
• (m t1,t2❀ , u) + t = (m t
′
1
,t′
2
❀ , u) if t ≤ t2; otherwise it is undefined;
t′1 = max(t1 − t, 0) and t′2 = t2 − t.
Time progress for a network is just time progress for all its channels,
where defined. For those k ∈ K for which the right hand side is defined,
(N + t)k = Nk + t.
We can now formulate the passage-of-time rule:
∀k ∈ K : 0 ≤ t ≤ tcp(Nk)
N
t−→n N + t
(N5)
4.3 The Process Model
A bCANdle process is described by a simple process-algebraic language. As-
sume given a network model supplying a set K of channel identifiers and a
set I of message identifiers; and also a data model which supplies sets V ar of
variables, Ω of operation names, Γ of predicates, as explained in the previous
subsections. Assume also a countable set of process variables.
A process term is one of the following.
• k!i.x
where k ∈ K, i ∈ I, x ∈ V ar. This denotes a process which causes a
message i.val(x) to be queued instantly for sending on channel k, and
then terminates.
• k?i.x
where k ∈ K, i ∈ I, x ∈ V ar. This denotes a process which waits for
a message with identifier i to reach its acceptance point on channel k;
then the data is associated with x and the process terminates.
• [ω : t1, t2]
where ω ∈ Ω, t1, t2 ∈ R∪{∞}. This is a process which performs a data
operation; t1, t2 are lower and upper bounds on its computation time.
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• γ → P
where γ ∈ Γ and P is a process term. This is to be interpreted as the
process which evaluates the guard γ then if true, performs P .
• P ;P ′
where P and P ′ are process terms: the process which performs P then
(when P terminated) performs P ′.
• P + P ′
where P and P ′ are process terms: the process which chooses non-
deterministically to behave either as P or as P ′.
• P [> P ′
where P and P ′ are process terms. This process behaves as P to begin
with but P ′ may interrupt it at any time before it terminates, in which
case P is aborted and P ′ runs with the network and data state inherited
from P .
• P |P ′
where P and P ′ are process terms: the process consisting of P and P ′
running in parallel.
• X
a process variable.
• recX.P
where X is a process variable and P a process term. This captures the
idea of a recursive process, as explained below. If X is a free variable in
the term P , then the quantifier recX binds it, and it will be seen that
recX.P is in a sense equivalent to the result of substituting recX.P for
X in P .
The semantics of these process terms is given by a body of formal rules,
to be described shortly. The symbols for combining process terms bind in
order of precedence as follows: →(high), ;, +, [>, rec, |(low). Combinators of
equal precendence associate to the left. Parentheses may be used to override
this precedence.
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Operational Semantics of bCANdle A formal model - a bCANdle sys-
tem - is defined to be a triple (P,N,D) consisting of a process term, a network
and a data environment. These are assumed to agree on channel identifiers,
message identifiers, data variables, operation and predicate names. It is also
assumed that if P has a subterm k!i.x, then the network semantic rules will
accommodate this: whenever v ∈ D.type(x), then i.v ∈ the message set of
Nk. Similarly, it is assumed that if P includes the subterm k?i.x, any message
i.v receivable by N (i.e., in the message set of Nk) has v ∈ D.type(x).
The operational semantics of bCANdle is defined in terms of a labelled
transition system whose states are all bCANdle triples (P,N,D) over given
K, I, V ar,Ω,Γ. Transitions between these states, (P,N,D)
λ−→ (P ′, N ′, D′)
are labelled by three kinds of labels λ:
• time passage: t ∈ R = {t ∈ R : t ≥ 0};
• a network action λn ∈ An as defined in the previous subsection;
• a process action label λp ∈ Ap = Ω ∪ Γ ∪ {k!i.v : k ∈ K ∧ i ∈ I ∧ v ∈
V } ∪ {k?i.v : k ∈ K ∧ i ∈ I ∧ v ∈ V }. The process actions are thus:
computations, evaluation of guards, data sends, data receives.
The timed transition system of a bCANdle system (P0, N0, D0) is defined
to be that part of the labelled transition system that is reachable from the
initial state (P0, N0, D0).
The transition relation is the smallest set closed under the rule
(
√
, N,D)
0−→ (√, N,D)
(P-)
and also rules set out below.
√
denotes an “ideal” process term - a
process which has nothing to do except terminate1. Variable λn ranges over
network discrete actions An, t ranges over times R≥0; λnt over network actions
An∪R≥0; λp over process actions as just described; and λ over Ap∪An∪R≥0.
1cf [79], pp197-8
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4.3.1 Rules for Atomic Process Terms
Nk = (s, u) ∧ v = D.x
(k!i.x,N,D)
k!i.v−→ (√, N [k := (s, u" i.v)], D)
(Snd 1)
N
λn−→n N ′
(k!i.x,N,D)
λn−→ (k!i.x,N ′, D)
(Snd 2)
(k!i.x,N,D)
0−→ (k!i.x,N,D)
(Snd 3)
Nk = (↑ i.v, u)
(k?i.x,N,D)
k?i.v−→ (√, N,D[x := v])
(Rcv 1)
N
λn−→n N ′ ∧ (∀v∀u.Nk 6= (↑ i.v, u) ∨Nk = N ′k)
(k?i.x,N,D)
λn−→ (k?i.x,N ′, D)
(Rcv 2)
N
t−→n N ′
(k?i.x,N,D)
t−→ (k?i.x,N ′, D)
(Rcv 3)
D
ω−→d D′
([ω : 0, t], N,D)
ω−→ (√, N,D′) (Comp 1)
N
λn−→n N ′
([ω : t1, t2], N,D)
λn−→ ([ω : t1, t2], N ′, D)
(Comp 2)
N
t−→n N ′ ∧ t ≤ t2
([ω : t1, t2], N,D)
t−→ ([ω : t′1, t′2], N ′, D)
(Comp 3)
where t′1 = max(0, t1 − t) and t′2 = t2 − t
4.3.2 Rules for Guard
D |= γ
(γ → P,N,D) γ−→ (P,N,D)
(Gu 1)
N
λn−→n N ′
(γ → P,N,D) λn−→ (γ → P,N ′, D)
(Gu 2)
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N
t−→n N ′ ∧ (D 2 γ ∨ t = 0)
(γ → P,N,D) t−→ (γ → P,N ′, D)
(Gu 3)
4.3.3 Rules for Sequential Composition
(P,N,D)
λ−→ (P ′, N ′, D′) ∧ ¬(P ′ ≡ √)
(P ;Q,N,D)
λ−→ (P ′;Q,N ′, D′)
(Seq 1)
(P,N,D)
λp−→ (√, N ′, D′)
(P ;Q,N,D)
λp−→ (Q,N ′, D′)
(Seq 2)
4.3.4 Choice
(P,N,D)
λp−→ (P ′, N ′, D′)
(P +Q,N,D)
λp−→ (P ′, N ′, D′)
(Ch 1)
(Q,N,D)
λp−→ (Q′, N ′, D′)
(P +Q,N,D)
λp−→ (Q′, N ′, D′)
(Ch 2)
(P,N,D)
λnt−→ (P ′, N ′, D) ∧ (Q,N,D) λnt−→ (Q′, N ′, D)
(P +Q,N,D)
λnt−→ (P ′ +Q′, N ′, D)
(Ch 3)
4.3.5 Recursion
Where P [Q/X] means the process term resulting from uniform substitution
of the term Q for the process variable X,
(P [recX.P/X], N,D)
λ−→ (P ′, N ′, D′)
(recX.P,N,D)
λ−→ (P ′, N ′, D′)
(Rec)
4.3.6 Interrupt
(P,N,D)
λp−→ (P ′, N ′, D′) ∧ ¬(P ′ ≡ √)
(P [> Q,N,D)
λp−→ (P ′[> Q,N ′, D′)
(Int 1)
4.3. THE PROCESS MODEL 83
(P,N,D)
λp−→ (√, N ′, D′)
(P [> Q,N,D)
λp−→ (√, N ′, D′)
(Int 2)
(Q,N,D)
λp−→ (Q′, N ′, D′)
(P [> Q,N,D)
λp−→ (Q′, N ′, D′)
(Int 3)
(P,N,D)
λnt−→ (P ′, N ′, D) ∧ (Q,N,D) λnt−→ (Q′, N ′, D)
(P [> Q,N,D)
λnt−→ (P ′[> Q′, N ′, D)
(Int 4)
4.3.7 Parallel Composition
(P,N,D)
λp−→ (P ′, N ′, D′) ∧ ¬(P ′ ≡ √)
(P |Q,N,D) λp−→ (P ′|Q,N ′, D′)
(Par 1)
(P,N,D)
λp−→ (√, N ′, D′)
(P |Q,N,D) λp−→ (Q,N ′, D′)
(Par 2)
(Q,N,D)
λp−→ (Q′, N ′, D′) ∧ ¬(Q′ ≡ √)
(P |Q,N,D) λp−→ (P |Q′, N ′, D′)
(Par 3)
(Q,N,D)
λp−→ (√, N ′, D′)
(P |Q,N,D) λp−→ (P,N ′, D′)
(Par 4)
(P,N,D)
λnt−→ (P ′, N ′, D) ∧ (Q,N,D) λnt−→ (Q′, N ′, D)
(P |Q,N,D) λnt−→ (P ′|Q′, N ′, D)
(Par 5)
4.3.8 A Note on Recursion
The process term recX.P captures the idea of a recursive process. If X
is a free variable in the term P , then the quantifier recX binds it, and
recX.P represents is a process that is “equivalent” to the result of substi-
tuting recX.P uniformly for X in P . This is effectively the meaning of rule
(Rec) and the “equivalence” can be formally derived from this rule as a strong
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bisimulation.
To see how this captures the the idea of recursion, think of a process which
iterates an action a (a computation [ω : t1, t2] for instance). This could be
defined as “A where A , a;A”: a recursive definition, since A appears in the
right hand side. In terms of the present formalism, this recursively defined
iterating process would be written recA.(a;A). The equivalence then asserts
that this process is equivalent to a;recA.(a;A) which has just the semantics
needed for iterating a.
Similarly, a process A which iterates actions a, b alternately, in an endless
loop would be defined recursively by means of a pair of equations:
A , a;B
B , b;A
A is defined to be a process which consists in doing a then behaving like B,
while B consists in doing b then behaving like A. A is succinctly defined to
be recA.(a; recB.(b;A)).
The rec construct essentially presents recursion as a “fixed point” in the
sense that R Milner explains in [98], p 57.
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4.3.9 Equational Laws
Following Milner [98], bCANDle process terms can be given an “equational”
presentation ([79]):
P +Q = Q+ P (+1)
P + (Q+R) = (P +Q) +R (+2)
P + P = P (+4)
P + idle = P (+5)
P ; (Q;R) = (P ;Q);R (;1)
(P +Q);R = P ;R +Q;R (;2)
idle;P = idle (;3)
idle[> P = P (I1)
P [> idle = P (I2)
P [> (Q[> R) = (P [> Q)[> R (I3)
P |Q = Q|P (P1)
P |(Q|R) = (P |Q)|R (P2)
P |idle = P if P is persistent (P3)
recX.P = P [recX.P/X] (R1)
P [Q/X] = Q, X guarded in P ⇒ recX.P = Q (R2)
Here, idle , [ID : ∞,∞] where ID ∈ Ω is a symbol for an operation
that does nothing; thus idle is a process that does nothing, indefinitely!
X guarded in P means that process variable X occurs in P in subterm(s)
of the form P1;P2 where the occurrence of X is in P2 and P1 is guarding –
that is, P1 is atomic or is a sequence of parallel composite of terms one of
which is guarding, or is a “+” or “[>” combination of terms which are both
guarding.
The point of the set of equational laws is that one can define a relation
⊢ P = Q meaning “equality of P, Q is derivable from the equational laws”.
This gives a notion of “equality” of process terms beyond syntactic identity,
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which is sound : ⊢ P = Q implies that P, Q are semantically equivalent in a
sense which will be made precise in the discussion of strong bisimulation and
strong equivalence below.
Chapter 5
Modelling bCANdle with
Automata
5.1 Introduction
Having defined a timed transition system semantics for bCANdle as outlined
above, Kendall developed a formalism for representing a bCANdle system as
a timed automaton and showed this automaton’s semantics to be strongly
equivalent to it. This construction is monolithic and computationally expen-
sive. The automaton constructed from a bCANdle system does not naturally
resolve into components and is apt to have a very large state spece.
The present chapter develops an adaptation of this formalism in which
the CAN network channels are modelled as timed automata and these com-
posed in parallel with automata representing process terms and associated
data. This will facilitate a compositional view of the CAN-based system, so
mitigating the state space explosion problem.
First, an overview of the model checking tool UPPAAL, and the extended
timed automata modelled by UPPAAL is presented; then an UPPAAL model
of a CAN channel is presented, followed by a simple examples of its use.
After this a mapping of bCANdle systems to parallel products of timed
automata is developed, and shown to induce a strong bisimulation between
the timed transition systems of the two formalisms. Thus, the models de-
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veloped in this chapter are semantically equivalent to the bCANdle models
from which they are derived: they exhibit equivalent behaviour.
5.2 UPPAAL and Timed Automata
Once we have developed a model of bCANdle as a parallel product of timed
automata, we wish to be able to check its properties. The UPPAAL tool
has turned out to be useful for this as it supports all the timed-automata
constructs, in the extended sense of §2.2.4. A recent tutorial overview of
UPPAAL is given by G Behrmann, A David and K G Larsen [19] (updating
earlier accounts [50][89]) and a discussion of its theoretical underpinnings
by J Bengtsson and W Yi [23]. Parallel products of timed automata are
programmable as UPPAAL systems in a natural way. In this section we
review UPPAAL syntax and semantics. This mirrors the time-automata
semantics faithfully: we need to see that a UPPAAL system simulates a
parallel product of timed automata in the sense of §2.4.2.
5.2.1 UPPAAL Syntax
This is given in full in the “help” that comes with the UPPAAL tool. The
following summary deals with the small subset of UPPAAL features employed
in the present work.
An UPPAAL system comprises three sections.
• First, a section of global declarations: variables and constants scoped
over the whole system are declared using a C++-like syntax (for in-
stance, const int a = 5;). User-defined types and functions may also
be declared although these will not play a role in the present investi-
gation.
Arrays and structs may also be declared and optionally initialised,
again with C++ style syntax: for example, int b[3] = {3, 5, 7};
for an array of three integers.
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Subranges of integer type may be declared: for example int[0,9] n;
is an integer variable with values in the range 0 to 9.
clock x; simply declares a clock variable. It is initialised to 0 at the
beginning of a run and whenever a transition calls for it to be reset.
chan ch; declares a binary channel. Edges in two automata can be
then given respective synchronisation labels ch!, ch?, forcing them to
synchronise, producing a joint or “rendez-vous” transition just as in
the definition of the parallel product of timed automata. A channel
may be declared urgent, slightly altering the semantics (see below).
A broadcast channel may be used to provide one-to-many synchro-
nisation: one edge is labelled ch! and two or more may be labelled
ch?.
• The second section comprises one or more process templates, each headed
process, followed by a process name and a list of formal parameters
which are declarations as above. A process template defines a timed
automaton type; the automata comprising the system are instances of
process templates.
Within a template are declarations of local variables, followed by dec-
larations of all the locations and edges of the automaton.
First, after the key word state is a list of all the locations. Each
location in the list may have an invariant listed after it in braces {}.
Next, after the key word commit is a list of the locations which are com-
mitted, then, after the key word urgent, a list of the urgent locations,
then after the key word init, the initial location of the automaton.
Committed and urgent locations are explained in the semantics section
below.
After this, and after the key word trans is a comma-separated list of
all the edges of the automaton. Each edge is declared as source location
-> target location followed optionally by, in braces {},
– key word guard followed by a guard for the edge, and a semicolon,
– key word sync followed by a synchronisation label which must be of
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the form c! or c? where c is a channel, a semicolon, and
– key word assign followed by a list of assignment or update state-
ments.
The update statements have a fairly self-evident C++-style syntax.
They may be compound statements with function calls, conditionals
and iterators (including a Java-style for(x:lst)) but for the purposes
of the present work, simple assignment statements suffice: x++, y -=
2, z = x * 2 and so forth. For backwards compatibility, a Pascal-
style assignment operator := is also permitted. Several update state-
ments may appear in a comma-separated list terminated by a semi-
colon.
• The third section defines the processes – instances of the process tem-
plates defined in the second section. Several instances of one template
may be defined. The syntax of a process definition is an instance name,
an assignment operator, a template, a list in parentheses () of param-
eters conforming to the formal parameters of the template definition,
and a semicolon. Finally, there is a system definition – a simple list of
all the processes comprising the system.
Version 4 of UPPAAL also provides syntax to declare priorities between
synchronisation channels and processes, to resolve non–determinism when
more than one action or synchronisation is enabled at once, and meta-
variables which can be used to track verifications without being saved in
the system state. The present work does not employ either of these features.
5.2.2 UPPAAL Semantics
The semantics of UPPAAL are based on timed transition systems just as
previously defined, but there are extra conditions defining urgency, commit-
tedness and the precise nature of the synchronisations. The semantic rules
described in this section are paraphrased from the UPPAAL 4.0 help system;
see also Behrmann et al [19].
5.2. UPPAAL AND TIMED AUTOMATA 91
An urgent location is easiest to understand in terms of standard timed
automata: imagine an extra clock x, reset on every edge running into the
location, and the location has invariant x ≤ 0. Thus, no time may elapse at
an urgent location.
A committed location is not only urgent in this sense, but in any run
of the timed transition system, wherever the state (not the last in the run)
includes a committed location, the next action transition must be from a
committed location. Thus, if there is just one committed location in a state,
the actions leading to and from the committed location are, in effect, atomic.
The timed transition system of an UPPAAL system is of the usual kind:
see for instance §§2.2.2-2.2.4. A state (−→l , v) is a vector −→l = (l1, ..., ln)
of component process (automaton) locations together with a valuation v of
all clocks and variables. Transitions between states are delay transitions or
action transitions.
A delay transition is of the form (
−→
l , v)
d→ (−→l , v) where d is a non-
negative real number, a time delay, and v + d is the valuation for which
(v + d)(x) = v(x) + d for any clock x, and which agrees with v on all other
variables. This delay transition is permitted only if
• for every d′ ∈ [0, d], v + d′ satisfies the invariant of −→l , the conjunction
of all the component invariants,
• no li is committed or urgent,
• no edge from any li synchronises on an urgent channel, or if it does, its
guard is not satisfied by v + d′ for any d′ ∈ [0, d].
An action transition is one of three kinds – internal transitions, binary
synchronisations and broadcast synchronisations.
• An internal transition has the form (−→l , v) → (−→l ′, v′) where in some
component process k, there is an edge lk
ζ,λ−→ l′k with no synchronisation
label, v satisfies the guard ζ, l′i = li for i 6= k, and valuation v′ is as v
after the updates (resets, assignments) in set λ have been executed.
It is further required that v′ satisfy the invariants of
−→
l ′, that lk is com-
mitted or no other li is committed, and that no other action transition
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from (
−→
l , v) has higher priority. The last proviso can be ignored as we
do not use priorities in this work.
• A binary synchronisation has the form (−→l , v)→ (−→l ′, v′) where in some
component process j, there is an edge lj
ζj ,c!,λj−→ l′j with synchronisation
label c! for some channel c, and in another component process k, there
is an edge lk
ζk,c?,λk−→ l′k with synchronisation label c?. The rest of
−→
l ′ is
like
−→
l : l′i = li for i 6= j, k.
It is required that v |= ζj ∧ ζk.
v′ is the valuation obtained from v by first executing updates λj then
executing updates λk. It is required that this v
′ satisfy the invariants
of
−→
l ′.
It is further required that if neither of lj, lk is committed, neither is any
other component location li, and that no other action transition from
(
−→
l , v) has higher priority (again, this can be ignored for the present
purpose).
• A broadcast synchronisation has the form (−→l , v) → (−→l ′, v′) where in
some component process j, there is an edge lj
ζj ,c!,λj−→ l′j with synchro-
nisation label c! for some broadcast channel c, and in m component
processes k1, ..., km edges lkp
ζkp ,c?,λkp−→ l′kp (p = 1, ...,m), with synchro-
nisation label c?. The m synchronisation-receiving edges belong to
different processes. In what follows, it is assumed the numbering of
processes k1, ..., km is in the order the processes are mentioned in the
system definition.
It is required that v satisfies all the guards: v |= ζj ∧ ζk1 ∧ ... ∧ ζkm .
For all locations li in
−→
l not one of lj, lk1 , ..., lkm , no edge from li has a
synchronisation label c? or if it does, v does not satisfy its guard. For
all of these locations, l′i = li, to complete the definition of
−→
l ′.
v′ is the valuation obtained from v by first executing updates λj then
executing updates λkp in order of p = 1, 2, ...,m.
It is required that this v′ satisfy all the invariants of
−→
l ′.
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If none of lj, lk1 , ... lkm is committed, neither is any other component
location li of
−→
l , and no other action transition from (
−→
l , v) has higher
priority (again, priorities can be ignored for the present purpose).
5.3 A CAN channel
(ip < QCAP &&
Q[ip] == FREE)
Init(c)
Acc(u)
PostAcc{h <= U}
S1(c)
PreAcc{h<=u} nMsg?
h = 0
iDlvr = ip; vDlvr = vp
dMsg!
h = 0
PostChk(c)
(h >= L)
ip = 0
Q[iIn] = vIn
nMsg?
ip++
(ip < QCAP)
Q[iIn] = vIn
h = 0
Q[ip] = FREE; ip++;h=0
(ip == QCAP)
Free
nMsg?
ip = iIn; vp = vIn
M2S (c)
vp = Q[ip]; Q[ip] = FREE
(Q[ip] != FREE)
(ip == QCAP)
(h >= l)
Figure 5.1: Automaton to model a CAN Channel
Figure 5.1 shows the locations and transitions of an UPPAAL timed au-
tomaton representing a CAN channel. Note that the legend (c) denotes
a committed location in the UPPAAL sense (see above). The UPPAAL
source code for this appears below in §5.3.2, in the definition of the process
Channel template. QCAP is a parameter denoting the number of distinct mes-
sage types supported by the channel. In order to function, the automaton
is equipped with some local and some global variables, the latter shareable
with other automata that might be composed with the CAN channel. The
local variables include a clock h to track its behaviour in time, and inte-
ger variables ip and vp to represent the message identifier (“priority”) and
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message pay-load respectively of the message “currently” in process of being
transmitted through the CAN channel.
Global variables are needed to interface this model with sending pro-
cess(es) and receiving process(es). Specifically, there are integers iIn and
vIn shared with a sending process to represent the identifier and data pay-
load of a message to be sent; integers iDlvr and vDlvr shared with a re-
ceiving process to represent the identifier and data pay-load of a message to
be handed on to the receiving process. The local array Q[] of integers, one
entry for each distinct message identifier value, comprises the “buffers” of
the CAN channel. The data type is int in this model but in reality would
be the type of the data pay-load.
Last but not least are two UPPAAL “channels”, urgent chan nMsg and
broadcast chan dMsg, not to be confused with the CAN channel we are
modelling. These are declared as formal parameters to the CAN channel
model automaton because they are shared between this and the sending and
receiving processes. Their function is to provide appropriate synchronisation
of the sending process with the channel model and of the latter with 0 or
more receiving processes. In particular a sending process sends a message
by setting shared variables iIn, vIn and then offering synchronization on
urgent chan nMsg. This is a synchronisation in the usual timed-automaton
sense, with the particular feature that the synchronised action occurs as soon
as guards on the component processes determine that it is able. The channel
automaton hands a message to any receiving process by setting shared vari-
ables iDlvr, vDlvr to ip, vp and then offering synchronization broadcast
chan dMsg. Again, this is a synchronisation in the “usual” sense, but an
UPPAAL broadcast channel will synchronise with as many parallel processes
as are in a position to do so. Thus, the channel hands the CAN message to
as many receiving processes as care to take delivery of it; the message is not
available to processes at any later time.
The automaton starts in location Init where it initialises each entry of
its “buffer” array to the special value FREE, meaning there is no message in
the buffer. Constant QCAP is the number of distinct message identifier values
or priorities: the number of entries in the buffer array.
5.3. A CAN CHANNEL 95
Once this has occurred, the automaton is forced to location Free where
it waits an arbitrarily long time for a nMsg synchronization, upon which
the assignments ip := iIn, vp := vIn store the incoming message. It is
necessary for nMsg to be an urgent chan because we do not want the CAN
channel automaton to have the option of sitting at location Free while a
sending process is offering synchronization – waiting to send.
The process of sending the message starts immediately after this. At
location Free, the queue of messages is empty; so a message acquired by the
channel from location Free is presumably the correct one to send. There is an
immediate transition (with a clock reset) to PreAcc, marking the beginning
of the pre-acceptance phase of the message, as defined by [79].
During this phase, at the location PreAcc, the self-loop allows more mes-
sages to enter the channel; these are stored in the priority queue Q[]. It is
permitted for a message with id (priority) i to enter a CAN channel over-
writing a message i already there but we do not expect this to destroy a
message once it is in process of being transmitted; and it does not as the
latter is saved in variables ip, vp.
The pre-acceptance phase of CAN transmission lasts a period of time
bounded by l and u, parameters of the CAN channel. The local clock h
times this.
After the pre-acceptance phase is the acceptance point, represented here
by an urgent location Acc.
This is followed by the post-acceptance phase, also timed by h and lasting a
time bounded by parameters L and U. Post-acceptance is where the message is
handed on to the receiving process(es). Note the use of a committed location
to ensure correct sequencing: first the shared variables iDlvr and vDlvr are
set, then synchronization on the broadcast chan is offered.
While in the post-acceptance phase, one or more additional messages be
enter the channel. This is modelled by the self-loop at location PostAcc.
The transition to PostChk ensures that if there is another message in any
of the buffers, Q[], it is sent right away. The channel only returns to the
“idle” state Free if all the buffers are Free.
The self-loop at committed location PostChk searches all the buffers for a
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message (Q[ip] != FREE). If such exists, the highest priority (lowest index)
one is sent: this is the transition to location M2S. Otherwise, if all the buffers
are FREE (which might happen on transition from PostAcc, after a full
circuit of the duty cycle), the automaton transits back to Free to wait for a
message to send.
It should be noted that a couple of assumptions have been made about
the behaviour of a CAN channel. First, it is possible for an arrival of a
message at priority p to be followed by the arrival of another message at the
same priority, before the first message has been accepted. In this case, the
second message overwrites the first. This appears to be permitted behaviour
of a CAN channel.
Second, and assumption of homogeneity is made: that the parameters u,
l, U, L have the same values at all nodes capable of sending on a particular
channel.
5.3.1 A Simple Example
This model of a CAN channel is simply illustrated by employing it in a simple
example of a flow regulator (cf. [79], p 89) described in bCANdle as a parallel
combination of process terms Flow | Valve where
- Flow is defined by the equation
Flow = [ReadSensor:85,90] ; k!flow.x;
idle [> [PERIOD:10000,10250] ;
Flow
– a process which periodically reads a sensor and transmits the reading onto
a network channel as a message of type flow, and
Valve = k?flow.y ; [AdjustValve:200,300] ;
Valve
– a process which repeatedly waits for a message of this type and on receiving
one, uses it to adjust a valve.
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The network part of this system consists of a single channel with bCAN-
dle description (flow:1, 45, 55, 10, 12) specifying a single message type
and values of l, u, L, U respectively. The data model part a variable x (”be-
longing” to the Flow process) and a variable y (the Valve process).
The two process specifications are equational presentations of the process
terms
rec X.([ReadSensor:85,90] ; k!flow.x;
(idle [> [PERIOD:10000,10250]) ; X)
and
rec Y.(k?flow.y ; [AdjustValve:200,300] ; Y)
An informal interpretation of this system is as a parallel composition of
one instance of the channel automaton, figure 5.1 with the automata shown
in figures 5.2 and 5.3.
StReadSensor {h <= 90 }
(h >= 10000) h = 0
ExpiryOfPeriod {h <= 10250} SensorRead
(h >= 85)
send! h = 0
iIn = 1; vIn = x
Figure 5.2: Automaton to model the Flow process
ExpectData AdjValve {h <= 300}
(h >= 200)
recv? i = iDlvr; y = vDlvr; h = 0
Figure 5.3: Automaton to model the Valve process
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The derivation of these automata from the corresponding bCANdle pro-
cess terms will be examined in more detail in the next section.
5.3.2 Example – UPPAAL Code
The following is the source code for an UPPAAL system modelling the ex-
ample of §5.3.1, including the CAN channel model. After some global dec-
larations, three process templates are defined, an instance of each is defined,
and a system defined comprising these three instances.
clock globalClock;
const QCAP 10, FREE -1;
int vIn := 0, iIn := 0; /* input message payload */
int vDlvr := 0, iDlvr;
broadcast chan dlvrMsg;
urgent chan newMsg;
process Channel(const l; const u; const L; const U;
urgent chan nMsg; broadcast chan dMsg) {
clock h;
int ip, vp;
int Q[QCAP+1];
state Free, PreAcc{h <= u}, Acc, PostAcc{h <= U},
PostChk, M2S, Init, S1;
commit PostChk, M2S, S1;
urgent Acc;
init Init;
trans
Init -> Init {
guard ip <= QCAP;
assign Q[ip] := FREE, ip++;
},
Init -> Free {
guard ip == QCAP+1;
assign h := 0;
},
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Free -> M2S {
sync nMsg?;
assign ip := iIn, vp:= vIn;
},
M2S -> PreAcc {
assign h := 0;
},
PreAcc -> PreAcc {
sync nMsg?;
assign Q[iIn] := vIn;
},
PreAcc -> Acc {
guard h >= l;
assign h := 0;
},
Acc -> S1 {
assign iDlvr := ip, vDlvr := vp;
},
S1 -> PostAcc {
sync dMsg!;
},
PostAcc -> PostAcc {
sync nMsg?;
assign Q[iIn] := vIn;
},
PostAcc -> PostChk {
guard h >= L;
assign ip := 0;
},
PostChk -> Free {
guard ip == QCAP;
},
PostChk -> PostChk {
guard ip < QCAP && Q[ip] == FREE;
assign ip++;
},
PostChk -> M2S {
guard ip < QCAP && Q[ip] != FREE;
assign vp := Q[ip], Q[ip] := FREE;
};
}
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process Flow(urgent chan c) {
clock h, k;
state ReadSensor{h <= 90}, StReadSensor{h <= 10250}, SensorRead;
init StReadSensor;
trans
StReadSensor -> ReadSensor {
guard h >= 10000;
assign h := 0, k := 0, iIn := 1;
},
ReadSensor -> ReadSensor {
guard k >= 5;
assign vIn++, k := 0;
},
ReadSensor -> SensorRead {
guard h >= 85;
},
SensorRead -> StReadSensor {
sync c!;
assign h := 0;
};
}
process Valve(broadcast chan c) {
clock m;
int i, y;
state expectMsg, AdjustValve{m <=300};
init expectMsg;
trans
expectMsg -> AdjustValve {
sync c?; assign m := 0, i := iDlvr, y := vDlvr;
},
AdjustValve -> expectMsg {
guard m >= 200;
};
}
theChannel := Channel(45, 55, 10, 15, newMsg, dlvrMsg);
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flow := Flow(newMsg);
valve := Valve(dlvrMsg);
system flow, theChannel, valve;
5.3.3 A Broadcast Example
dataToSndIdle {h <= p}
(h >= p) vIn++
h = 0; vIn = 0
iIn = (iIn+1)%QCAP; h = 0
c! iIn = 0; h = 0
Figure 5.4: An abstract producer process
gotData {h <= 120}
(h >= 60)
ExpectData
h = 0; vIn = 0
c? i = iDlvr; v = vDlvr; h = 0
Figure 5.5: An abstract consumer process
The CAN channel model presented here exhibits broadcast semantics if
broadcast channels, as devised in the UPPAAL modelling tool (see §5.2.2),
are incorporated in the compositional scheme. To illustrate this, consider
an UPPAAL system comprising the CAN channel model accepting messages
from the abstract producer process illustrated by figure 5.4 and several in-
stances of the abstract consumer process illustrated in figure 5.5. Again,
channel c of the producer is bound to a globally defined urgent channel
newMsg and the channel c of the consumer(s) to a globally defined broadcast
channel dlvrMsg, to which the channel parameters of the CAN model are
also bound.
If one experiments with varying numbers of instances of the consumer,
it is found that indeed the CAN channel model’s behaviour is to broadcast :
dlvrMsg! is capable of synchronizing with 0, 1 or several dlvrMsg? edges.
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5.4 A Compositional Model of bCANdle
The task now is to define a formal translation of bCANdle into a system of
parallel timed automata whose semantics are strongly equivalent to those of
the original bCANdle system. The approach is a modification of Kendall’s
clocked bCANdle system construction ([79], chapter 4).
The basic idea is to build, for each process in a bCANdle system, a
timed automaton whose timed transition system will mirror behaviour of the
process within the bCANdle system. The locations of the automaton are
pairs consisting of a process term and an associated data environment. The
process term is to be thought of intuitively as a “to do” list: a transition of
the automaton from, say (P,D) to (P ′, D′) is possible when P ′ is “what is
to do” after an action has occurred starting from P and the data model has
in consequence evolved from D to D′. This is a common way to interpret
process algebra and is implicit in the operational semantics of section 4.3.
However, here we are defining not a timed transition system but an au-
tomaton whose timed semantics will mirror the bCANdle timed semantics.
To bring this about, in the process terms, atomic operations [ω : t1, t2]
are augmented with a clock h each: [ω : t1, t2]
h and a transition ([ω :
t1, t2]
h;Q,D) −→ (Q,D′) is guarded by the condition h ≥ t1 while loca-
tion ([ω : t1, t2]
h;Q,D) must satisfy the invariant h ≤ t2.
The formal definitions follow. First, fix a set of data values and variables,
a set Γ of predicate symbols over the variables, and a set Ω of operation
symbols over the variables, over which a data environment may be defined
as in section 4.1. Suppose given a bCANdle system (P,N,D) in which the
process term P = P1|...|Pn where the Pi are bCANdle process terms not
containing the parallel composition symbol. It is also assumed that time
constraints on atomic operations (e.g. [ω : t1, t2], ω ∈ Ω) are natural number-
valued, compound terms have static control and clocks are allocated safely
in the sense explained in §5.4.1 below.
By static control, we mean that no process term has a subterm of the form
recX.P ′ in which P ′ has a subterm of the form Q;R or Q[> R and the process
variable X occurs free in Q. This, as [79] explains, ensures that recX.P ′ does
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give rise to unbounded recursion, and that the timed automaton shortly to
be described has a finite number of states.
We further assume that the sets of variables occurring in the Pi are disjoint
and that hence D = D1 ∪ ... ∪ Dn where Di is the restriction of D to the
variables in Pi. Here the restriction of a data model is the data model made
by restricting the four functions making it up, and the union of two data
models with disjoint variables sets is the pairwise set-theoretic union of the
four constituent functions as sets.
5.4.1 Clocked Process Terms
This is defined as in ([79], §4.2), but is restricted to process terms not em-
ploying parallel composition |. A clocked process term is defined recursively
as follows:
• A bCANdle send or receive process term, k!i.x or k?i.x is a clocked
process term;
• Where [ω : t1, t2] is a basic process term representing an operation, and
t1, t2 are natural numbers or∞, and h a new clock variable, [ω : t1, t2]h
is a clocked process term.
• Where γ is a predicate symbol, X a process variable and Qˆ, Qˆ′ clocked
process terms, so are X, γ → Qˆ, recX.Qˆ, Qˆ; Qˆ′, Qˆ+ Qˆ′,
Qˆ[> Qˆ′.
The set HQˆ of initial clock variables of the clocked process term Qˆ is
defined recursively by:
• If Qˆ is a send or receive term, then HQˆ = ∅;
• If Qˆ is [ω : t1, t2]h, then HQˆ = {h};
• Hγ→Qˆ = ∅;
• HQˆ;Qˆ′ = HQˆ;
• HQˆ+Qˆ′ = HQˆ[>Qˆ′ = HQˆ ∪HQˆ′ .
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A clocked process term is safely clocked, the allocation of clocks to the
term is safe, if in every subterm of the form Qˆ[> Rˆ, Rˆ is guarded (every
process variable is guarded in the sense of §4.3.9) and the initial clock vari-
ables of Rˆ do not appear among the clock variables of Qˆ. This will ensure
that in the timed automaton construction described below, reset of the clocks
allocated to the different subterms of a process term do not interfere with
one another. Kendall discusses a similar situation in [79], chapter 4, further
requiring that in a subterm of the form Qˆ|Rˆ, the clock variables of Qˆ and Rˆ
are disjoint; we do not require this as we do not include parallel composition
in our syntax.
5.4.2 An Automaton Construction
Let Pˆ0 be a clocked process term and D0 a data model supporting all the data
variables and operations of Pˆ0. The timed automaton A(Pˆ0, D0) is defined
as follows:
• The locations are pairs consisting of a clocked process term and a data
model supporting all the data variables and operations of the process
term. Corresponding to the ideal process term
√
introduced in § 4.3
there are locations (
√
, D) where D is a data model. The initial loca-
tion is (Pˆ0, D0). Once the transition relation is defined we restrict to
the locations reachable from (Pˆ0, D0). Let Π denote the set of these
locations.
• The action alphabet is the set Ap defined in section 4.3. Recall that
this consists of predicate symbols γ ∈ Γ for which the corresponding
action is evaluation of a guard γ; operation symbols ω ∈ Ω; and CAN
send and receive actions k!i.v, k?i.v where i is a message identifier, v a
variable, k a CAN channel.
• The transition relation is the least E ⊆ Π× ZH × Ap × 2H × Π closed
under the rules set out in § 5.4.2.2 below. H is the set of clock variables
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occuring in Π and ZH the set of clock zones, defined in the usual way
1,
and ((Qˆ,D), ζ, λ,H, (Qˆ′, D′)) ∈ E is as usual written
(Qˆ,D)
ζ,λ,H−→ (Qˆ′, D′)
• H includes a special clock variable hu reset on every transition edge and
which forces an urgent action by the conjunction of hu ≤ 0 with the
invariant at the target location. The invariant function I : Π→ ZH is
defined in § 5.4.2.1 below.
5.4.2.1 The Invariant Function
On the ideal locations, I(
√
, D) = (hu ≤ 0) (cf. [79] pp. 197-8).
I is defined on atomic clocked process terms thus. (hu is the urgent clock,
1 the “top” element of the boolean algebra 2.)
I(k!i.x,D) = (hu ≤ 0)
I(k?i.x,D) = 1
I([ω : t1, t2]
h, D) = (h ≤ t2)
...and recursively on compound terms thus.
I(γ → Qˆ,D) =
{
(hu ≤ 0) if D |= γ
1 otherwise
I(Qˆ; Qˆ′, D) = I(Qˆ,D)
I(Qˆ+ Qˆ′, D) = I(Qˆ,D) ∧ I(Qˆ′, D)
I(Qˆ[> Qˆ′, D) = I(Qˆ,D) ∧ I(Qˆ′, D)
I(recX.Qˆ,D) = I(Qˆ[recX.Qˆ/X], D)
5.4.2.2 The Transition Relation
E is the smallest relation closed under the following rules.
1as logical conjunctions of inequalities between a clock variable or difference of two
clock variables and a constant
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(k!i.x,D)
1,k!i.v,{hu}−→ (√, D)
(C Snd)
(k?i.x,D)
1,k?i.v,{hu}−→ (√, D[x := v])
(C Rcv)
D
ω−→d D′
([ω : t1, t2]h, D)
(h≥t1),ω,{hu}−→ (√, D′)
(C Cmp)
D |= γ
(γ → Q,D) 1,γ,{h
u}∪HQ−→ (Q,D)
(C Gd)
where HQˆ denotes the set of initial clock variables as defined in §5.4.1.
(Qˆ,D)
ζ,λ,H−→ (Qˆ′, D′) ∧ ¬Qˆ′ ≡ √
(Qˆ; Rˆ,D)
ζ,λ,H−→ (Qˆ′; Rˆ,D′)
(C Seq 1)
(Qˆ,D)
ζ,λ,H−→ (√, D′)
(Qˆ; Rˆ,D)
ζ,λ,H∪H
Rˆ−→ (Rˆ,D′)
(C Seq 2)
where HRˆ denotes the set of initial clock variables as in §5.4.1.
(Qˆ,D)
ζ,λ,H−→ (Qˆ′, D′)
(Qˆ+ Rˆ,D)
ζ,λ,H−→ (Qˆ′, D′)
(C Ch 1)
(Rˆ,D)
ζ,λ,H−→ (Rˆ′, D′)
(Qˆ+ Rˆ,D)
ζ,λ,H−→ (Rˆ′, D′)
(C Ch 2)
(Qˆ[recX.Qˆ/X], D)
ζ,λ,H−→ (Qˆ′, D′)
(recX.Qˆ,D)
ζ,λ,H−→ (Qˆ′, D′)
(C Rec)
(Qˆ,D)
ζ,λ,H−→ (Qˆ′, D′) ∧ ¬Qˆ′ ≡ √
(Qˆ[> Rˆ,D)
ζ,λ,H−→ (Qˆ′[> Rˆ,D′)
(C Int 1)
(Qˆ,D)
ζ,λ,H−→ (√, D′)
(Qˆ[> Rˆ,D)
ζ,λ,H−→ (√, D′)
(C Int 2)
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(Rˆ,D)
ζ,λ,H−→ (Rˆ′, D′)
(Qˆ[> Rˆ,D)
ζ,λ,H−→ (Rˆ′, D′)
(C Int 3)
As an example of the application of these rules, here is a sketch of a deriva-
tion of the timed automata (figures 5.2, 5.3) of the flow regulator system of
§ 5.3.1.
Consider the Flow process term: rec X.([ReadSensor:85,90];
k!flow.x; (idle [> [PERIOD:10000,10250]); X).
Corresponding to the subterm [ReadSensor:85,90] is an automaton lo-
cation ([ReadSensor:85,90]h, D) where h is an additional clock and D a
data environment which supports the numerical variable x. According to
§ 5.4.2.1, this location has invariant (h ≤ 90) and by § 5.4.2.2 rule (C Cmp)
there is a transition ([ReadSensor:85,90]h, D)→ (√, Dω) where Dω is the
state of D after performance of the data operation ω. This transition has
guard (h ≥ 85) and action label ω.
It follows by rule (C Seq 2) that there is a transition
([ReadSensor:85,90];k!flow.x;(idle [> [PERIOD:10000,10250]);X, D)
h>=85,ω,{h}−→ (k!flow.x;(idle [> [PERIOD:10000,10250]);X, Dω)
(5.1)
Similarly, a transition by rule (C Snd), (k!flow.x, Dω)
k!flow.v−→ (√, Dω)
(where v is the value of x in Dω) gives, via rule (C Seq 2) transition
(k!flow.x;(idle [> [PERIOD:10000,10250]);X, Dω)
k!flow.v−→ ((idle [> [PERIOD:10000,10250]);X, Dω) (5.2)
The last location has invariant (h <= 10250).
From ([PERIOD:10000,10250], Dω)
(h>=10000−→ (√, Dω) one obtains, using
rules (C Int 3) and (C Seq 2) a transition
((idle [> [PERIOD:10000,10250]);X, Dω)
h>=10000−→ (X, Dω) (5.3)
Now, let Qˆ denote the clocked process term at the source of transition 5.1.
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Substituting recX.Qˆ for the free process variable X in 5.1-5.3,
([ReadSensor:85,90];k!flow.x;(idle [> [PERIOD:10000,10250]); recX.Qˆ,D)
h>=85,ω,{h}−→ (k!flow.x;(idle [> [PERIOD:10000,10250]); recX.Qˆ,Dω)
k!flow.v−→ ((idle [> [PERIOD:10000,10250]); recX.Qˆ,Dω)
h>=10000−→ (recX.Qˆ,Dω)
(5.4)
The first clocked process term in this sequence is simply Qˆ[recX.Qˆ/X]; so,
by rules (C Rec) and (C Seq 1) we can infer,
(recX.Qˆ,D)
h>=85,ω,{h}−→ (k!flow.x;(idle [> [PERIOD:10000,10250]); recX.Qˆ,Dω)
k!flow.v−→ ((idle [> [PERIOD:10000,10250]); recX.Qˆ,Dω) h>=10000−→ (recX.Qˆ,Dω)
This is the loop comprising figure 5.2 (note that with UPPAAL automata,
the data environment D is subsumed into the locations). The locations are
given less unwieldy names in the figure, and the action k!flow.v updates
variables shared with the channel automaton before synchronising with it.
We shall see in the next chapter a refined channel model in which this is
accomplished by a single synchronised action.
The automaton of figure 5.3 is derived in a similar way, starting from pro-
cess term recY.(k?flow.y; [AdjustValve:200,300]; Y)≡ recY.Rˆ. Rules
(C Rcv) and (C Cmp) can be used in conjunction with (C Seq 2) to obtain
transitions of the form
(k?flow.y;[AdjustValve:200,300]);Y, D)
k?flow.v,{h,hu}−→ ([AdjustValve:200,300]);Y, D[y := v])
h>=200,Adj−→ (Y, D[y := v])
Recognising that the first clocked process term in the sequence is Rˆ, one
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substitutes recY.Rˆ for Y and obtains, using rule (C Rec),
(recY.Rˆ,D)
k?flow.v,{h,hu}−→ ([AdjustValve:200,300]); recY.Rˆ,D[y := v])
h>=200,Adj−→ (recY.Rˆ,D[y := v])
It will be shown that, under a few simple assumptions, a general bCANdle
system (P,N,D) in which P = P1|...|Pn and the process terms Pi are con-
structed without |, is strongly equivalent to the timed transition system of a
parallel product (see §2.2.3) of automata including the A(Pˆi, Di) constructed
as in subsection 5.4.2.
5.4.3 Strong Bisimulation and Strong Equivalence in
bCANdle
Given an equivalence relation ≈ between states, a strong ≈-bisimulation (up
to ≃) is a relation R between states which is a bisimulation (up to ≃) as
above, and also R ⊆≈ – i.e. (σ1, σ2) ∈ R ⇒ σ1 ≈ σ2. This notion of strong
equivalence may be applied to the timed transition systems of bCANdle
and of timed automata. In this case, ≈ is what in [79] is termed context
equivalence: between two bCANdle systems, the network and data model
states equate: (P,N,D) ≈ (P ′, N ′, D′) iff N = N ′, D = D′.
Two bCANdle systems are strongly equivalent,
(P1, N1, D1) ≃ (P2, N2, D2)
iff there is a ≈-bisimulation between them. From this Kendall develops a
notion of strong equivalence of closed, guarded process terms. Closed terms
are those in which every process variable is bound by the rec “quantifier” and
guarded process terms are those in which every process variable is guarded
in the sense of §4.3.9. Kendall’s process term equivalence P1 ≃ P2 holds
iff (P1, N,D) ≃ (P2, N,D) for all admissible (in a sense he makes precise)
network and data models. This is a notion of semantic equivalence of process
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terms: it is a congruence with respect to all the process term operators, and
⊢ P1 = P2 implies P1 ≃ P2. This is the soundness of the equational laws
referred to at the end of §4.3.9.
As Kendall remarks, semantic equivalence extends in a natural way to
clocked process terms: Pˆ1 ≃ Pˆ2 iff timed systems initiating from Pˆ1, Pˆ2 are
strongly ≈-bisimilar. In the timed-automaton formalism presented in this
chapter, this means that whenever an automaton A(Pˆ1, D) is composed with
a suitable (set of) network channel automata, the timed transition system of
the product is ≈-bisimilar to the timed transition system of the product of
A(Pˆ2, D) with the same network. The equational laws are sound in the sense
that any equation Pˆ1 = Pˆ2 derived from them implies Pˆ1 ≃ Pˆ2.
5.5 bCANdle as a Parallel Product
5.5.1 Theorem
Suppose a bCANdle system (P,N,D) in which P = P1|...|Pn and the pro-
cess terms Pi are constructed without |. Suppose further that the variables
occurring in Pi are disjoint from the variables occurring in Pj when i 6= j.
Let Di denote the data environment which results from restricting D to the
variables occurring in Pi, and Pˆi the clocked process term resulting from Pi
according to § 5.4.1. Suppose the time constraints on atomic operations are
natural-number-valued and that clocks are allocated safely and with static
control as explained at the beginning of § 5.4.
Let Nk, k ∈ K denote the timed automata representing the CAN channels
as described in § 5.3.
Then the timed transition system of the product ‖ni=1 A(Pˆi, Di) ‖ (‖k∈K
Nk) is strongly equivalent to that of (P,N,D).
5.5.2 Construction and Proof
The proof of this theorem is achieved by constructing a strong ≈-bisimulation
where ≈ is context equivalence suitably extended to include timed states of
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of product automaton. The construction is described here, and the bulk of
the details of the proof appear in appendix B.
Suppose N consists of CAN channels Nk, k ∈ K. A channel Nk will be
in one of the states (↓, u)h, (t1,t2❀ m,u)h, (↑ m;u)h, (m t1,t2❀ , u)h explained in
§ 4.2. These map into the locations Free, PreAcc, Acc, PostAcc of the timed-
automaton model of the CAN channel displayed in § 5.3. Let Ck(k ∈ K)
denote an instance of this automaton, corresponding to Nk.
The product automation proposed to represent the bCANdle system is
(‖ni=1 A(Pˆi, Di)) ‖ (‖k∈K Ck).
The main task is to construct a bisimulation relating (P,N,D) to the
timed transition system of this product. This will be done by adapting a
construction of Kendall’s ([79], appendix B).
A general state of the timed transition system of the product automaton
has the form
((Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m, (ηk)k∈K , v)
where m ≤ n and v is a valuation of clocks. The remaining parts comprise a
vector of A(Pi, Di) locations and channel automaton locations.
The bisimulation is constructed via a mapping of such states to bCANdle
systems, using an adaptation of the age function of [79]. This function is
defined on clocked process terms as in [79], definition B2, but without the
|-clause. Its definition is as below.
unclk(Qˆ) is the process term obtained by removing the clock references
from the clocked process term Qˆ: unclk(k!i.x) , k!i.x; unclk(k?i.x) ,
k?i.x; unclk([ω, t1, t2]
h) , [ω, t1, t2]; unclk(γ → Qˆ1) , γ → unclk(Qˆ1);
unclk(Qˆ1; Qˆ2) , unclk(Qˆ1); unclk(Qˆ2) and similarly for unclk(Qˆ1 + Qˆ2),
unclk(Qˆ1[> Qˆ2); unclk(recX.Qˆ1) , recX.unclk(Qˆ1); unclk(X) , X.
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t
.− t′ is the greater of t− t′, 0.
age(k!i.x, v) , k!i.x
age(k?i.x, v) , k?i.x
age([ω, t1, t2]
h, v) , [ω, t′1, t
′
2] where t
′
i = ti
.− v(h)
age(γ → Qˆ, v) , unclk(Qˆ)
age(Qˆ; Qˆ′, v) , age(Qˆ, v); unclk(Qˆ′)
age(Qˆ+ Qˆ′, v) , age(Qˆ, v) + age(Qˆ′, v)
age(Qˆ[> Qˆ′, v) , age(Qˆ, v)[> age(Qˆ′, v)
age(recX.Qˆ, v) , age(Qˆ[recX.Qˆ/X], v)
Similarly, a function age maps a timed state of a channel automaton to
a bCANdle network channel state thus.
age(Free, v) , (↓, u)
age(PreAcc, v) , (
t1,t2
❀ m,u) where t1 = l
.− v(h), t2 = u
.− v(h)
age(Acc, v) , (↑ m,u)
age(PostAcc, v) , (m
t1,t2
❀ , u) where t1 = L
.− v(h), t2 = U
.− v(h)
Free, PreAcc, Acc, PostAcc are the locations of a channel automaton in
which m is the current message and u the current state of the message queue
for the channel, h a clock in the channel automaton reset when it goes to
PreAcc or PostAcc. The notation on the right hand side is that of section
4.2 for a bCANdle network channel.
A general state of the timed transition system of the product automaton,
maps to a bCANdle system:
((Qˆi, DQi)i=1...n, (ηk)k∈K , v) 7−→ (|ni=1age(Qˆi, v), (age(ηk, v))k∈K ,⊔ni=1DQi)
(5.5)
– the data environment component DQ1 ⊔ ... ⊔DQn is formed in the natural
way from the data environments DQi over disjoint sets of variables.
To complete the proof it suffices to show that the graph B of this mapping
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is a strong ≈-bisimulation up strong equivalence (≃) between the two timed
transition systems, the transition graph of the product automaton, and the
transition graph of of the bCANdle system, where ≈ is a relation of context-
equivalence suitably generalised to states of either timed transition systems.
Let σ1, σ2 denote two states of either timed transition system; say σ1 ≈ σ2
(σ1 is context equivalent to σ2) iff σ1, σ2 fit one of the following clauses:
• Two bCANdle systems: (Q,N,D) ≈ (Q′, N ′, D′) iff N = N ′, D = D′
• A bCANdle system and an automaton state:
((Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m, (ηk)k∈K , v) ≈ (Q,N,D) iff
(Q,N,D) ≈ ((Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m, (ηk)k∈K , v) iff
(∀k ∈ K)Nk = age(ηk, v) and D = DQ1 ⊔ ... ⊔DQm
• Two automaton states:
((Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m, (ηk)k∈K , v) ≈ ((Qˆ′i, D′Qi)i=1...m′ , (η′k)k∈K , v′) iff
(∀k ∈ K)age(ηk, v) = age(η′k, v′) and DQ1⊔...⊔DQm = D′Q1⊔...⊔D′Qm′
To see that the mapping (5.5) provides a strong ≈-bisimulation up to
strong equivalence (≃) one needs to check, for ((Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m, (ηk)k∈K , v)
as a general timed state of the automaton, and
(|ni=1age(Qˆi, v), (age(ηk, v))k∈K ,⊔ni=1DQi) as the bCANdle system to which it
maps,
1. ((Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m, (ηk)k∈K , v) ≈ (|ni=1age(Qˆi, v), (age(ηk, v))k∈K ,⊔ni=1DQi);
2. For every transition λ from (|ni=1age(Qˆi, v), (age(ηk, v))k∈K ,⊔ni=1DQi)
in the bCANdle timed transition system there is a transition with the
same label λ from ((Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m, (ηk)k∈K , v), and the targets are con-
text equivalent to states related by the mapping;
3. For every transition λ from ((Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m, (ηk)k∈K , v) there is a tran-
sition with the same label λ from (|ni=1age(Qˆi, v), (age(ηk, v))k∈K , ⊔ni=1DQi),
and the targets are context equivalent to states related by the mapping.
The first of these requirements is met by definition of context equivalence.
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The second is established by considering a number of cases and using
induction on the computation of |ni=1age(Qˆi, v). Details appear in appendix
B.
The third is established in a way symmetrical with the second, again by
induction on the computation of |ni=1age(Qˆi, v). Details are in appendix B.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have established a formal construction which derives from
a bCANdle model of a broadcasting embedded system a semantically equiv-
alent parallel composite of timed automata. This will be useful in the sequel
because it will allow one to reason compositionally about bCANdle mod-
els. The components of a model can be examined individually, replaced
with abstractions and reasoned about; then, using suitable compositionality
theorems developed in chapter 7, properties of the model can be inferred
from properties of a model in which come components have been abstracted.
This, as we shall see, is a useful thing to be able to do in situations where
the model’s state space is “blowing up”, becoming unmanagably large.
Chapter 6
Composition without Shared
Variables
Chapter 5 showed how a CAN-based distributed (broadcasting) embedded
system could be modelled by a parallel composition of timed automata, and
showed it strongly equivalent to a bCANdle system. This approach depends
on the construction of a CAN channel as a process or timed automaton and
indeed such a construction arose in a natural way from the definition of the
behaviour of a CAN channel. The aim is to use this compositional method
of modelling in order to verify properties of CAN systems by inference from
properties of components, or of system models in which components have
been abstracted in some way. The compositionality theorems presented in
chapter 7 provide a theoretical basis for doing this, using a form of assume-
guarantee reasoning; but this requires the composition of timed automata to
have no shared variables. The naturally arising CAN automaton described
above uses shared variables. A formally equivalent structure exists which
looks much less natural and elegant, but does the job without shared vari-
ables. The present chapter presents such a structure and shows it to be
equivalent to the formalism already developed.
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6.1 Another CAN Channel Automaton
An alternative formulation of a timed automaton for a CAN channel is in-
troduced and will be shown to be strongly equivalent to that of chapter 5.
This automaton is based closely on that of §5.3: indeed, it is like its
prototype, an UPPAAL process template, and has the same locations and
the same cyclic behaviour.
The major difference is motivated by the need to do without shared vari-
ables. The original model (§5.3) shared with its environment
• Variables iIn, vIn of the types of the i-values and the v-values respec-
tively. These hold the type and the value of a CAN message i.v being
put onto the network.
• Variables iDlvr, vDlvr of the types of the i-values and the v-values
respectively. These hold the type and the value of a CAN message i.v
being delivered from the network to a receiving process.
• The channel automaton receives a synchronisation on an UPPAAL “ur-
gent channel” nMsg? when a process wishes to send a message: it reacts
by copying the message payload in vIn into Q[iIn].
• When a message in the channel is ready to be handed off to the receiving
process, its type and payload are copied to iDlvr and vDlvr and a
broadcast synchronisation issued on an UPPAAL ‘broadcast channel”
dMsg!.
Figure 6.1 shows the new channel automaton in an abbreviated form.
The logical flow is for the most part the same as that of the original §5.3
channel: compare this diagram with figure 5.1 on page 93. (Note: the legend
(c) denotes a committed location in the UPPAAL sense.)
The array Q is carried over from the old model. This is indexed by mes-
sage identifiers, the possible values of component i of a CAN message. The
type of these is a subrange 0 .. (m − 1) where m is the number of message
types supported by the channel; and the type of the array entries is that of
the message payload, the component v of a CAN message. For the purposes
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nMsg[µ,ν]?
vp=
h=0
ip=µ
ν
nMsg[µ,ν]?
M2S[µ,ν] (c)
PreAcc [µ,ν] (c)
(ip == µ && vp == ν)
Acc[µ,ν] (c)
nMsg[µ,ν]?
PostAcc[µ,ν] (c)
(Q[µ −1]==−1)
PostChk[µ ](c)
(Q[µ ]==−1)
(Q[µ ]== ν)
Q[ µ ]=−1
Q[ µ ] = ν
Q[ µ ] = ν
PreAcc{h<=u}
Acc(u)
Init(c)
PostAcc{h <= U}
PostChk[0](c)
Free PostChk[m−1](c)
h = 0 (Q[m−1]==−1)
(Q[0]==−1)
(h >= L)
(h >= l)
h = 0
dMsg
(Q[m−2]==−1)
(ip == m)
[µ,ν]!
Q[ip] = −1; ip++; h = 0
(ip < m)
Figure 6.1: Automaton to model a CAN Channel without shared variables
of the present work, this is also a subrange of integers from 0 to some max-
imum supported v value. Q[i] may also hold the value FREE (actually, −1)
indicating that this message type is currently vacant.
The important differences in the new model are as follows. Suppose there
are m different message types and n different values (that is, a message type
is an integer in the range 0 .. (m − 1) and a message value is an integer in
the range 0 .. (n− 1)).
• In place of iIn, vIn and the single urgent channel nMsg are m × n
urgent channels nMsg[µ, ν], 0 ≤ µ < m, 0 ≤ ν < n.
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• In place of the committed location M2S is the family of committed loca-
tions M2S[µ, ν], 0 ≤ µ < m, 0 ≤ ν < n, with urgent synchronising edges
decorated nMsg[µ, ν]? fanning out from location Free to M2S[µ, ν]. In
figure 6.1 the thick arrows denote such bundles of edges. These edges
play a role analogous to the synchronising edge
Free
nMsg?,Q[iIn]:=vIn,...−→ M2S
in figure 5.1 (p93).
• There are also families of committed locations PreAcc[µ, ν], Acc[µ, ν],
PostAcc[µ, ν], 0 ≤ µ < m, 0 ≤ ν < n in addition to locations PreAcc,
Acc (urgent), PostAcc. The thick arrows in the figure between these
locations denote bundles of edges fanning-in or fanning-out.
• Note, in particular, the arrows Acc[µ, ν] dMsg[µ,ν]!−→ PostAcc fanning in.
These are analogous to the edges in figure 5.1 (p93),
Acc
iDlvr := ip,vDlvr := vp−→ S1 dMsg!−→ PostAcc
• Similarly, the edges labelled nMsg[µ, ν]? from PreAcc to PreAcc[µ, ν]
and from PostAcc to PostAcc[µ, ν], followed by edges back again guarded
by the condition (Q[µ] == ν), are analogous to the self-loops on PreAcc
and PostAcc in figure 5.1.
• The array Q[] is still present in the new model but is a local variable.
The shared variables iIn, vIn, iDlvr, vDlvr have been replaced by the
multiple synchronisations nMsg[µ, ν], dMsg[µ, ν].
• Note the edges from PostAcc to PostChk[0] to ... to PostChk[µ] ... to
PostChk[m−1] to Free with bundles of edges, an edge from PostChk[µ]
to M2S[µ, ν] guarded by (Q[µ] == ν) and with update Q[µ] = −1.
These provide for messages being removed from the queue in priority
order (µ == 0 first) and sent.
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The corresponding part of the old model (fig 5.1, p93) is the guarded
self-loop at location M2S together with the guarded edges from here to
locations Free and PreAcc, using local variables ip, vp. In the new
model, the multiple paths indexed by µ and ν values replace these local
variables.
It should be borne in mind throughout this account that the µ, ν are
metavariables – every occurrence of them in the foregoing in reality occurs
as specific values occurring in the context of an indexed set of UPPAAL
tokens – locations, synchronisation channels and so forth.
The following pseudo code is an UPPAAL xta listing of the new channel:
compare this with the listing in §5.3.2. The metavariables µ, ν in the account
above appear here as µ, ν also; lines containing these metavariables and dec-
orated with inequalities on them, such as [0 ≤ µ < m] and/or [0 ≤ ν < n]
are to be understood as being repeated over all (integer) values of µ, ν sat-
isfying the inequalities. Symbols rendered in figure 6.1 and the commentary
on it, as for instance M2S_[µ, ν], are written below as M2S_µ_ν and so forth,
and expanded into “proper” UPPAAL xta as M2S_000_000, M2S_000_001,
..., M2S_001_000, ... and so on.
process Channel(const int l, const int u, const int L, const int U,
urgent chan nMsg_µ_ν[0 ≤ µ < m, 0 ≤ ν < n],
broadcast chan dMsg_µ_ν[0 ≤ µ < m, 0 ≤ ν < n]) {
clock h;
int[0,m] ip;
int[0,n− 1] vp;
int[-1,n− 1] Q[m];
state
Init, Free,
M2S_µ_ν[0 ≤ µ < m, 0 ≤ ν < n], PreAcc_µ_ν[0 ≤ µ < m, 0 ≤ ν < n],
Acc_µ_ν[0 ≤ µ < m, 0 ≤ ν < n], PostAcc_µ_ν[0 ≤ µ < m, 0 ≤ ν < n],
PreAcc{h<=u}, Acc, PostAcc{h<=U},
PostChk_µ[0 ≤ µ < m];
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commit
Init,
M2S_µ_ν[0 ≤ µ < m, 0 ≤ ν < n], PreAcc_µ_ν[0 ≤ µ < m, 0 ≤ ν < n],
Acc_µ_ν[0 ≤ µ < m, 0 ≤ ν < n],
PostAcc_µ_ν[0 ≤ µ < m, 0 ≤ ν < n],
PostChk_µ[0 ≤ µ < m];
urgent
Acc;
init
Init;
trans
Init -> Init {
guard ip < µ;
assign Q[ip] = -1, ip++, h = 0;
},
Init -> Free { guard ip == µ; assign h = 0; },
Free -> M2S_µ_ν { sync nMsg_µ_ν?; }[0 ≤ µ < m, 0 ≤ ν < n],
M2S_µ_ν -> PreAcc { assign ip=µ, vp=ν, h = 0; }
[0 ≤ µ < m, 0 ≤ ν < n],
PreAcc -> PreAcc_µ_ν { sync nMsg_µ_ν?; }[0 ≤ µ < m, 0 ≤ ν < n],
PreAcc_µ_ν -> PreAcc { assign Q[µ] = ν;}[0 ≤ µ < m, 0 ≤ ν < n],
PreAcc -> Acc { guard h >= l; assign h = 0; },
Acc -> Acc_µ_ν { guard ip == µ && vp == ν; }
[0 ≤ µ < m, 0 ≤ ν < n],
Acc_µ_ν -> PostAcc {sync dMsg_µ_ν!; }[0 ≤ µ < m, 0 ≤ ν < n],
PostAcc -> PostAcc_µ_ν {sync nMsg_µ_ν?;}[0 ≤ µ < m, 0 ≤ ν < n],
PostAcc_µ_ν -> PostAcc {assign Q[µ]=ν;}[0 ≤ µ < m, 0 ≤ ν < n],
PostAcc -> PostChk_0 { guard h >= L; },
PostChk_(µ− 1)->PostChk_µ {guard Q[(µ− 1)] == -1;}[1 ≤ µ < m],
PostChk_(m− 1)->Free {guard Q[(m− 1)] == -1;},
PostChk_µ -> M2S_µ_ν {guard Q[µ] == ν; assign Q[µ] = -1;}
[0 ≤ µ < m, 0 ≤ ν < n];
This pseudo-UPPAAL code is expanded, for a particular choice of value
for the parameters m and n, the number of message types and or message
payload values supported, by a software tool CANGen devised by the author.
The CANGen output for m = 3, n = 4 corresponding to the pseudocode above
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appears as appendix C.
It will be evident that the no-shared-variables model of the CAN chan-
nel has a large number – m × n – of locations and synchronisation chan-
nels. In effect these have been taken on in lieu of the shared variables
(iIn, vIn, iDlvr, iDlvr) of the old model, whose values occupied a similarly
sized portion of the state space. Technically, this change is not expensive in
terms of the state space the model-checker must search, although admittedly
it is conceptually unwieldy. It will transpire, however, that even with the
large number of locations and synchronisations, the compositional approach
afforded by this model does afford considerable speed-up and economy in
model-checking.
As to the unwieldiness of the large number of locations and synchroni-
sations: in the sequel and in practice we spend very little time looking at
the “full” automaton, the CANGen output. the pseudocode is easier to read
and also to diagram. As will be seen in chapter 8 one can concisely draw
automaton diagrams corresponding to the pseudocode, in which a single edge
or location may represent a “bundle” of edges or locations indexed by µ, ν
(which also figure in guards, synchronisations, updates decorating the edges).
It is thus possible to retain a simple view of the model in spite of the poten-
tially large number of locations and edges.
Practical limits to the size of m × n will be discussed in chapter 8. Of
course, in practice it may well be possible simplify a model checking problem
by working with an abstraction in which these parameters are of modest size.
6.2 The Equivalence of the Two CANModels
The new model was developed with reference to the old one, and intended to
have exactly the same semantics, so that the equivalence with bCANdle is
preserved. To demonstrate this equivalence formally a bisimulation will be
developed between the following two systems -
1. An UPPAAL system combining an old-style CAN channel model with
a sending process which repeatedly sends messages of some type µ (0 ≤
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µ < m) and value ν (0 ≤ ν < n), chosen non-deterministically, and a
receiving process which indefinitely and repeatedly waits for messages
from the channel and takes receipt of them.
The sender’s duty cycle will set shared variable iIn to µ and vIn to ν
before offering a synchronisation on nMsg. The receiver will, on each
synchronisation with dMsg save the shared variables iDlvr and vDlvr
and switch to a location determined by their values. See figure 6.2. As
before, (c) denotes an UPPAAL committed location and (u) an urgent
location; and the thick arrows a bundle of edges fanning in or out,
replicated over all µ, ν.
µiIn = νvIn = 
SInit
Sender
nMsg! && vDlvr == ν)
(iDlvr == µ
R[µ, ν] (u)
Receiver
Init R(c)
dMsg?
Figure 6.2: A Sender and a Receiver process to drive the old Channel au-
tomaton
2. An UPPAAL system combining a new-style CAN channel model with
a sending process which repeatedly sends messages of some type µ and
value ν, chosen non-deterministically, and a receiving process which
indefinitely and repeatedly waits for messages from the channel and
takes receipt of them – just as above.
In this case the sender will non-deterministically choose a synchroniza-
tion nMsg µ ν to offer to the channel. The receiver will wait for any
one of the m× n synchronisations dMsg µ ν. See figure 6.3.
The bisimulation will be a relation between states of the two systems.
The variables of the “new” system (sender, new channel model, receiver)
are just the local variables of the channel automaton: integer subranges ip,
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nMsg[µ, ν]!
SInit
Sender
[µ, ν]
dMsg[µ, ν]?
R[µ, ν](u)
Receiver
Init
Figure 6.3: A Sender and a Receiver process to drive the new Channel au-
tomaton
vp, array Q[], clock h. Thus a state of the “new” system is a valuation of
these variables together with a vector of locations.
The “old” system (sender, old channel model, receiver) has just these
variables plus integer subranges iIn, vIn, iDlvr, vDlvr. Thus a state is a
valuation of these variables together with a vector of locations.
The semantics of UPPAAL committed locations say that no time may
pass in a state containing a committed location, and that after a transition to
such a state, the next transition must be from a state containing a committed
location. This means, that in the absence of simultaneous committed states
elsewhere in the model a sequence of transitions
C1 → C2 → ...→ Cn → D
in which all but the last location are committed may be regarded as atomic.
The committed locations are interposed simply to enforce a particular se-
quence of actions – synchronisations, assignments, including choices driven
by guards. This, indeed, is how committed locations have been used in the
present work. Let us call a sequence of edges like this a committed sequence.
6.2.1 Definition - Weak Bisimulation of UPPAAL Sys-
tems
Bearing this in mind, a bisimulation between the “old” and the “new” system
will be developed as a relation between states of the two systems in which
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only non-committed locations figure, and such that whenever we have related
states σold, σnew,
1. For any sequence of timed transitions
σold → σ1old → σ2old → ...→ τold
in which the transitions arise from a committed sequence of edges of
one of the components, there is a sequence (based on a committed
sequence in one of the components)
σnew → σ1new → σ2new → ...→ τnew
for some τnew related to τold;
2. For any sequence of timed transitions
σnew → σ1new → σ2new → ...→ τnew
in which the transitions arise from a committed sequence of edges of
one of the components, there is a sequence (based on a committed
sequence in one of the components)
σold → σ1old → σ2old → ...→ τold
and τold and τnew are related.
Any such relation we term a weak bisimulation of UPPAAL systems. Of
course, it is strong enough for us to regard the systems as equivalent in their
external behaviour.
6.2.2 The bisimulation
Let us write (So, Co, Ro, vo) for a state of the “old” system: these are, re-
spectively, non-committed locations of the Sender (figure 6.2), the Channel
automaton (figure 5.1, page 93), and the Receiver (figure 6.2); and a valua-
tion of the clock and other variables of the old system.
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Similarly we write (Sn, Cn, Rn, vn) for a state of the “new” system (figures
6.3, 6.1).
Note that the domain of vo is the domain of vn together with the shared
variables iIn, vIn, iDlvr, vDlvr, and Co, Cn ∈ {Free, PreAcc, Acc, PostAcc}.
Let us say (So, Co, Ro, vo)B(Sn, Cn, Rn, vn) iff -
1. Co = Cn ∈ {Free, PreAcc, Acc, PostAcc};
2. vo and vn agree on the channel local variables;
3. So = Init⇔ Sn = Init;
4. ∀µ∀ν : (So = S ∧ vo(iIn) = µ ∧ vo(vIn) = ν)⇔ Sn = S[µ, ν];
(the quantifiers range over 0 ≤ µ < m, 0 ≤ ν < n)
5. Ro = Init⇔ Rn = Init;
6. ∀µ∀ν : (Ro = R[µ, ν]⇔ Rn = R[µ, ν];
7. ∀µ∀ν : (Ro = R[µ, ν]⇒ v0(iDlvr) = µ ∧ v0(vDlvr) = ν.
6.2.3 Theorem
The relation between state of the “old” and the “new” systems defined by
§6.2.2 is a weak bisimulation of UPPAAL systems.
Proof. It will be useful to refer to figures 5.1 (page 93) and 6.1 (page 117)
and the (pseudo) UPPAAL code relating to these diagrams.
In both systems, any run begins from a state in which all variables have
value 0, and both channel models pass initially through committed locations
to Free, where the message queue Q[] has been initialised so that all entries
are −1 = FREE. The two FREE locations are related.
A committed sequence in the “old” model from Free to PreAcc will neces-
sarily involve first synchronising on nMsg with the sender process (ip, vp will
be set to the type and payload of the message sent), then the channel’s local
clock h is reset, then (while l ≤ h ≤ u) there may be 0 or more transitions
on the loop at PreAcc synchronising on nMsg with the sender process and
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resulting in the queue being populated with more messages. The correspond-
ing sequence of events in the “new” model is first, a transition synchronising
with the sender process on nMsg[µ, ν] (for some µ, ν), then the message type
and payload value (in fact, µ, ν) are saved to ip, vp and the channel’s local
clock h reset, then (while l ≤ h ≤ u) there are 0 or more transition sequences
from PreAcc via a synchronisation with the sender on some nMsg[µ, ν] (in
general different from the previous µ, ν) to committed location PreAcc[µ, ν]
and back via a transition which updates Q[µ] to ν. Thus, the variables h, ip,
vp, Q[] end up in the same state in the two models. From this one can find,
for any sequence in the old model (..., Free, ...) → ... → (..., PreAcc, ...), a
corresponding sequence in the new model leading from a related source state
to a related target state.
The reasoning is simpler in the case of a committed sequence in either
model from PreAcc to Acc as the two channel models correspond closely. The
sequence in the old model will begin with 0 or more transitions on the loop
at PreAcc synchronising on nMsg with the sender process and resulting in the
queue being populated with more messages. The corresponding sequence in
the new model will begin with 0 or more transition sequences from PreAcc
via a synchronisation with the sender on some nMsg[µ, ν] to PreAcc[µ, ν] and
back via a transition which updates Q[µ] to ν. As in the previous case, the
two corresponding sequences update the system state in the same way and the
bisimilarity of sequences (..., PreAcc, ...)→ ...→ (..., Acc, ...) is preserved.
A committed sequence in the old model from Acc to PostAcc updates
shared variables iDlvr, vDlvr from ip, vp, then synchronises on dMsg with
the receiver process, then possibly (while L ≤ h ≤ U) does 0 or more transi-
tions on the loop at PostAcc synchronising on nMsg with the sender process
and resulting in the queue being populated with more messages. A corre-
sponding sequence in the new model goes from Acc to Acc[µ, ν] matching
µ, ν to the current values of ip, vp, then synchronising with the receiver
process on dMsg[µ, ν]. This may be followed (while L ≤ h ≤ U) with 0
or more transition sequences from PostAcc via a synchronisation with the
sender on some nMsg[µ, ν] to committed location PostAcc[µ, ν] and back via
a transition which updates Q[µ] to ν. Again it can be seen that correspond-
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ing sequence in the two models update state in equivalent ways, so that
bisimilarity of sequences of the form (..., Acc, ...)→ ...→ (..., PostAcc, ...) is
preserved.
A committed sequence in the two models from PostAcc will begin with 0
or more sub-sequences synchronising with the sender nMsg or nMsg[µ, ν] as the
case may be and, as we have seen, updating the message queue in equivalent
ways. After this, the sequence in the old model goes to committed location
PostChk resetting ip to 0, then executes repeated ip++ updates until either
• a message Q[ip] is found waiting to be sent:v there is a move to com-
mitted location M2S then to PreAcc and vp is set to Q[ip], Q[ip] to
FREE an h to 0; or
• ip reached the end of the queue (QCAP or m in the new model) finding
no waiting messages: in this case the sequence moves to location Free.
An examination of the committed locations PostChk[µ], 0 ≤ µ < m
and the guarded edges between them and from them to M2S[µ, ν] will show
exactly the same logic. If µ is the smallest such that Q[µ] is not -1 (FREE) the
sequence goes PostAcc → PostChk[0] → ... → M2S[µ, ν] (for some ν) and
thence to PreAcc, updating ip, vp appropriately and resetting the clock. If
the queue is empty, the sequence rather goes all the way to PostChk[m− 1]
and thence to Free. (m is the number of distinct message types supported
– QCAP in the old model.)
Thus, again, the sequences do equivalent things to the system state, and
the bisimilarity is preserved.
6.3 Conclusion
The formal derivation from a bCANdle model of a broadcasting embedded
system of a semantically equivalent parallel composite of timed automata has
now been developed into a construction of a parallel composite of UPPAAL
timed automata which communicate without recourse to shared variables. As
pointed out at the beginning of the chapter this will allow the construction of
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compositional models of CAN-based systems to which assume-guarantee-type
compositionality theorems can be applied, to infer properties of a model from
properties of abstractions of it. The compositionality results are presented
in the next chapter.
Chapter 7
Compositionality Theorems
In this chapter are developed compositionality theorems which will under-
pin the compositional analysis of the broadcasting embedded system models
developed in the framework outlined in the chapters above. The definitions
and results presented here are motivated by the work of Kaynar, Lynch et al.
[77], [78] in which they develop a type of timed-automaton-style modelling to
which they apply a type of assume-guarantee reasoning. It will be seen that
our timed automata and also UPPAAL models map into their formalism,
although we have found it instructive to prove analogues of their assume-
guarantee result directly for our timed automata and UPPAAL models.
The main result of this work appears in section 7.5, where an assume-
guarantee theorem for UPPAAL systems (theorem 7.5.2) is developed and
presented. This (and some lesser results in §7.6) underpin the practical work
discussed in chapter 8.
7.1 Preamble
The starting point of the present work was the modelling real-time systems
with timed automata of the type developed by Alur and Dill (see [7]) and
with hybrid automata, using constructs which generalise them in a natural
way. The UPPAAL tool set uses essentially hybrid automata of this form
also [109].
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Kaynar, Lynch, Segala and Vaandrager in [77], [78] develop a form of
Timed Automaton for timed systems with data input and output. Their
formal definition is different from ours. However they explain how their
construct subsumes ours (which they call Alur-Dill automata) and they state
(but do not prove in detail) a useful “assume-guarantee” theorem allowing
properties of an automaton which is a parallel composition to be inferred
from properties of its components.
The purpose of this chapter is to describe some work done comparing
the automaton constructions of Kaynar, Lynch et al. with ours, and ex-
ploring their compositionality theorem, proving a version of it for “our”
(Alur/Dill/UPPAAL) type of timed automata.
7.2 Timed Automata
We have been modelling with a notion of timed automata which Kaynar,
Lynch et al. term “Alur-Dill” automata: (L, l0, A,H,→, I) where
• L is a set of control locations
• l0 is the initial location
• A is a set of discrete action labels
• H is a set of clock variables
• → is a transition relation. Specifically, let Z(H) denote the set of
boolean conjunctions of upper or lower bound expressions on clock
variables in H; then →⊆ L×Z(H)× A× ℘(H)× L. We write
l
ζ,a,λ−→ l′
for (l, ζ, a, λ, l′) ∈→, meaning that action a is enabled when the au-
tomation is at location l and the guard ζ ∈ Z(H) is satisfied by the
values of the variables inH; then the automaton may transit to location
l′, resetting the clocks in subset λ ⊆ H.
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• I : L → Z(H), I(l) is a predicate that must be satisfied by the clocks
while the automaton is at location l.
7.2.1 KLSV Structures
Kaynar, Lynch et al. [77], on the other hand, describe an automaton in
a different way as a structure (X,Q,Θ, E,H,D, T ). X is a set of internal
variables ; Q ⊆ val(X) a set of states (val(X) is the set of valuations –
assignments of values to variables in X; thus a state is identified with a
valuation of variables). Θ ⊆ Q is a set of initial states and E,H are sets of
possible external and internal actions ; E ∩H = ∅. This structure they call
a timed automaton; in their timed I/O automaton E is further partitioned
into a disjoint pair of subsets I of input actions and O of output actions,
although these will not concern us much at present.
Let A , E ∪ H. D ⊆ Q × A × Q is the transition relation and T a
set of possible trajectories in Q. These are “curves” in Q, mappings from a
left-closed interval of the time line ([0, b] or [0, b) or [0,∞), b ∈ R) to Q. T
has certain closure properties:
• For each q ∈ Q the point trajectory [0, 0]→ Q, 0 7→ q is in T ;
• a trajectory τ ′ is a prefix of τ , written τ ′ ≤ τ , iff τ ′ is the restriction of
τ to a left-closed subinterval of its domain.
If τ ′ ≤ τ ∈ T then τ ∈ T ;
• if τ is a trajectory and t ∈ dom(τ) then the suffix τ D t (to use the
notation of [77]) is the mapping u 7→ τ(t + u) defined for u ≥ 0 such
that u+ t ∈ dom(τ), which defines a trajectory.
Any suffix of a trajectory in T is in T ;
• If τ is a closed trajectory – dom(τ) = [0, b], a finite closed interval,
and τ ′ another trajectory, the concatenation τ a τ ′ is the mapping
u 7→ τ(u) if u ∈ [0, b] and u 7→ τ ′(u− b) if u > b and u− b ∈ dom(τ ′)1.
1[77] proves a number of expected formal properties, such as τ ≤ υ iff (∃τ ′)τ a τ ′ = υ,
and that ≤ is a complete partial ordering.
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If τk, k = 0, 1, 2, ... is a sequence of closed trajectories with domains
[0, bk] and (∀k)τk(bk) = τk+1(0), another sequence is defined recursively
by τ ′0 , τ0, τ
′
k+1 , τ
′
k a τk+1. This sequence {τk} is monotonic in-
creasing with respect to the prefix relation (which is a complete partial
ordering) ≤. The infinite concatenation τ0 a τ1 a τ2 a ... is defined to
be the ≤-least upper bound of the the directed set {τ ′k|k = 0, 1, 2, ...}.
T is closed under the concatenation operation: Given a finite or infinite
sequence of trajectories as above, in T , their concatenation is in T .
An execution fragment is a hybrid sequence τ0a1τ1a2τ2... of alternating
trajectories and actions (ai ∈ A); a run or execution is an execution frag-
ment such that τ0(0) ∈ Θ. The sequence is infinite, or else the last term is a
trajectory; and each trajectory other than the last is closed. There is a prefix
ordering among such sequences: α ≤ β iff α = β or α is finite, ending in a
closed trajectory and this forms an initial segment of sequence β. Similarly,
if α is a finite sequence τ0a1τ1a2...τn with a closed final trajectory, the con-
catenation α a β is formed by concatenating τn with the initial trajectory
of β. Kaynar, Lynch et al. [77] show that α ≤ β iff (∃β′)α a β′ = β, and
that ≤ among hybrid sequences renders them a complete partially ordered
set, so that concatenation of an infinite hybrid sequence can be defined in a
fashion similar to that of a sequence of trajectories.
7.2.2 Timed Automata and KLSV Structures
Our timed automaton (L, l0, A,H,→, I) can be represented as a structure of
this type:
• Let X = H ∪ {loc} where loc is a discrete variable whose values are
the control locations L;
• Q = val(X);
• Actions: E = A,H = ∅;
• Θ is the set of valuations which assign 0 to all clock variables (H) and
the value l0 to loc.
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• D is the set of (x, a, x′), a ∈ A, x, x′ ∈ val(X), such that l ζ,a,λ−→ l′ in
(L, l0, A,H,→, I), and x(loc) = l, x |= ζ, x′(loc) = l′, x′ |= I(l′), and
∀h ∈ λ.x′(h) = 0.
• The trajectories are constrained by the requirements that the discrete
values of loc do not vary in time, the values of the clock variables have
unit rate of change, and the location invariants I(l) be satisfied.
See, for example, [77] pp. 38-40 (where our timed automata are called “Alur-
Dill automata”). The KLSV structure so defined by Kaynar, Lynch et al. is
functionally equivalent to the timed transition system of the timed automa-
ton.
Alternatives to setting E = A, H = ∅ are E = ∅, H = A, or possibly
partitioning A into E ∪ H so that E contains the edge labels intended to
participate in synchronisations, while H contains those intended to be purely
“local”, H = A− E.
7.2.3 Composition
KLSV structures of the type described in [77] can be composed in parallel;
we have already seen such a construction for simple timed automata. Briefly,
Ai = (Xi, Qi,Θi, Ei, Hi, Di, Ti), for i = 1, 2 are compatible iff H1 ∩ (H2 ∪
E2) = ∅ and vice versa and X1 ∩ X2 = ∅. In that case, the composite is
A1 ‖ A2 = (X,Q,Θ, E,H,D, T ) where
• X = X1 ∪X2,
• Q = {x ∈ val(X) : x ↾ Xi ∈ Qi, i = 1, 2}
• Θ = {x ∈ val(X) : x ↾ Xi ∈ Θi, i = 1, 2}
• E = E1 ∪ E2, H = H1 ∪H2,
• For x, x′ ∈ Q, a ∈ A ⊆ E ∪H, (x, a, x′) ∈ D iff for i = 1, 2,
either a ∈ Ai = Ei ∪Hi and (x ↾ Xi, a, x′ ↾ Xi) ∈ Di;
or a /∈ Ai and x ↾ Xi = x′ ↾ Xi
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• T consists of X-trajectories whose restrictions in Xi lie in Ti
This composition turns out to be equivalent to ours for structures derived
from our automata. Consider two of our automata: Ai = (Li, l0i , Ai,Hi,→i
, Ii), i = 1, 2. Translating these into the formalism of [77] as above yields, for
i = 1, 2,
• Xi = Hi ∪ {loci} where loci’s values are the Li;
• Qi = val(Xi);
• Ei = Ai, Hi = ∅;
• x ∈ Θi ⇔ ∀h ∈ Hi.x(h) = 0 & x(loci) = l0i .
• (x, a, x′) ∈ Di iff for some li ζi,a,λi−→i l′i in Ai, x(loci) = li,
x′(loci) = l
′
i, x |= ζi, and x(h) = 0 for h ∈ λi.
Forming the composite of [77],
• X = H1 ∪H2 ∪ {loc1, loc2},
• Q = val(X)
• x ∈ Θ iff for every h ∈ H1 ∪ H2, x(h) = 0 and also x(loci) = l0i for
i = 1, 2.
• E = A1 ∪ A2, H = ∅,
• For x, x′ ∈ Q, a ∈ A1 ∪ A2, (x, a, x′) ∈ D iff for i = 1, 2,
either a ∈ Ai and (x ↾ Xi, a, x′ ↾ Xi) ∈ Di;
or a /∈ Ai and x ↾ Xi = x′ ↾ Xi.
The last item above is equivalent to: for i = 1, 2,
either a ∈ Ai and for some li ζi,a,λi−→i l′i in Ai, x(loci) = li,
x′(loci) = l
′
i, x |= ζi, and x(h) = 0 for h ∈ λi;
or a /∈ Ai and x, x′ agree on Hi and x(loci) = x′(loci). (7.1)
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By comparison, our parallel composite is
A1 ‖ A2 = (L1 × L2, (l01, l02), A1 ∪ A2,→, I)
where
I(l1, l2) = I1(l1) ∧ I2(l2) and
(l1, l2)
ζ,a,λ−→ (l′1, l′2) iff one of the following obtains for some l1 ζ1,a,λ1−→1 l′1 in A1
and/or some l2
ζ2,a,λ2→2 l′2 in A2:
a ∈ A1 ∩ A2, ζ = ζ1 ∧ ζ2, λ = λ1 ∪ λ2 (7.2)
a ∈ A1 − A2, ζ = ζ1, λ = λ1, l2 = l′2 (7.3)
a ∈ A2 − A1, ζ = ζ2, λ = λ2, l1 = l′1 (7.4)
If we identify {loc1, loc2} with {loc} where x(loc) = (x(loc1), x(loc2))
then we see that the two composite constructions are equivalent.
The definition of (l1, l2)
ζ,a,λ−→ (l′1, l′2) is essentially equivalent to condition
(7.1) above, bearing in mind that if a /∈ A1, A2, the condition yields a trivial
“identity transition”.
Condition (7.2) gives “synchronising transitions” and conditions (7.3, 7.4)
give “interleaving transitions”.
7.2.4 UPPAAL Automata as KLSV Structures
An UPPAAL process template can be rendered as a KLSV-style timed au-
tomaton in a way that naturally generalises the definition of §7.2.2:
• Let X = H ∪ {loc} where loc is, as before, a discrete variable whose
values are the control locations of the template; but now H is the set
of all variables of the process template.
• Q = val(X) is now the set of all valuations of variables in X;
• Actions: E is the set of actions which synchronise: c? or c! where c is
some channel identifier. Internal actions are anonymous in UPPAAL
(“τ”): H is thus a singleton.
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• Θ is the set of valuations which assign 0 to all variables inH, or initialise
them as prescribed by their UPPAAL declarations, and assign the value
l0 to loc.
• D is the set of (x, a, x′), a ∈ E ∪ H, x, x′ ∈ val(X), such that there is
an edge from location x(loc) to x′(loc) labelled a, and x satisfies the
guard (if any) on the edge, and x′ satisfies the invariant at x′(loc), and
x′ respects any updates that occur on the edge.
• The trajectories are constrained by the requirements that the discrete
values of loc do not vary in time, neither do the values of non-clock
variables, the values of the clock variables have unit rate of change, and
the location invariants be always satisfied.
7.3 An Assume-Guarantee Theorem
7.3.1 Implementation Relationships
Kaynar, Lynch, Segala and Vaandrager in [77], [78] are interested in imple-
mentation relationships between their automata. Of particular interest is a
relation A1  A2 between two automata of the (X,Q,Θ, E,H,D, T )-type,
KLSV-structures: every trace of A1 is also a trace of A2.
As seen above, in the parlance of Kaynar, Lynch et al., an execution
fragment of a (KLSV) automaton is a sequence τ0, a1, τ1, a2, ...of alternate
trajectories and discrete actions. Each trajectory τk is a mapping of an
interval of time into Q, and so tracks changes in values of the continuous
variables as an interval of time passes. Each ak is an action drawn from
E ∪ H. A trace is an execution restricted to the empty set of variables:
that is, a sequence showing pure passages of time alternating with discrete
actions.
A1  A2 therefore means, in effect, every possible behaviour (timed se-
quence of actions) of A1 is a possible behaviour of A2; or more succinctly,
the behaviour specified by A2 is implemented by A1.
7.3. AN ASSUME-GUARANTEE THEOREM 137
Kaynar, Lynch et al. call two of their (KLSV) automata comparable if
they have the same external action labels (set E). Their I/O automata have
E partitioned into input actions I and output actions O: in this case these
two sets of action labels are the same if the automata are comparable. They
call two automata compatible if the two sets of states X are disjoint, each
set of internal actions H is disjoint from the other’s E ∪H, and the output
action labels O are disjoint.
7.3.2 Simulation and Trace Inclusion
Given comparable KLSV structures Ai = (Xi, Qi,Θi, Ei, Hi, Di, Ti), i = 1, 2,
a simulation is defined as a relation between states, R ⊆ Q1×Q2, analogously
to §2.4.2:
• ∀q1 ∈ Θ1∃q2 ∈ Θ2 : (q1, q2) ∈ R.
• If (q1, q2) ∈ R and (q1, a, q′1) ∈ D1 then there is an execution fragment
in A2 consisting of the action a preceded by a closed trajectory from2
q′1 and succeeded by a closed trajectory to
3 q′2 (say), and the trace
in A2, the restriction of the trajectories to clocks, is the same as the
trace in A1: action a preceded and succeeded by point trajectories; and
(q′1, q
′
2) ∈ R.
• If (q1, q2) ∈ R and τ is a closed trajectory in A1 from q1, to q′1, say,
then there is in A2 a closed trajectory with the same trace as τ , from
q2 to a state q
′
2 such that (q
′
1, q
′
2) ∈ R.
Kaynar, Lynch et al. term this a forward simulation – see [77] §4.5 (p41).
They prove (Theorem 4.23, Corollary 4.24) that if such a forward simulation
exists, then the traces of A1 are included in the traces of A2, i.e., A1  A2.
2By a trajectory τ from q we mean τ(0) = q.
3Recall a closed trajectory τ is defined on a closed interval [0, b]; by a trajectory to q′
we mean τ(b) = q′
138 CHAPTER 7. COMPOSITIONALITY THEOREMS
Proposition If we refer back to the representation of a simple timed au-
tomaton as a KLSV structure, subsection 7.2.2 we can infer a simulation re-
lation exists between (the timed transition systems of) two timed automata,
in the sense of §2.4.2, then again the traces of the first timed automaton are
included in the traces of the second.
7.3.3 An Assume-Guarantee Theorem
Kaynar, Lynch et al. define a Timed I/O Automaton ([77], section 7) to
be a structure consisting of what we have hitherto called a KLSV structure,
(X,Q,Θ, E,H,D, T ) together with a partition E = I ∪O, I ∩O = ∅ of the
external actions into a set of input actions I and a set of output actions O.
The structure must satisfy two additional axioms:
• An input-action enabling axiom: ∀x ∈ Q ∀a ∈ I ∃x′ : (x, a, x′) ∈ D;
• A time-passage-enabling axiom: For every x ∈ Q there is a τ ∈ T from
x such that either τ is infinite or τ is closed and is to a state where
some internal (H) or output (O) action is enabled.
These structures are an interesting possible subject of future work, but
what interests us at present is a form of assume-guarantee theorem which
these authors state as Theorem 8.7:
Given automata A1,A2,B1,B2 such that
1. A1,A2 are comparable;
2. B1,B2 are comparable;
3. Ai is compatible with Bi (i = 1, 2);
4. The set of traces of A2 and the set of traces of B2 are limit-closed (i.e.
the set contains all sequences of which all finite prefixes are in the set);
5. Suffixing a trace over A2 with a trajectory over ∅ yields again a trace
over A2; and similarly for B2;
IF A1 ‖ B2  A2 ‖ B2 AND A2 ‖ B1  A2 ‖ B2 THEN A1 ‖ B1  A2 ‖ B2.
7.3. AN ASSUME-GUARANTEE THEOREM 139
7.3.4 UPPAAL Templates as TIOA
An UPPAAL process template can be construed as a timed I/O automaton
in the sense of Kaynar, Lynch, et al. [77] provided it satisfies certain extra
axioms. Let us define an UPPAAL process template to be an UPPAAL I/O
automaton iff
1. (Input enabling axiom) For every synchronisation of the form c? and
at every location other than a committed or urgent location there is an
enabled edge from the location labelled c?.
2. (Time passage enabling axiom) At every location, either the invariant
is satisfied for all time, or time passage proceeds to a state at which
some output (c! for some c) or local (internal) action is enabled.
The assume-guarantee theorem of [77] can be stated and proved in terms
of these structures. One obtains s KLSV-style I/O automaton by defining
the KLSV structure as in §7.2.4 and additionally defining the set O of output
actions as those actions of the structure which are c!-synchronisations for
channels c, and the set I of input actions as the c?-synchronisations. The
two conditions set out above are required in order to satisfy the input action
enabling and time passage enabling axioms for KLSV-type I/O automata.
In order to state the theorem, first note that a trace as defined by [77] to
be an execution restricted to the empty set of variables and external actions
(cf §3.4.3) is, in the case of an UPPAAL template, simply an alternating
sequence of time passages and discrete actions, starting with a time passage:
l0
t0→ l0 a1→ l1 t1→ l1 a2→ l2 t2→ ...
The invariant at location ln is satisfied throughout tn. Location ln+1
carries a (timed) state which incorporates any update associated with action
an. The timed state associated with ln after time passage tn satisfies any
guard on an. Of course, the trace is the sequence t0a0t1a1t2...; the locations
are not part of the trace. A closed trace finishes with a time passage, or
the sequence may go to infinity. A time passage of 0 corresponds to a point
trajectory of c.
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Also following these authors, let us call the set of traces of an UPPAAL
I/O automaton limit-closed iff any sequence, all of whose finite prefixes are
a trace, is itself a trace. Also say that two UPPAAL I/O automata are
comparable if they have the same external actions (i.e. synchronisations)
and compatible if the internal actions of either are disjoint from the actions
of the other. The latter is what we require in order to be able to compose
two automata. Let us also follow them in writing A1  A2 (when A1,A2 are
comparable) to denote that traces of A1 ⊆ traces of A2.
Composition of automata is our composition. In §7.2.3 it was seen to be
equivalent to that of Kaynar, Lynch et al. and this is the case for UPPAAL
automata too.
In the sequel, we speak of “UPPAAL I/O automata” while considering
that an UPPAAL I/O automaton may in fact itself be a composite; so that
the locations ln referred to above are actually vectors.
7.3.4.1 Theorem
Let A1, A2 be comparable UPPAAL I/O automata, B1, B2 be comparable
UPPAAL I/O automata, and suppose each Ai is compatible with each Bj
(i, j = 1, 2). Suppose further that
1. The set of traces of A2 is limit-closed, and the set of traces of B2 is
limit-closed;
2. Concatenating a closed trace of A2 with further time passage yields
again a trace of A2 (i.e., the invariants are satisfied) and likewise for
B2;
THEN A1 ‖ B2  A2 ‖ B2 and A2 ‖ B1  A2 ‖ B2 imply A1 ‖ B1  A2 ‖ B2.
Remark This is exactly theorem 8.7 Kaynar, Lynch et al. [77] (see also
§7.3.3), applied to UPPAAL I/O automata and stated in terms of these. It
is instructive also to work through these authors’ proof in terms of UPPAAL
I/O automata.
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Proof Suppose A1 ‖ B2  A2 ‖ B2 and A2 ‖ B1  A2 ‖ B2.
One first proves that any closed trace of A1 ‖ B1 is a trace also of A2 ‖ B2.
This is proven by induction on the length of a trace
l0
t0→ l0 a1→ l1 t1→ l1 a2→ l2 t2→ ...
The locations here are, of course vectors of A1 components and B1 com-
ponents.
The base of the induction is a simple time transition l0
t0→ l0 in A1 ‖ B1.
Then, t0 satisfies the invariants the components of l0 in A1 ‖ B1. From the
comparability hypotheses we can infer that t0 is also a trace in A2 ‖ B2.
Now suppose given a closed trace αn = (l0
t0→ ... tn−1→ ln−1 an→ ln) in A1 ‖ B1.
Assume by induction hypothesis that the prefix αn−1 = (l0
t0→ ... tn−1→ ln−1)
in A1 ‖ B1 is actually a closed trace in A2 ‖ B2. To establish the induction,
that αn is a trace in A2 ‖ B2 there are the following cases to consider.
1. an is an output action c! of (a component of) A1 and tn = 0. In
this case, αn projects on A1 to a trace αn ↾ A1 and also αn−1 by
induction hypothesis, projects on B2 to a trace of B2. Because A1,B1
are compatible and B1,B2 are comparable, either an is an input action
(c?) of B2 or it is not an action of B2 at all. In the former case, the
input enabling axiom implies that B2 has an action an synchronising
with the A1 action an (i.e. c!, c?) whence projecting αn to the external
actions B2 gives a trace of B2. In the latter case, αn and αn−1 agree
on B2. Either way, pasting these traces on A1, B2 together, we have a
trace in A1 ‖ B2. By the hypothesis of the theorem, A1 ‖ B2  A2 ‖ B2,
this is a trace in A2 ‖ B2.
2. an is an output action c! of (a component of) B1 and tn = 0. This is
symmetrical with the previous case, using hypothesis A2 ‖ B1  A2 ‖
B2 rather than A1 ‖ B2  A2 ‖ B2.
3. an is an input action c? of both A1 and B1, and tn = 0. By induction
hypothesis, αn−1 is a trace of A2 ‖ B2. Projecting onto the two com-
ponent subsystems, we have projections of αn−1 which are traces of A2
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and of B2. Let α be a run of A2 whose trace is the projection of αn−1
on A2. Because A1 and A2 are comparable, an is an input action of A2.
By the input enabling axiom there is an input action labelled an from
the projection of ln−1 on A2. It follows that the projection of αn on A2
is a trace of A2.
Repeating this reasoning swapping the roles of A2 and B2, we see that
also the projection of αn on B2 is a trace of B2. It follows the αn is a
trace of A2 ‖ B2.
4. an is an input action of A1 but not an action of B1, and tn = 0. By
induction hypothesis, αn−1 is a trace of A2 ‖ B2. As in the previous
case, it projects to traces in A2 and in B2. Let α be a run of A2
whose trace is the projection of αn−1 on A2. Because A1 and A2 are
comparable, an is an input action of A2. By the input enabling axiom
we can concatenate to α an action ln−1 ↾ A2
an→ ln ↾ A2 (where ↾ denotes
projection). So αn projects to a trace of A2.
B1 and B2 are comparable and an is not an action of B1, hence it is
also not an action of B2. So αn, αn−1 agree on B2. Combining this
information with the previous paragraph we obtain αn as a trace in
A2 ‖ B2.
5. an is an input action of B1 but not an action of A1, and tn = 0. This
is symmetric with the previous case, swapping As and Bs.
6. tn > 0. We can assume ...
an→ ln 0→ ln in A2 ‖ B2 by induction hy-
pothesis. Project this onto each of A2, B2 and apply premiss 2 of the
theorem to each projected trace. This yields ...
an→ ln tn→ ln projecting
to a trace on each of A2, B2. It follows that in its totality it is a trace
of A2 ‖ B2.
This completes the proof that any closed trace of A1 ‖ B1 is a (closed)
traces of A2 ‖ B2.
We infer the same inclusion for all traces (including infinite ones) by
lifting closed prefixes of a trace in A1 ‖ B1 to A2 ‖ B2, projecting each of
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these onto each of A2, B2 and on each component, invoking limit-closure
(theorem premiss 1) to infer a sequence which projects on each of A2, B2 to
a trace, and which is therefore a trace of A2 ‖ B2.
7.4 A Compositionality Theorem forOur Timed
Automata
This section and the next explore the possibility of a similar assume-guarantee
theorem for our timed automata, and also (next section) for UPPAAL au-
tomata. There are theorems asserting inclusion of runs, not merely traces;
but we shall see rather strong assumptions are required regarding the nature
of synchronised actions, which may limit the usefulness of these theorems.
7.4.1 Runs, Traces
A trace in the sense of Kaynar, Lynch et al. turns out in the case of our
automata to be just a run of the type described in this subsection. When
the action labels A of two of our automata, A1,A2 are the same, the relation
A1  A2 says just that every possible run of A1 is a possible run of A2.
A run of A = (L, l0, A,H,→, I) is a sequence of alternate time passages
tk ∈ R and discrete actions ak ∈ A:
(v0, l0)
t0→ (v0 + t0, l0) a1→ (v1, l1) t1→ (v1 + t1, l1) a2→ ... ak→ (vk, lk) tk→ ... (7.5)
Each state on the way consists of a control location lk ∈ L of the under-
lying automaton, and a valuation, vk ∈ val(H), an assignment of values to
the variables in H (cf val(X) in the formalism of Kaynar, Lynch et al.). v0
is the 0 valuation, v0(x) = 0, and vk + t is the valuation which assigns the
value vk(x) + t to variable x.
The arrows labelled with a real numbers represent time passage; tk rep-
resents time passage at location lk. The invariant must remain true during
time spent at a location: ∀k.∀t ∈ [0, tk].(vk + t) |= I(lk).
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The arrows labelled with discrete actions arise from transitions of A.
The arrow (vk−1 + tk−1, l
k−1)
ak→ (vk, lk) arises from A-transition lk−1 ζ,ak,λ−→ lk
where vk−1 + tk−1 |= ζ and vk = (vk−1 + tk−1)[λ], the valuation assigning
0 to variables in λ and otherwise agreeing with vk−1 + tk−1. Note that the
previous paragraph ensures that the invariant will be satisfied in the target
state.
Now let
A = (L, l0, A,H,→A, I) (7.6)
B = (M,m0, B,K,→B, J) (7.7)
denote two automata. Assume H ∩K = ∅ – the clock variables are disjoint.
Thus, a valuation in A ‖ B is just the union of an A-valuation and a B-
valuation. There is no overlap to worry about.
A run of A ‖ B is a sequence of the form
(v0, l0,m0)
t0→ (v0 + t0, l0,m0) a1→ (v1, l1,m1) t1→ (v1 + t1, l1,m1)
a2→ ... ak→ (vk, lk,mk) tk→ (vk + tk, lk,mk)→ ... (7.8)
where
• tk ∈ R, ak ∈ A ∪B and
• ∀k.∀t ∈ [0, tk].(vk + t) |= I(lk) ∧ J(mk); and
• For all k, one of the following obtains: EITHER
– (a synchronised transition) ak ∈ A ∩ B and there are transitions
lk−1
ζA,ak,λA−→ lk in A and mk−1 ζB ,ak,λB−→ mk in B, and
(vk−1 + tk−1) |= ζA ∧ ζB and
vk = (vk−1 + tk−1)[λA ∪ λB] = (vk−1 + tk−1)[λA][λB]; OR
– (an interleaving transition) ak ∈ A−B and
there is a transition lk−1
ζ,ak,λ−→ lk in A; and
mk−1 = mk, and
(vk−1 + tk−1) |= ζ and vk = (vk−1 + tk−1)[λ]; OR
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– (an interleaving transition) ak ∈ B − A and
lk−1 = lk, and
there is a transition mk−1
ζ,ak,λ−→ mk in B; and
(vk−1 + tk−1) |= ζ and vk = (vk−1 + tk−1)[λ]
7.4.2 Theorem
Let A1,A2 be automata with a common action alphabet, B1,B2 be automata
with a common action alphabet, and suppose Ai is compatible with Bj for
i, j = 1, 2 – the clocks and locations of Ai, Bj are disjoint. Suppose that
A1 ‖ B2  A2 ‖ B2 (7.9)
A2 ‖ B1  A2 ‖ B2 (7.10)
Then A1 ‖ B1  A2 ‖ B2.
To prove this, we need to check, under the stated premisses, that any run
of A1 ‖ B1 is also a run in A2 ‖ B2.
The argument will be an induction on the length (number of actions) of
a run. First, Consider a “trivial run” of A1 ‖ B1,
(0, l0,m0)
t0→ (0 + t0, l0,m0) (7.11)
where t0 ∈ R, 0 is the zero valuation and l0,m0 are the initial locations of
A1,B1.
Without loss of generality, in view of (7.9, 7.10) we can assume l0,m0
are also the respective initial locations of A2,B2 – re-label if necessary. Let
α1, α2, β1, β2 denote the invariants at l
0 in A1,A2 and at m0 in B1,B2. Then
(7.11) implies that
∀t < t0 : (0 + t) |= α1 ∧ β1
We aim to deduce that (0 + t) |= α2 ∧ β2.
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Now, the Ai-variables are disjoint from the Bj-variables. Let v1 denote a
valuation which agrees with (0+ t) on the A-variables, and which is 0 on the
B-variables. We can assume with no loss of generality that 0 |= β2.
Then v1 |= α1 ∧ β2. It follows from (7.9) that v1 |= α2 ∧ β2. In particular,
v1 |= α2.
Therefore, by construction of v1, (0 + t) |= α2.
By a similar argument employing premiss (7.10), (0 + t) |= β2.
Applying this to all t ∈ [0, t0] we can deduce that the time delay (7.11)
is actually a run in A2 ‖ B2.
Now, let
(0, l0,m0)
t0−→ (0 + t0, l0,m0) a1−→ ... tn−1−→ (vn−1 + tn−1, ln−1,mn−1)
an−→ (vn, ln,mn) tn−→ (vn + tn, ln,mn) (7.12)
be a run of “length” n in A1 ‖ B1. Assume as induction hypothesis that all
runs of length shorter than n in A1 ‖ B1 map into A2 ‖ B2. We shall abuse
notation by using the same symbols lk,mk (k < n) for “corresponding”
locations in A2 ‖ B2.
Then the part of (7.12) up to (vn−1 + tn−1, l
n−1,mn−1) is already a run in
A2 ‖ B2.
At each stage, k < n, vk = vk−1 + tk−1 with the resets of ak applied.
Now we have to consider three possibilities for the transition:
(vn−1 + tn−1, l
n−1,mn−1)
an−→ (vn, ln,mn)
We could have (1): an ∈ A1 − B1, an “interleaving” transition of A1, or
(2): an ∈ B1 − A1,an interleaving transition of B1, or (3): an ∈ A1 ∩ B1, a
synchronizing transition.
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First, suppose an to be an “interleaving” transition of A1. Thus,
mn = mn−1,
vn = vn−1 + tn−1
with resets on A-variables only.
This lifts to A1 ‖ B2 since mn “is” already in B2. (Abuse of notation
again: more precisely, there is a corresponding location of B2 which we can
label mn.)
Consider the time delay (vn, ln,mn)
tn→ (vn + tn, ln,mn) in A1 ‖ B1. Let
α1, β1 be the invariants in A1,B1 at ln,mn. Then,
∀t < tn : (vn + t) |= α1 ∧ β1
Let α2, β2 be the invariants in A2,B2 at ln,mn (abuse of notation again)
and for arbitrary t < tn define the valuation wt on the A-variables as vn + t
and on the B-variables as vn. Then wt |= α1 and also wt |= β2 because
mn = mn−1 and we can appeal to the induction hypothesis.
Now,
∀t < tn : wt |= α1 ∧ β2
exhibits tn as a possible time delay “run” in A1 ‖ B2; hence by premiss (7.9),
as a time delay in A2 ‖ B2. It follows (the reasoning is the same as in the
induction base case) that
∀t < tn : wt |= α2 ∧ β2
In particular, ∀t < tn : wt |= α2. So, since wt agrees with vn + t on
A-variables, ∀t < tn : (vn + t) |= α2.
By a similar argument swapping the roles of Ai,Bi and employing premiss
(7.10), ∀t < tn : (vn + t) |= β2.
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Thus tn is a permissible time delay in A2 ‖ B2 and the segment
...
an−→ (...) tn−→ (...)
extends the “tail” of (7.12) to a run in A2 ‖ B2.
A similar argument lifts (7.12) to a run in A2 ‖ B2 in the case of the
second possibility: that an is an interleaving transition of B1.
Now consider the third possibility: an ∈ A1 ∩ B1, an is a synchronizing
transition of A1 ‖ B1. In particular, there are transitions
ln−1
ζ1,an,λ1−→ ln in A1 (7.13)
mn−1
η1,an,µ1−→ mn in B1 (7.14)
where (vn−1 + tn−1) |= ζ1 ∧ η1 (the guards of an in A1 and B1) and
vn = (vn−1 + tn−1)[λ1 ∪ µ1] |= α1 ∧ β1, the invariants at ln,mn.
Also, in view of the time delay (vn, ln,mn)
tn−→ (vn+tn, ln,mn) in A1 ‖ B1,
we have ∀t < tn : (vn + t) |= α1 ∧ β1.
Now define a valuation w in A1 ‖ B2 to agree with vn on A1 and vn−1+tn−1
on B2. Remember, by the induction hypothesis, the “tail” of (7.12) lifts from
A1 ‖ B1 to A2 ‖ B2; in particular, vn−1 + tn−1 makes sense in B2.
This w gives a transition enabled in A1 ‖ B2:
(vn−1 + tn−1, l
n−1,mn−1)
an−→ (w, ln,mn−1)
which by premiss (7.9) lifts to A2 ‖ B2
It follows from this that the guard of an in A2 is satisfied by vn−1 + tn−1
and the invariant at ln in A2 by w, hence (by definition of w) by vn.
Now apply the same argument with Ai,Bi reversed to obtain an edge in
B2 corresponding to an, whose guard is satisfied by vn−1+ tn−1 and such that
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the invariant at its target (corresponding to ln−1,mn in A2 ‖ B1) is satisfied
by vn. For this we need to define w to be like vn on B1 and vn−1 + tn−1 on
A2.
The result is edges in A2,B2 corresponding to (7.13, 7.14) whose guards
and target invariants are satisfied, and so the synchronized an is lifted to
A2 ‖ B2.
The time delay transition tn is lifted to A2 ‖ B2 using exactly the same
reasoning as before.
Thus the run (7.12) is in A2 ‖ B2 in the case of a synchronised transition
and the induction is complete.
7.5 Compositionality Theorem for UPPAAL
Automata
It is interesting to see if the theorem of 7.4.2 can be extended to UPPAAL
systems, whose semantics are described in 5.2.2. Again, the result will apply
to parallel compositions of automata (UPPAAL process instances) with no
shared variables. For our purposes, therefore, we shall suppose an UPPAAL
System with no global variables apart from the channels used to mediate
synchronisation, and just two process instances. By variables in the sequel,
we mean just local variables within process instances.
7.5.1 Runs of the UPPAAL System
The first point to note is that a run as described by (7.5) above is the same
in UPPAAL except for the following points.
• The component H is, for each type, a set of variables of that type;
• Variables of all types may participate in transition guards and location
invariants;
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• The valuations v assign values to all the variables; for t ∈ R, valuation
v + t advances the clocks but leaves other values unchanged;
• A transition is not generally decorated with an action label (although
a synchronisation label could be pressed into service) but the update
λ is now a set of UPPAAL assignments to local variables rather than
just a set of clocks to assigned 0.
• A discrete action in the run is as before an interleaving transition or
several component actions in synchrony; but now the UPPAAL seman-
tic rules of 5.2.2 decide which kind of action occurs when. UPPAAL
priorities have not been employed in this work and will therefore not
be mentioned in the following.
Consider now a run of a system A1 ‖ ... ‖ An generalising (7.6)(7.7),
with Ai, i = 1...n the component UPPAAL processes. Unlike in the case of
KLSV traces, we are now considering inclusion of runs without necessarily
restricting to external actions and to the empty set of variables. It is use-
ful to consider several processes rather than just two when considering the
semantics of broadcast synchronisations. Recall that internal actions in UP-
PAAL are anonymous (“τ”); the action labels in A,B may be “borrowed”
to denote synchronisations c!, c?, etc. Again we have a sequence of the form
(v0, (l0i )i=1...n)
t0→ (v0 + t0, (l0i )) a1→ (v1, (l1i )) t1→ (v1 + t1, (l1i ))
a2→ ... ak→ (vk, (lki )) tk→ (vk + tk, (lki ))→ ... (7.15)
where
• (lki )i=1...n, or by slight abuse of notation, (lki ), is an abbreviation for a
vector of locations (lk1 , l
k
2 , l
k
3 , ..., l
k
n);
• The l0i are the initial locations of the component processes; lki , i = 1...n
are their subsequent locations;
• tk ∈ R;
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• ak is normally in UPPAAL anonymous (a “τ” action), but we may
borrow it to use as a synchronisation label;
• ∀k.∀t ∈ [0, tk].(vk + t) |=
∧m
i=1 Ii(l
k
i ), the invariants at (l
k
i ); and
• For all k, one of the following obtains:
1. There is an internal transition arising from a transition
lk−1i
ζ,ak,λ−→ lki on one component Ai: ak is “τ” (denoted “*” by
nothing at all in the UPPAAL Help),
(∀j 6= i)lk−1j = lkj ,
(vk−1 + tk−1) |= ζ,
vk = (vk−1 + tk−1)[λ], the result of applying the UPPAAL assign-
ment(s) λ to the valuation vk−1 + tk−1,
vk |= Ii(lki ),
either lk−1i is committed (in the UPPAAL sense) or (∀j 6= i)lk−1j
is not committed.
2. There is a binary synchronization: ak denotes a binary channel
and there are transitions on different processes i, j, lk−1i
ζi,ak!,λi−→ lki
in Ai and l
k−1
j
ζj ,ak?,λj−→ lkj in Aj,
(∀h 6= i, j)lk−1h = lkh,
(vk−1 + tk−1) |= ζi ∧ ζj,
vk = (vk−1 + tk−1)[λi][λj] (Note that the UPPAAL assignment(s)
of the !-edge are applied before the assignment(s) of the ?-edge),
vk |= Ii(lki ) ∧ Ij(lkj ),
either lk−1i , l
k−1
j are both committed or (∀h 6= i, j)lk−1h is not
committed.
3. There is a broadcast synchronisation: ak denotes a broadcast
channel and there are transitions on different processes i, j1, ..., jm,
lk−1i
ζi,ak!,λi−→ lki in Ai and lk−1jh
ζjh ,ak?,λjh−→ lkjh in Ajh for h = 1...m, with
j1, ..., jm indexed in such a way that the Ajh are numbered in the
order they occur in the UPPAAL system definition,
(∀h 6= i, j1, ..., jm)lk−1h = lkh,
(vk−1 + tk−1) |= ζi ∧ ζj1 ∧ ... ∧ ζjm ,
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Every edge from a location other than li, lj1 , ..., ljm either has no
synchronisation label ak?, or the valuation (v
k−1 + tk−1) does not
satisfy its guard, vk = (vk−1 + tk−1)[λi][λj1 ]...[λjm ] (note the order
in which the assignments are applied),
vk |= Ii(lki ) ∧ Ij1(lkj1) ∧ ... ∧ Ijm(lkjm),
either at least one of lk−1i , l
k−1
j1
, ..., lk−1jm is committed or no location
other than these is committed.
The assume-guarantee theorem 7.4.2 relied on a rather liberal synchro-
nisation semantics; UPPAAL takes a rather stricter view of enforcing syn-
chronisation. In view of this, the UPPAAL version of the assume-guarantee
theorem requires stronger hypotheses.
7.5.2 Theorem
Let A1, ...,An be UPPAAL-type timed automata comprising a composite
UPPAAL system (not employing priorities or global variables other than
channels) and suppose each component Ai can be replaced by a component
A′i with the same synchronisations. Suppose further that if i 6= j, the local
variables of Ai, A′i are disjoint from those of Aj, A
′
j. In the sequel, let
∏
denote a parallel product4.
If (a) for i = 1, ..., n,
( ∏
1≤j<i
A′j
)
‖ Ai ‖
( ∏
i<j≤n
A′j
)

n∏
i=1
A′i, (7.16)
and (b) whenever a subset of indices I = {i1...ir} identifies system compo-
nents which participate in a synchronised action,
n∏
i=1
A′′i 
n∏
i=1
A′i (7.17)
where A′′i is Ai when i ∈ I and A′i otherwise;
4e.g.
∏n
i=1 Ai for A1 ‖ ... ‖ An
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then
n∏
i=1
Ai 
n∏
i=1
A′i (7.18)
Proof. To show any trace of the product on the left of (7.18) is also a
trace of the product on the right, we reason by induction on the length (the
number of actions) of a trace.
First, consider a “trivial run” of A1 ‖ ... ‖ An,
(v0, (l0i )i=0...n)
t0→ (v0 + t0, (l0i )i=0...n) (7.19)
where t0 ∈ R, v0 is the valuation which zeros all clocks and initialises local
variables, and (l0i )i=0...n is the vector of initial locations of
∏n
i=1Ai. In the
sequel such a vector of locations (li)i=1...n will be abbreviated
−→
l .
Without loss of generality, in view of (7.16), we can assume the
−→
l 0 are
also the respective initial locations of
∏n
i=0A
′
i – re-label if necessary. Let
αi, α
′
i denote the invariants at l
0
i in Ai,A
′
i. Then (7.19) implies that
∀t < t0 : (v0 + t) |=
∧
i
αi
We aim to deduce that (v0 + t) |= ∧i α′i.
Now, the variables of Ai,A′i are disjoint from those of Aj,A
′
j when i 6= j.
For i = 1, ..., n, let vi denote a valuation which agrees with (v
0 + t) on the
Ai,A′i-variables, and which is as v
0 on the Aj,A′j-variables for all j 6= i. We
can assume with no loss of generality that v0 |= α′j.
Then vi |= αi ∧
∧
j 6=i α
′
j. It follows from (7.16) that vi |=
∧
j α
′
j. In
particular, vi |= α′i.
Therefore, by construction of vi, (v
0 + t) |= α′i.
∀t < t0 : (v0 + t) |=
∧
i
α′i
Applying this for all i and to all t ∈ [0, t0] we can deduce that the time
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delay (7.19) is actually a run in
∏n
i=1A
′
i.
Now, let
(v0,
−→
l 0)
t0−→ (v0 + t0,−→l 0) a1−→ ... tm−1−→ (vm−1 + tm−1,−→l m−1)
am−→ (vm,−→l m) tm−→ (vm + tm,−→l m) (7.20)
be a run of “length” m in
∏n
i=1Ai. The action labels ak are largely ignored
in UPPAAL but here they serve admirably as references to the action tran-
sitions. Assume as induction hypothesis that all runs of length shorter than
m in
∏n
i=1Ai map into
∏n
i=1A
′
i. We shall abuse notation and use the same
symbols
−→
l k (k < n) for “corresponding” locations in
∏n
i=1A
′
i.
Then the part of (7.20) up to (vm−1 + tm−1,
−→
l m−1) is already a run in∏n
i=1A
′
i.
At each stage, k < m, vk = vk−1+tk−1 with the assignments of ak applied.
Now we have to consider three possibilities for the transition:
(vm−1 + tm−1,
−→
l m−1)
am−→ (vm,−→l m)
We could have (1): an internal transition of a single component Ai, or (2): a
binary synchronisation between two components carrying the labels am!, am?
or (3): a broadcast synchronisation between a “sending” component carrying
the label am! and “receiving components” carrying the label am?.
First, suppose am to be an internal transition on Ai. Thus,
∀j 6= i : lmj = lm−1j ,
vm = vm−1 + tm−1
with update assignments on Ai-variables only.
This lifts to
(∏
1≤j<iA
′
j
)
‖ Ai ‖
(∏
i<j≤nA
′
j
)
since for j 6= i, lmj “is”
already in A′j. (Abuse of notation again: more precisely, there is a corre-
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sponding location of A′j which we can label l
m
j .)
Consider the time delay (vm,
−→
l m)
tm→ (vm + tm,−→l m) in
∏n
i=1Ai. For
j = 1, ..., n, Let αj be the invariant in Aj at
−→
l m. Then,
∀t < tm : (vm + t) |=
∧
j
αj
Let α′j be the invariant in A
′
j at l
m
j (abuse of notation again) and for
arbitrary t < tm define the valuation wt on the Ai, A′i-variables as v
m+ t and
on the Aj, A′j-variables for j 6= i as vm. Then wt |= αi and also wt |=
∧
j 6=i α
′
j
because for j 6= i, lmj = lm−1j and we can appeal to the induction hypothesis.
Now,
∀t < tm : wt |= αi ∧
∧
j 6=i
α′j
exhibits tm as a possible time delay “transition” in
(∏
1≤j<iA
′
j
)
‖ Ai ‖(∏
i<j≤nA
′
j
)
; hence by premiss (7.16), as a time delay in
∏n
j=1A
′
j. It follows
(the reasoning is the same as in the induction base case) that
∀t < tm : wt |=
∧
j
α′j
In particular, ∀t < tm : wt |= α′i. So, since wt agrees with vm + t on
Ai, A′i-variables, ∀t < tm : (vm + t) |= α′i.
By repetitions of this argument for all i, using all the parts of premiss
(7.16), tm is a permissible time delay in
∏n
i=1A
′
i and the segment
...
an−→ (...) tn−→ (...)
extends the “tail” of (7.20) to a run in
∏n
i=1A
′
i.
Now consider the second possibility: am is a binary synchronisation of
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∏n
i=1Ai. In particular, there are transitions
lm−1i
ζi,am!,λi−→ lmi in Ai (7.21)
lm−1j
ζj ,am?,λj−→ lmj in Aj (7.22)
where (vm−1 + tm−1) |= ζi ∧ ζj (the guards of am in Ai and Aj) and
vm = (vm−1 + tm−1)[λi][λj] |= αi ∧ αj, the invariants at lmi , lnj . The semantic
rules of UPPAAL are satisfied and the update assignments λi, λj applied in
the correct order.
Also, in view of the time delay (vm,
−→
l m)
tm−→ (vm+ tm,−→l m) in
∏n
h=1Ah,
we have ∀t < tm : (vm + t) |= αi ∧ αj.
This am synchronised action lifts to( ∏
1≤h<i
A′h
)
‖ Ai ‖
( ∏
1≤i<h<j
A′h
)
‖ Aj ‖
( ∏
j<h≤n
A′h
)
(7.23)
(without loss of generality, we may assume i < j) since for h 6= i, j, lmh is
“already” (by abuse of notation) already in A′h.
As before, considering the time delay tm in
∏n
h=1A
′
h, where for h =
1, ..., n, αh be the invariant in Ah at
−→
l m,
∀t < tm : (vm + t) |=
∧
h
αh
Let α′h be the invariant in A
′
h at l
m
h (abuse of notation again) and for
arbitrary t < tm define the valuation wt on the Ai, A′i, Aj, A
′
j-variables as
vm + t and on the Ah, A′h-variables for h 6= i, j as vm. Then wt |= αi ∧ αj
and also wt |=
∧
j 6=i,j α
′
j because for h 6= i, j, lmh = lm−1h and we can appeal to
the induction hypothesis.
Now,
∀t < tm : wt |= αi ∧ αj ∧
∧
h 6=i,j
α′h
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exhibits tm as a possible time delay “transition” in the product automaton
7.23; hence by premiss (7.17), as a time delay in
∏n
h=1A
′
h. It follows as before
that
∀t < tm : wt |=
∧
h
α′h
In particular, ∀t < tm : wt |= α′i ∧ α′j. So, since wt agrees with vm + t on
Ai, A′i, Aj, A
′
j-variables, ∀t < tm : (vm + t) |= α′i ∧ α′j.
tm is a permissible time delay in
∏n
i=1A
′
i and the segment
...
an−→ (...) tn−→ (...)
extends the “tail” of (7.20) to a run in
∏n
i=1A
′
i.
The third possibility is that am is broadcast synchronisation. The com-
putational details of the inductive step are in this case similar to the previous
one, except instead of a single receiving edge in component j there are sev-
eral, in components j1, ..., jr and so the “exceptional” edges are in i, j1, ..., jr.
Thus the run (7.20) is in
∏n
h=0A
′
h in the case of a synchronised transition
and the induction is complete.
7.6 Further Composition Theorems
In applications, it is useful to replace one component of a system with an
abstraction with the same external interface: synchronising actions (at least)
and locations, and have in consequence a system which simulates the original.
7.6.1 Definition
Given two timed automata A = (L, l0, A,H, E, I) and
A′ = (L′, l′0, A,H, E ′, I ′) with the same set of clocks and set of action labels,
call a relation R ⊆ L × L′ a component-simulation if for all (l, l′) ∈ R, for
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every edge from l, l
ζ,a,λ−→ m there exists an edge from l′, l′ ζ′,a,λ′−→ m′5, with
• the same action label;
• targets related by R: (m,m′) ∈ R;
• ζ ⊢ ζ ′, I(m) ⊢ I ′(m′) and λ′ = λ.
If A, A′ are UPPAAL automata (process templates), this definition ap-
plies with a ∈ A understood as an “empty” (“anonymous”, “τ”) action label
or a synchronisation label, and λ, λ′ as sets of the more general UPPAAL
assignment/updates involving variables of UPPAAL types, not just clocks.
7.6.2 Proposition
Let let A, A′ be automata as above and suppose them to be components
of composite system: A ‖ ... and A′ ‖ ..., the ellipses representing the other
components which are the same in two systems. Let V denote the set of
valuations of clocks and other variables (interpreted in a suitably general way
in the case of UPPAAL automata) of the two systems. Given a component-
simulation R ⊆ L × L′, define a relation Rˆ between timed states of the
systems by
(l, ..., v; l′, ..., v, ) ∈ Rˆ iff (l, l′) ∈ R and the remaining component locations
match, and v = v′ in V .
Then Rˆ is a simulation of timed transition systems 2.4.2.
Proof. Say (l, l′) ∈ R, v = v′ and there is a timed transition (l, ..., v) a→
(m, ..., w) in the A-based system. This must arise from some edge (which may
or may not be participating in a synchronised action) l
ζ,a,λ−→ m of A, with
v |= ζ and w = v[λ] |= I(m). (v[λ] means v with the updates – assignments
and clock resets of λ.)
By hypothesis, there exists an edge with the same label, l′
ζ′,a,λ′−→ m′ with
(m,m′) ∈ R, ζ ⊢ ζ ′, I(m) ⊢ I ′(m′) and λ′ = λ: so v′ = v |= ζ ′ and
w′ , w = v[λ] = v′[λ′] |= I ′(m′). There is therefore a corresponding timed
5The −→ refers to E or E′ according to context.
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transition in the A′-based system: (l′, .., v′)
a→ (m′, ..., w′). If synchronisation
is required, the requirements carry over from the one system to the other.
7.6.3 Definition
Given two timed automata A = (L, l0, A,H, E, I) and
A′ = (L′, l′0, A,H, E ′, I ′) with the same set of clocks and set of action labels,
call a relation B ⊆ L× L′ a component-bisimulation if for all (l, l′) ∈ R,
• For every edge from l, l ζ,a,λ−→ m there exists an edge from l′, l′ ζ′,a,λ′−→ m′,
with the same action label, targets related by R: (m,m′) ∈ R, and
ζ ⊢ ζ ′, I(m) ⊢ I ′(m′) and λ′ = λ.
• For every edge from l′, l′ ζ′,a,λ′−→ m′ there exists an edge from l, l ζ,a,λ−→ m,
with the same action label, targets related by R: (m,m′) ∈ R, and
ζ ′ ⊢ ζ, I ′(m′) ⊢ I(m) and λ = λ′.
7.6.4 Proposition
Let let A, A′ be components of composite systems as above, the other com-
ponents being the same in the two systems. Let V denote the set of valuations
of clocks and other variables . Given a component-simulation B ⊆ L × L′,
define a relation Bˆ between timed states of the systems by
(l, ..., v; l′, ..., v, ) ∈ Bˆ iff (l, l′) ∈ R and the remaining component locations
match, and v = v′ in V .
Then Bˆ is a strong bisimulation of timed transition systems 2.4.1.
The proof is is essentially a repetition of the previous proof in two logical
directions.
7.7 Conclusions
7.7.1 Hybrid Automata, UPPAAL
The formal proof given in subsection 7.4.2 dealt specifically with timed au-
tomata but most tool sets and many modelling situations deal with more
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general hybrid automata. These carry an arbitrary set of variables, not just
clocks, and a subset of variables can be updated to arbitrary values (not
just reset to 0) on each discrete action. Actually, hybrid automata come in
many flavours, some featuring real (continuous) variables, some integers only,
some, like the UPPAAL toolset [109], quite a complex type system including
arrays. Since UPPAAL is such a useful tool for applying the results of this
thesis, developing compositionality results for UPPAAL automata seems a
good idea.
7.7.2 The  Relation
The  relation between automata corresponds loosely to the notion of sat-
isfaction of specified properties of a system. Behaviour can be specified by
an automaton S; then A  S tells us that the behaviour described by A
implements the specification S.
The UPPAAL tool set includes a CTL-like language (including modal op-
erators  = “always”, ♦ = “eventually”, U = “until”, and ∀,∃-quantification
over execution paths) described in [109] for expressing properties of an au-
tomaton or, more generally, of systems modelable by automata.
It will useful that, whenever A  S and ϕ is formula of the specification
language expressing some system property, then S |= ϕ implies A |= ϕ. In
fact this is the case provided ϕ employs only universal quantification over
paths: see, for instance Clarke et al. [45], p177, Theorem 16. Briefly, if ϕ is
∀ψ, satisfied by S, then ψ is true at every state on every run of S, hence
a fortiori at every state on every run of A. Similarly if ϕ is ∀♦ψ: ψ is true
atsome state on every run of S, hence at some state on every run of A.
A related question is, given a property ϕ for which we would like to
know whether some model A |= ϕ, whether there is some more abstract
specification S such that A  S |= ϕ.
7.7.3 Decomposition
The case studies to be considered in the sequel make use of UPPAAL which
does in fact support hybrid automata, although in the first instance we are
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primarily interested in modelling and checking bCANdle models via the plain
timed-automaton representation. We shall in the sequel show that UPPAAL
semantics simulates timed-automata semantics in the sense of 2.4.2.
So far, work in UPPAAL with questions such as those of the previous
subsection has run frustratingly often into the state-explosion problem: it
will be useful, therefore, to decompose automaton-based models into parallel-
composites and employ results such as those obtained in this chapter. The
work of the next chapter will be to examine some examples of how this may
be done in practice, and the benefits that accrue from this approach.
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Chapter 8
Compositional Model Checking
in Practice
In this chapter, examples will show how the results of the last chapter may
be used with decomposition to make checks of composite models faster, using
less memory, and, indeed, to make previously intractable checks tractable.
The focus is on distributed timed systems in which components communicate
via CAN, modelled in UPPAAL using the CAN representation described in
chapter 6. The checks were performed using the UPPAAL verifier tool.
8.1 A Translation Tool
There is a practical problem with the no-shared-variables CAN model. For
a given value of the parameters m and n, the number of message types and
values (of each type) supported, the UPPAAL source hard-codes multiple
synchronisation “channels”, locations and edges with multiplicity m or m×n
(denoted by the thick lines in figure 6.1 and by the indices µ, ν in this figure
and in the pseudo code at the end of §6.1). In early experiments this was
coded by hand, and quickly became tedious.
To help with this, CANGen, a code-generating “front-end” to UPPAAL was
developed, which reads an input file and generates UPPAAL source code in
.xta format. The input file starts with lines specifying values of m and n;
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then a line beginning #channel specifies that code for a CAN channel be
generated, using l,u,L,U-parameters given on the line.
After this are lines of ordinary UPPAAL source code interspersed with
other CANGen directives
• #fanoutTypes generates code for a process to fan an urgent synchro-
nisation out over multiple channels;
• #globals causes subsequent input to be placed in the global declara-
tions area of the UPPAAL source;
• #processes causes subsequent input to be placed in the process tem-
plate area of the UPPAAL source;
• #procInstances causes subsequent input to be placed in the process
instance definition area of the UPPAAL source;
• #sysDef causes subsequent input to be placed in the system definition
area of the UPPAAL source.
The most important syntactic constructs in the input to CANGen are
• FORType(t) ... token|t|... ROF
• FORVal(v) ... token|v|... ROF
These cause input tokens to be replicated over all message idetifiers (types)
and, respectively, all message values. The sequence of tokens between FORType(t)
and ROF is replicated m times, each instance of |t| becoming 000 then 001
and so on up to m− 1. The sequence of tokens between FORVal(v) and ROF
is replicated n times. There may be multiple occurrences of |t| or |v| in a
sequence being replicated; the metavariable may be something other than t
or v but must match the one in the FOR token.
The replicated sequences are generated as a list separated by “,” or by
“;” depending on the UPPAAL context.
The construct may run over several lines in the source file: \n is just a
source code character as far as CANGen is concerned.
These constructs may be nested. For instance,
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FORtype(t) FORval(k) broadcast chan &rdg|t|_|k| ROF ROF
expands in the case m = 2, n = 3 to
broadcast chan &rdg000_000, broadcast chan &rdg000_001,
broadcast chan &rdg000_002, broadcast chan &rdg001_000,
broadcast chan &rdg001_001, broadcast chan &rdg001_002
As an illustration, the input file to CANGen and the generated UPPAAL
source code are listed in appendix D.
8.2 A First Example
variable reading swOn/Off
swOn/Off
request reading
variable reading
request reading
network (CAN channel) −− C
plant − sensor −− A controller −− B
Figure 8.1: A distributed control system: the component processes and mes-
sages
Figure 8.1 shows a small control system comprising a sensing process and
a controller process communicating via a CAN network.
The sensing process A might naturally be conceived as a composite, a
“plant”, P synchronising in parallel with a “sensor” process S as in figure
8.2. After some analysis one may obtain a simulation P ‖ S  A, the latter
being a combined plant-sensor process like the one depicted in figure 8.3.
The controller B is depicted in figure 8.4 and the connecting CAN network
is represented by a channel process C. From proposition 7.6.2 we can infer
that P ‖ S ‖ B ‖ C  A ‖ B ‖ C and so the system is modelled at an abstract
level as A ‖ B ‖ C. The CANGen source code for this is to be found in appendix
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s
s’
Init(u)
rq?
rqstd (u)
p1
inc?
v++
v = V/2
v−−
dec?
val|k| (u)
(v == |k|)
rdg|k|!
on {h <= p}
off {h <= p}
h = 0
swOn?
swOff?
(h >= p/2) h = 0 (h >= p/2)
(h >= p/2)
inc! h = 0
(h >= p/2) h = 0 
Sensor, SPlant, P
dec! h = 0
Figure 8.2: Synchronising Plant and Sensor processes
E.1. The system can be in an “on” state or an “off” state and features a
variable which non-deterministically increments when the state is “on”, and
decrements when the state is “off”. The variable, perhaps a temperature, is
being continuously monitored by the sensor process and readings fed through
a network to the controller process which decides whether to switch the
system state (perhaps a heater) on or off.
The sensing process (see figure 8.3) has a duty cycle in which it repeat-
edly waits for a request (delivered through the network, denoted rq) from
the controller for a sensor reading, then outputs the current reading onto a
network. While waiting (at location p1), it simulates the variable being in-
cremented or decremented non-deterministically, and at any location in the
duty cycle it can respond to a request swOn or swOff from the controller via
the network, to switch the system state (heater) on or off. This is, perhaps,
more than simply a sensing process as it simulates the variable being sensed
as well.
CANGen is modelling the network for the system using three message types
and V distinct values. Type 0 messages from the plant-sensor deliver readings
8.2. A FIRST EXAMPLE 167
p1 {h <= p}
rqstd (u)
(v == |k|)
rq?
swOff?
h = 0
v = V/2, on = 0
on = 0
swOn?
(h >= p/2 && on) 
v++; h = 0
(h >= p/2 && !on) 
v−−; h = 0
val|k| (u)
swOff?
swOff?
on = 0
on = 0
swOn?
swOn?
on = 1
on = 1
rdg|k|!
on = 1
Init(u)
Figure 8.3: A Plant Sensor process with a single sensor
to the controller; type 1 messages deliver switch-on, switch-off (values 1, 0)
requests from the controller, and type 2 messages reading requests. In figure
8.3, p denotes an integer parameter to the plant sensor process template, and
g, h denote UPPAAL clock variables.
The controller process (figure 8.4) duty cycle begins at location rqstVal
and repeatedly requests a reading by issuing the rq! synchronisation and
then obtains a sensor reading from the network, assigning the value to vari-
able vAv. Parameters lo, hi define limits within which the controller would
like to keep the sensor reading. If vAv falls below lo, an instruction to the
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Init(u)
got|k| (u)
vAv = V/2, g = 0, h = 0
rqstVal {h <= dly}
(h >= dly) h = 0
rq!  h = 0
rqstd (u)
getVals {h <= dly2} (h >=   dly2)h = 0
rdg|k|?
vAv = |k|
sndOff {h <= dly2}(vAv > hi)(vAv < lo)
h = 0h = 0
swOff! h = 0swOn! h = 0
sndOn {h <= dly2}
h = 0
(lo <= vAv <= hi)
Figure 8.4: A Plant Controller process
sensing process to “switch on” is issued; if vAv rises above hi, an instruction
to “switch off” is issued; otherwise, the process returns to the beginning of
its duty cycle.
With this system, one can check various desirable properties such as that
it will not deadlock, and that values of the variable are kept within bounds.
Properties such as these are expressible in the UPPAAL specification lan-
guage (essentially CTL):
• ¬∃♦deadlock (or ∀¬deadlock)
• ∀(controller.vAv < 28)
• ∀(controller.getVals⇒ controller.vAv > 12)
When lo and hi are given as 19 and 21 respectively, UPPAAL’s verifyta
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tool verifies1 that these three properties are satisfied. Further, verifyta can
be run inside J Bengtsson’s memtime tool to obtain execution times and
measures of memory usage. This simple software tool, obtainable from the
UPPAAL web site, forks a child process within which the command (e.g.
verifyta) runs, while the parent process gathers time and memory usage
statistics for the child process from its /proc/(pid)/stat file. CPU time
(in user and in kernel mode) and maximum (virtual) memory allocated to
the process and maximum resident set size (real memory usage – the size of
segment of the process permanently resident in memory) are reported.
Results for the present case, obtained on a simple Intel-based machine,2
are as below. These figures are averages over 20 trials: means and stahdard
deviations are quoted
∀(controller.getVals ⇒ controller.vAv > ξ) is abbreviated o(ξ) and
∀(controller.vAv < ξ) is abbreviated u(ξ). Maximum memory usages (vir-
tual memory usage and resident set size) are reported in megabytes.
check: o(12) o(14) o(16) u(24) u(26) u(28)
mean user time: 94.0” 96.5” 92.9” 94.6” 94.9” 93.3”
standard dev : 0.8 1.0 0.8 1.6 2.3 0.5
mean max v mem: 43.331 43.331 43.332 43.330 43.330 43.330
standard dev : 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003
mean max rss: 8.851 8.851 8.851 8.851 8.849 8.849
standard dev : 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.002
A check that the system is deadlock-free took somewhat longer, 693.1
seconds averaged over 20 trials, with stamdard deviation 13.8; maximum
virtual memory usage was 45.571 Mb (SD = 0.003) and maximum rss was
11.5 Mb (SD = 0.003).
It would be good to see whether such desirable behaviour of the system
is also guaranteed in more “developed” versions of this control system, and
these figures provide a base line for comparison with the computing effort
associated with this.
1using breadth-first search and conservative state space optimisation
2an Acer Aspire 1360 running at 2.8 GHz with 1Gb RAM, running Ubuntu 8.04
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p1 {h <= p}
rqstd (u)
rq?
swOff?
h = 0
v = V/2, on = 0
on = 0
val|k| (u)
swOff?
swOff?
on = 0
on = 0
swOn?
swOn?
on = 1
on = 1
rdg|k|!
(h >= p/2 && on) 
v2 −−; h = 0
(h >= p/2 && !on) 
(h >= p/2 && on) 
(h >= p/2 && !on) 
v2 ++; h = 0
v1 ++; h = 0
v1 −−; h = 0
((v1+v2)/2 == |k|)
Init(u)
on = 1
swOn?
Figure 8.5: A Plant Sensor process with two sensors, averaged
For instance, one might decide to use two sensors whose readings are
averaged instead of a single sensor. Figure 8.5 shows a replacement for the
sensing process in which two variables are sensed (again this is simulated by
non-deterministic random-walk) and on request, their average is output to
the network for the controller to pick up. The controller process is the same
as before.
With just this admittedly artificial but simple increase in complexity, it
now takes UPPAAL a long time (over an hour) to verify any of the o(ξ), u(ξ)
properties. For instance a check of o(12) inside memtime took 1 hour, 44
minutes, 33 seconds. Total memory usage in this case rose to 189 Mb (rss to
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155 Mb) – still feasible with current resources.
However with a further increase in complexity, to a system which averages
three sensors, verfication of o(ξ) failed altogether. After a little over 10 hours,
with memtime reporting 10h 3m 50s elapsed CPU time, memory usage rose
dramatically to 936 Mb (around the limit of installed RAM) and the disk
drive started thashing. Therafter, the CPU time indication made very little
progress. Memory demand (the size of the state space) had outstripped the
machine.
Clearly this limit could be pushed further out by using a bigger machine;
but then what about a further small increase in the complexity of the prob-
lem? Fortunately, all the properties considered here can be inferred from
the corresponding properties of the simpler 1-sensor system. First, if one
imagines computing (v1+v2)/2 every time v1 or v2 is incremented or decre-
mented by the plant sensor process at location p1, then the externally visible
behaviour of the two-sensor process is (with this addition) just that of a state
machine looking like that of the one-sensor process (8.3) except with (for all
k) the transition rqstd −→ val|k| guarded by (v/2 == |k|).
This in turn is easily seen to be simulated by a version of the one-sensor
process. The simulation relation is the diagonal. One may now use the
proposition 7.6.2 to infer the properties set out above for the two-sensor
system: it is simulated by a one-sensor system for which corresponding prop-
erties are easily verified; and for any execution of the the simulated system
there is a corresponding execution of the simulating system with the desired
properties.
The reasoning behind this example generalises to systems which aver-
age more than two sensors, for which a direct check is, as we have seen,
intractable.
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8.3 Using Assume-Guarantee
8.3.1 Another Control System
Consider now a control system with the same high-level structure as the
examples of the previous section (Figure 8.6).
variable reading swOn/Off
swOn/Off
request reading
variable reading
request reading
network (CAN channel) −− C
plant − sensor −− A controller −− B
Figure 8.6: Distributed control system: the component processes and mes-
sages
A plant-sensor process models and simulates a plant which obtains read-
ings of a sensed variable and sends them through a CAN network to a con-
troller process. The controller sends requests for readings, receives these
readings and sends switch-on, switch-off requests to the plant-sensor process.
The plant-sensor process non-deterministically increments the sensed vari-
able when it is “on” and decrements it when “off”. So far, this is very like
the examples of §8.2.
Imagine now, though, that we wish to model a kind of system inertia in
the plant-sensor process. In particular, there is an “inertia” parameter which
specifies a minimum time that must elapse from a switch-on or switch-off
before the change of state takes effect. Before this time has elapsed, the
variable does not change value.
There is also some inertia now in the controller. In the previous version
of this, there was a “switch-on threshold” and “switch-off threshold”; the
controller could issue a switch-on command if a received value was below the
switch-on threshold, and a switch-off command if it was above the switch-off
threshold. A more complex logic is now modelled. There is, in addition, a
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parameter e, and also an “inertia” parameter provided. When a reading is
received which is below the lower threshold or above the upper threshold, a
switch-on or switch-off command (as appropriate) may be issued provided a
time of at least the inertia parameter has elapsed since the last issue of a
switch-on or -off. A switch-on or -off will also be issued if the received reading
is below the lower or above the upper threshold by e or more, regardless of
the time elapsed. Otherwise no switch-on or -off is issued. This models a
situation where the controller may respond sluggishly to small crossings of the
thresholds, but respond urgently to large deviations (modelled by parameter
e).
As before the system is modelled as an UPPAAL system A ‖ B ‖ C
composed of three processes: (A) the plant-sensor process (figure 8.7), (B)
the controller process (figure 8.8), and (C) the CAN network channel.
The plant-sensor process sends readings of its variable v through the
network channel as before (as messages of type 000) to the controller process.
The controller sends commands to “switch on” or “switch off” to the plant-
sensor as before, as messages of type 001, value 000 for “off”, value 001 =
“on”; and requests for a reading as messages of type 002.
As before, the plant-sensor process simulates a variable v whose value,
initially set to the middle of the range of integer values modelled by the chan-
nel process, goes up when the system is “on” and down when it is “off”. After
half the permitted delay at location p1, v may (but does not have to) incre-
ment if the system is “on” and decrement if it is “off”, provided also that the
required “inertia time” has elapsed. The latter is modelled by the conjunct
g > in in the guards of the self-loops at p1 which increment and decrement
v. Clock g is reset whenever a request to switch on or switch off is received.
This may happen at every location in the duty cycle. Bear in mind that
these messages are, in the fashion of UPPAAL broadcast-synchronisation
semantics, picked up as soon as they are available.
Similarly, the plant-sensor process may not linger at p1 when a rqmessage
arrives, but must proceed to the rest of the duty cycle in which a reading
of v is sent through the network to the controller in a fashion similar to the
the example of §8.2. An UPPAAL urgent synchronisation rdg|k|! sends
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p1 {h <= p}
(v == |k|)
rq?
g = 0, h = 0
v = V/2, on = 0
Init(u)
rqstd (u)
val|k| (u)
(h >= p/2 && on && g > in) 
(h >= p/2 && !on && g > in) 
v−−; h = 0
v++; h = 0
(h >= p/2 && g <= in)
h = 0
swOff? on = 0,
swOn? on = 1,
swOff? on = 0,
swOn? on = 1,
swOff? on = 0,
swOn? on = 1,
g = 0
g = 0
g = 0
g = 0
g = 0
g = 0
rdg|k|!
Figure 8.7: A plant-sensor process
the value k onto the network where it is eventually received by the controller
process.
The controller process B is shown in figure 8.8. In addition to the features
of the previous version, there is a clock gmeasuring time since the last switch-
on or switch-off command was sent. Guards test clock g against an “extra
inertia” parameter in the process of deciding whether to issue switch-on or
switch-off instructions.
Its duty cycle begins at location rqstVal with, after a delay, a move to a
location rqstd from which a request to the plant-sensor process for a variable
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Init(u)
got|k|
vAv = V/2, h = 0, g = 0
rqstVal {h <= dly}
sndOn
rqstd
(h >= dly) h = 0
vAv = |k|
{h <= dly2}h = 0
sndOff
h = 0
getVals
rq!  h = 0
rdg|k|?
h = 0
(lo−e <= vAv <= hi+e)))
h = 0
((lo <= vAv <= hi) ||
(g <= inert &&
|| vAv < lo−e)((vAv < lo && g > inert) || vAv > hi+e)
((vAv > hi && g > inert)
h = 0, g = 0swOn!
h = 0, g = 0
swOff!
Figure 8.8: A controller process
reading is sent to the network. This happens by means of an UPPAAL urgent
synchronisation, as soon as it can happen. Then, from location getVals, a
value is received from the network and assigned to the variable vAv.
Bear in mind that as usual in CANGen notation, got|k| is actually
shorthand for a set of locations (k = 0 ... 39) and the edges into and out
of got|k| are likewise sets of edges. The edges from getVals “fan out” and
the edges to sndOn “fan in”, as do the edges to sndOff and back to rqstVal.
If either the value of vAv has fallen below lo and time since the last
switch-off or -on (measured by g) exceeds inert, or vAv has fallen below
lo - e, the edge to sndOn may be followed, whence a switch-on message is
urgently sent to the network (and thence to the plant-sensor). If either vAv
has risen above hi and g > inert, or vAv has risen above hi + e, the edge
to sndOff may be followed, whence a switch-off message is sent. However, as
long as the value of vAv is between lo-e and hi+e and less time than inert
has elapsed since the last switch-on or -off, the edge back torqstVal may be
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taken, bypassing the sending of switch-on or switch-off messages.
The CANGen source code for this model is listed in appendix F.1.
Can this model deadlock? How good is the control provided by it?
In experiments, the “nominal” value of the variable plantSensor.v was
set to 20: plantSensor.v and controller.vAv were initialised to this.
controller.lo and controller.hi are 19, 21 respectively. The properties
[o(ξ)] : ∀(controller.getVals⇒ controller.vAv > ξ)
were checked for ξ = 12, 14, 16 and the properties
[u(ξ]) : ∀(controller.vAv < ξ)
were checked for ξ = 24, 26, 28. As in the previous section, the checks were
by UPPAAL verifyta running inside memtime. The results are means and
standard deviations of 20 trials. When e was set at 2, all these properties
were satisfied. Here are the times and memory usage of these checks when e
= 2:
check: o(12) o(14) o(16) u(24) u(26) u(28)
mean user time: 261.2” 264.9” 252.2” 252.6” 252.8” 256.9”
standard dev : 5.6 9.1 0.5 0.5 1.0 7.0
mean max v mem: 43.415 43.415 43.417 43.415 43.415 43.415
standard dev : 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003
mean max rss: 9.002 8.851 8.999 8.998 8.999 9.001
standard dev : 0.008 0.009 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.007
In all cases the model was found also to be deadlock-free: ¬∃♦deadlock (or
∀¬deadlock). However, the check for this took much longer: the companion
to the result above took 2461 seconds (41 minutes, 1 second) averaged over 20
trials, with a standard deviation of 40 seconds; maximum (virtual) memory
reached 45.4 Mb and rss 11.5 Mb, on average with standard deviations of
0.003 Mb, 0.004 Mb respectively.
It would be useful to these properties could be checked more rapidly. This
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can in fact be done if the component A can be replaced by a simpler, faster to
check, component A′ which nevertheless simulates it (in the presence of the
rest of the system), and if the component B is likewise replaced by a simpler
abstraction B′. For this to be valid, we need to know that all timed runs of
A ‖ B ‖ C are also timed runs of A′ ‖ B′ ‖ C. To be useful, the abstract
model must be quicker to check.
We shall construct models A′,B′ by abstracting from A,B and find that
the checks can indeed be performed much more quickly on A′ ‖ B′ ‖ C which
the model A ‖ B ‖ C simulates. The relation A ‖ B ‖ C  A′ ‖ B′ ‖ C is
inferred using the assume-guarantee theorem 7.5.2 and, using this, the o(ξ),
u(ξ) and deadlock-freeness properties for A ‖ B ‖ C can be inferred from the
analogous properties of A′ ‖ B′ ‖ C.
A′ is devised by abstracting out some of the logic of A. Figure 8.9 shows
the (non-deterministic) abstraction A′ of the plant-sensor process A of figure
8.7. This has the same structure as A, the only difference being that the
guards on three of the loops at location p1 are weaker. The clock g has
disappeared; it is not needed.
Similarly, B′ is abstracted from B. Figure 8.10 shows the abstraction B′
of the controller process B of figure 8.8. Again the structure of locations and
guards is the same, but the inertia modelling involving tests on clock g have
been replaced by weaker guards. The CANGen source code for the whole
abstraction is listed in appendix F.2.
It will be seen that the properties of the system A′ ‖ B′ ‖ C are checkable
very quickly. To be useful, though, it needs be established that runs of this
system subsume those of the original system A ‖ B ‖ C.
The assume-guarantee theorem 7.5.2 (page 152) is now used to establish
A ‖ B ‖ C  A′ ‖ B′ ‖ C.
Indeed, given that the same version, C appears on both sides of this
relation, the premisses (a) and (b) of the theorem are covered provided we
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p1 {h <= p}
(v == |k|)
rq?
h = 0
v = V/2, on = 0
Init(u)
rqstd (u)
val|k| (u)
(h >= p/2 && on) 
(h >= p/2 && !on) 
v−−; h = 0
v++; h = 0
swOff? on = 0
swOn? on = 1
swOff? on = 0
swOn? on = 1
swOff? on = 0
swOn? on = 1
rdg|k|!
(h >= p/2) 
h = 0
Figure 8.9: An abstract plant-sensor process
can show
A ‖ B ‖ C  A′ ‖ B ‖ C and A ‖ B ‖ C  A ‖ B′ ‖ C.
Now, A and A′ have the same locations and transition edges, save that
some guards in A are stronger than the corresponding guards in A′. From
this it is straightforward to infer that the diagonal relation between states
provides a simulation from A ‖ B ‖ C to A′ ‖ B ‖ C
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Init(u)
got|k|
vAv = V/2, h = 0
rqstVal {h <= dly}
swOff!swOn!
sndOn
rqstd
(h >= dly) h = 0
h = 0
h = 0 h = 0
{h <= dly2}h = 0
(vAv < lo)
sndOff
h = 0
(vAv > hi)
getVals
rq!  h = 0(lo−e <= vAv <= hi+e)
h = 0
rdg|k|?
vAv = |k|
Figure 8.10: An abstract controller process
Similarly, B and B′ have the same locations and transition edges, save
that some guards in B are stronger than the corresponding guards in B′,
from which similarly one infers a simulation from A ‖ B ‖ C to A ‖ B′ ‖ C.
Thus, the premisses of theorem 7.5.2 are fulfilled and A ‖ B ‖ C  A′ ‖
B′ ‖ C.
This implies that all traces of A ‖ B ‖ C are therefore possible traces of
A′ ‖ B′ ‖ C and since ∀(controller.vAv < ξ) is (for suitable ξ) satisfied by
A′ ‖ B′ ‖ C, it is also by A ‖ B ‖ C.
Likewise, ∀(controller.getVals ⇒ controller.vAv > ξ) (for suitable ξ)
and ∀¬deadlock are satisfied by A ‖ B ‖ C.
Now we know that all universally quantified properties of the abstraction
are also properties of the original, we can test the properties on the abstrac-
tion A′ ‖ B′ ‖ C. The results, as before presented as averages of 20 trials, are
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as follows. Parameter e is set to 2 as before.
check: o(12) o(14) o(16) u(24) u(26) u(28)
mean user time: 30.8” 30.9” 15.7” 28.8” 30.52” 32.3”
standard dev : 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4
mean max v mem: 44.791 44.791 42.552 44.624 44.790 44.792
standard dev : 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.058 0.002 0.002
mean max rss: 10.010 10.010 7.874 9.863 10.010 10.099
standard dev : 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005
Now the time to check for deadlock-freeness is down from 41 minutes to
172.7 seconds (averaged over 20 trials with standard deviation 7.6). Memory
usage was similar: max v mem = 48.7 Mb (SD = 0.003), rss = 14.1 Mb (SD
= 0.002).
This abstract system is deadlock-free, of course, and also the o(12), o(14),
u(26) and u(28) properties were verified. However in this abstraction, the
properties o(16), u(24) fail when e set to 2. This is not in fact a very
surprising result: it is telling us that the abstraction will not keep the variable
controller.vAv within 2 of the set point when e=2: there is too much “slack”
in the system. Notice the checks on o(16), u(24) took less time than the
other checks in this test: the o(16) check was especially quick, presumably
because UPPAAL verifyta found a counter-example very quickly.
We now have a situation where we can infer deadlock-freeness and also
o(12), o(14), u(26) and u(28) for the original more “concrete” process (figures
8.7, 8.8) an order of magnitude faster than by checking it directly. However
the failure of o(16), u(24) leaves us with no help with the original process.
In view of the fact that these properties were verified in the original check
we evidently have in the abstract model spurious counterexamples for them.
When e = 1 in the, all properties, o(12), o(14), o(16), u(24), u(26) and
u(28) and deadlock-freeness, were verified. The o(16) check of the abstract
model took 21.9 seconds (averaged over 20 trials; SD = 0.2) and the u(24)
check took 21.5 seconds. By comparison, checks of these two properties of
the concrete model took 260.1 seconds (SD = 4.3) and 259.2 seconds (SD =
8.7) respectively, over an order of magnitude longer.
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This abstraction has, overall, yielded a significant speed-up of checks of
∀-properties of the original model. A limitation is that it is possible for a
properties to be falsified by the abstraction even when true in the concrete
model: the abstraction can yield spurious counterexamples.
Nevertheless, the example illustrates how compositional reasoning can
be used to speed up the checking of an embedded system model: decom-
pose it and replace components with abstractions which the original compo-
nents simulate; use compositional theorems and reasoning (such as assume-
guarantee) to infer an overall simulation relationship and hence infer prop-
erties of the system model from the same properties of its abstraction.
8.3.2 Broadcasting
network (CAN channel) −− C
swOn/Off
rq rdgrdg
controller −− Bplant − sensor −− A
rq rdg
swOn/Off
rdg
esd
esd
esd
emergency −− E
Figure 8.11: A system with broadcast emergency-shutdown
A slight extension of this scenario introduces broadcast – a sender sending
to multiple receivers. In figure 8.11, The system A ‖ B ‖ C is extended with
a process E which simulates an emergency, causing it to emit an urgent
“emergency shut-down” synchronisation esd – see figure 8.12.
esd!
h = 0
down {h <= T}eminit
(h >= T)
h = 0
Figure 8.12: The emergency simulator
Processes A and B both receive this broadcast and are accordingly ex-
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tended each with an extra location down and a transition from every other
location with a broadcast synchronisation with the emergency shutdown mes-
sage.
It can be checked that the broadcast emergency shut-down works as
intended: ∀(emsd.down ⇒ ∀♦(controller.down ∧ plantSensor.down))
where emsd denotes an instance of the emergency simulator. Using the ab-
stractions A′, B′ in lieu of A, B, this property was verified for the system
A′ ‖ B′ ‖ C ‖ E using the same hardware set as before in 35 minutes, 52.1
seconds. The o(ξ), u(ξ) and non-deadlock properties were still satisfied also.
Unfortunately, the assume-guarantee theorem is no longer useful, for in
order to infer A ‖ B ‖ C ‖ E  A′ ‖ B′ ‖ C ‖ E one needs this already in
order to satisfy premiss (b) of the theorem.
A limitation of the assume-guarantee theorem is that processes jointly
participating in a synchronisation (such as A, B, C in the present instance)
cannot be simulated separately, but must be simulated (or abstracted) to-
gether.
8.4 Working with bCANdle
So far, our examples have focussed on systems modelled by UPPAAL-type
automata, communicating via a CAN channel. These are interesting in that
they show how compositional reasoning can be applied to UPPAAL models
of embedded systems communicating by CAN. However our starting point
was the bCANdle specification framework.
The example of section 8.3, however, uses constructs which can all be
defined in bCANdle.
A process very similar to the plant-sensor process of (figure 8.7) can be
specified as a bCANdle process term PlantSensor by the equations below,
in which g, h are clock variables, v an integer variable, on a boolean, and p
an integer parameter.
PlantSensor = [g = h = 0, v = V/2, on = 0 : 0, 0] ; PSDutyCycle
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PSDutyCycle = [idle: p/2, p]
[> ChgState; PSDutyCycle
[> RecOffOn; PSDutyCycle
[> Comm; PSDutyCycle
ChgState = (on→ [v ++, h = 0 : p/2, p]+!on→ [v −−, h = 0 : p/2, p]
+[h = 0 : p/2, p]
RecOffOn = ch?1.s; (s == 0→ [on = 0, g = 0 : 0, 0]
+s == 1→ [on = 1, g = 0 : 0, 0])
Comm = RecRq; SendVal
RecRq = ch?2.x[> (RecOffOn; RecRq)
SendVal =
∑
k(v == k → ch!0.k)[> (RecOffOn; SendVal)
Here, we assume a data environment DPS which supports integer variable v
(whoe type is a subrange from 0 to some maximum V ) and boolean variable
on, basic operations to initialise these varaibles and the clocks, a predicate
to test whether v has value k (k = 0, ..., V − 1) and basic operations to
increment and decrement v.
Symbol p is a time-delay parameter corresponding to the p in figure 8.7,
and ch denotes the CAN channel. Also recall that a message of type 0 sends
a variable reading, a message type 1 sends a command to switch on or switch
off, and a message of type 2 requests a reading.
Similarly, to define a process like the controller of figure 8.8 would require
a bCANdle equational specification of the form
Controller = [g = h = 0, vav = V/2 : 0, 0] ; ControllerDutyCycle
ControllerDutyCycle =
[ωnull : dly, dly]; ch!2.0; ch?0.vav;
((γlo → ch!1.1) + (γmed → [ωnull : 0, dly2] + (γhi → ch!1.0));
ControllerDutyCycle
As with the plant-sensor process we assume given a data environment DC
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with support for the integer variable vav, a basic operation to initialise vav
and the clocks g, h, operation ωnull which does nothing but reset clock h on
completion, and predicates
γlo ≡ (vav < lo ∧ g > inert) ∨ vav < lo− e,
γhi ≡ (vav > hi ∧ g > inert) ∨ vav > lo+ e,
γmed ≡ ((vav ≥ lo∧ vav ≤ hi)∨ (g ≤ inert∧ (vav ≥ lo− e∧ vav ≤ hi+ e)))
to test the value of variable vav in relation to the values of parameters lo, hi, e
and the clock g in relation to the inertia parameter. Parameters lo, hi, e, inert
are as depicted in figure 8.8 and discussed in §8.3. The clock resets h = 0
appearing in 8.8 add nothing to the functionality of the model but do poten-
tially aid verification by reducing the number of states needing to be checked.
A bCANdle specification (P,N,D) analogous to the example would be
constructed as the parallel composite P = PlantSensor|Controller with
a network term N containing the channel k and data environment D =
DPS ⊔DC .
This example shows how, starting from a bCANdle specification, a paral-
lel composite of timed automata can be constructed using the constructions
employed in the proof of theorem 7.4.2: see § 5.4.2 and appendix B).
Developing canGen. To do this is always possible, but to do it by hand
is laborious, of course. An interesting future project is to develop a software
tool, an extension of CANGen, to parse a bCANdle specification and gen-
erate an equivalent composite of timed automata, an equivalent UPPAAL
“system”.
Parsing bCANdle process terms is straightforward, as the syntax is de-
fined by a BNF grammar. As the examples above and in §5.4.2 show, the
bCANdle data environment D accompanying a process term must be inferred
at a suitable level of abstraction from from the variables and atomic oper-
ations occurring in the process terms. a CANGen-generated channel of m
message types and n values The tool will then have to generate from the
parse tree the clocked bCANdle terms (with associated data environment
states) and transitions between them as illustrated in the example of §5.4.2.
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The rules of this section will need to be recursively applied to generate the
a timed automaton equivalent to the the original clocked process term and
data environment. There will be opportunities for optimising the automa-
ton, for instance by resetting clocks in order to trim the state space size. A
system defined as a bCANdle system comprising a set of parallel processes
not employing parallelism at a lower level (a restriction also imposed in the
original bCANdle analysis) will thus give rise to a set of parallel timed au-
tomata communicating by CAN channels. An extended version of CANGen
expand this into an UPPAAL “system”.
A possible further development of this tool would be to integrate it with
a model checker rather than using UPPAAL, and to incorporate counter-
example-guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR). The latter is reported
([44], see below) to be a powerful model-checking technique in itself. Be-
cause of the essential role of “human” reasoning in obtaining compositional
abstractions via simulations of components, such a tool will need to output
timed automata (in some suitable) language and accept such timed automata
as well as bCANdle systems as input.
8.5 Scope and Limits of the Method
The method described in this chapter will in theory extend to as many CAN
channels, message types and payload values as one would wish, although
the present version of CANGen generates only a single channel automaton.
This has sufficed to prove the concept of the approach and an upgrade of
CANGen to generate multiple channels is future work. Of course, the def-
inition of a CAN frame allows 211 message types and 264 data values. One
could in theory thus have for a single channel 275 urgent synchronisations (in-
put), broadcast sychronisations (output) and associated indexed automaton
locations: theoretically possible, but well beyond what is practicable using
current computing technology.
Alur [15] reports that the computational time-complexity of reachability
analysis of the state space of a timed automaton with n locations and k
clocks, in which every clock constraint constant is ≤ c, is n.2O(klog(kc)) (cf
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§3.3.1), the region automaton has n.k!.2k.(2c + 2)k vertices and that the
reachability problem is PSPACE-complete. On the other hand, the space-
and time-complexity of expanding a CANGen source is linear both in the
number of of message types and in the number of message values. Thus the
complexity of the combined verification is essentially the complexity of the
back-end model-check.
L[µ,ν]
[µ,ν]!snd
ini{h<=100 }
h = 0
(h >= 90)
h = 0
[µ,ν]?rcv
R[µ,ν] {urgent}
ini
Figure 8.13: Simple sender and Receiver
The practical limit of the method is therefore at present determined by
UPPAAL and the complexity of the systems it can check. As a simple test,
checks were tried on a simple system in which a CANGen-generated channel
of m message types and n values was fed every 90–100 time units by a simple
sender process with a message of arbitrary type µ (0 ≤ µ < m) and value ν
(0 ≤ ν < n), and a simple receiver process took delivery of it (figure 8.13).
The UPPAAL property sender.Lµ,ν --> receiver.Rµ,ν
3 was checked for
various values of m,n, µ, ν.
With ten message types and 50 values (m = 10, n = 50) the property
sender.L8,10 --> receiver.R8,10 was verified in around 75 seconds. With
m = 5, n = 120 the property sender.L4,60 --> receiver.R4,60 was verified
in around 150 seconds. However, doubling either the number of message
types or the number values modelled overwhelmed the simple resources that
have been used for the experiments described in this chapter. For example,
the following caused the verification run to thrash -
• m = 5, n = 240: sender.L4,120 --> receiver.R4,120
• m = 5, n = 180: sender.L4,120 --> receiver.R4,120
3ie ∀(sender.Lµ,ν ⇒ ∀♦receiver.Rµ,ν)
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• m = 10, n = 100: sender.L8,90 --> receiver.R8,90
• m = 10, n = 75: sender.L8,60 --> receiver.R8,60
The method is clearly restricted to rather small numbers of message types
and values, although the boundaries might be pushed a little by use of more
powerful computing equipment (or at least, more RAM). Future work might
include adaptation of the method to model checkers other than UPPAAL,
or perhaps, even, a custom checker. However, it is unlikely we shall be able
accommodate very large values of m,n.
On the other hand, do we need to? The method is intended to work with
CAN-communicating systems at an abstract level and although an imple-
mented system might well communicate numerical values from a large range
of values, an abstraction of it might well (depending on the logic of the sys-
tem) simulate it adequately using a much smaller range – small enough to
be accommodated within the limits implied by these tests.
As discussed briefly in §1.3, methods other than model-checking with
timed automata might well be appropriate for checking systems at a low level
of implementation detail, such as true, as opposed to interleaving concurrency
methods. The present work focuses on modelling timed automata, however,
as this is widely used for checking properties at a high level of abstraction.
The approach is suitable for working at such an abstract level with, for
instance, communication protocols or distributed control systems in which
the potential number of states is bounded and where one is interested in
properties such as
• safety properties: for instance, a variable is maintained within a desired
range;
• liveness and bounded liveness: for example, the system responds to an
input from its environment or delivers output to its environment within
some time bound ;
• fairness and freedom from starvation: for instance, actions or processes
that are required to be performed with minimum frequency are.
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The approach of this thesis is not intended for analysing aspects of system
performance such as “throughput”, speed, bandwidth. It focusses pretty
much on the ability of a system to respond and to meet real-time deadlines.
It was mentioned in §3.3.1 that forward reachability analysis allows a
tool like UPPAAL to check many properties other than those which can be
expressed directly in its specification language, by means of test automata.
These allow one to formulate checks for safety, liveness and fairness properties
as above – indeed anything that may be formulated in timed TCTL (§3.3.2).
Also, as Bowman and Gomez [29] point out in their chapter 11, reachability
analysis is versatile: many general liveness properties can be handled by
nested reachability checks, although this is computationally expensive.
Of course, when one is making use of simulation relations in order to em-
ploy compositionality, we must confine ourselves to universal quantification
over paths.
As it stands, the method used in the present work is a mixture of manual
and automatic procedures. A simple prototype translator exists which, start-
ing with a bCANdle system, generates equivalent CANGen source code. This
tool (CANTranslator on the accompanying CD) is at a very early stage of de-
velopment, defined earlier in the thesis as future work, and has not figured in
the experiments of the present chapter. The CANGen source code, explained
in §8.1, can on a small scale be easily written by hand working from timed
automata or translating from bCANdle according to the operation semantic
rules of bCANdle (as in the example at the end of §5.4.2).
The source code is expanded by CANGen into UPPAAL .xta-format code
which can be checked by UPPAAL’s verifyta tool. CANGen at present sup-
ports one CAN channel: this has sufficed for our experiments but a upgrade
is envisaged for “production” use.
Thus far, a mixture of automatic and manual methods has be employed
but it is envisaged that in the future this part of the method will be fully au-
tomated. Constructing component-wise abstractions via simulation relations
is, on the other hand, a matter of human creativity. One needs to study the
logic a particular compositional model in order to find suitable abstractions
which simulate its components.
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J Berendsen and F Vaangrager [27], exploring compositional abstraction
in a more general setting than the present work, do suggest some approaches
to this. They suggest -
• Weaken guards and location invariants of a component to obtain an
“overapproximating” abstraction;
• After weakening guards and invariants, omit variables that are no
longer tested;
• It may be possible to keep one component (or a small number of com-
ponents) exact and replace the remainder by a single very coarse ab-
straction, preserving just the information about their interaction with
the one “in the spotlight”. B Wachter and B Westphal [112] develop
this approach, which they call the “Spotlight Principle”;
• It may be possible to abstract a component automaton by a parallel
combination of automata; although Berendsen and Vaandrager found
proving the correctness of an instance of this hard.
The examples discussed earlier in this chapter (§§8.2, 8.4) employed rea-
soning of the type covered by the first two items.
This element of the approach will inevitably require some manual input
but possible future work will explorer automated methods such as counterexample-
guided abstraction refinement.
8.6 Summary
An embedded system composed of parallel components communicating by
CAN can be modelled in bCANdle. The several components of this model
can be translated into timed automata as explained in §5.4.2, using the rules
set out there. The translation is in fact into the formalism comprising the
input to CANGen. As just discussed, this procedure can (and eventually will)
be implemented in a software tool. The result is a composition of parallel
timed automata including automata which model the CAN channel(s). After
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expansion with CANGen the result is an UPPAAL “system”, whose properties
expressible in ACTL can be checked.
In the case of models which are unfeasibly large for this, there is the op-
portunity for replacing components of the model with (usually more abstract)
components which simulate them. The framework for doing this is provided
by the theorems of chapter 7 and examples explored in the preceding sections
of this chapter. Finding useful simulations will usually be a matter of human
ingenuity although, as seen in §8.3, abstracting data and operations of the
model is generally a promising strategy. Counterexample-guided abstraction
refinement is a promising “automatic” technique for refining such simula-
tions when a property is found to fail: this possible refinement of our work
is discussed briefly in the next chapter.
Compositional models can be developed directly as timed automata, as
well as bCANdle models; and the framework devloped here could be ported
to other kinds of communicating systems, as long as the communication
mechanism is modellable as a timed automaton.
Chapter 9
Conclusions and Further Work
9.1 Model Checking Broadcasting Embedded
Systems
This thesis has examined the used of compositional methods for checking
models of broadcasting embedded systems comprising processes communi-
cating via CAN network channels. In particular, it has examined D Kendall’s
bCANdle formalism (chapter 4), and shown (chapter 5) how it can be cast
into an equivalent form in which all the system components are (parallel)
timed automata modellable in UPPAAL.
Thus, a system expressible in bCANdle can be modelled as a parallel
composition of UPPAAL timed automata. This representation was further
cast into an equivalent form (chapter 6) in which variables were not shared
between processes. This allowed some compositionality results (chapter 7)
to be applied.
The compositionality results allow one to infer a simulation of a given
composite model A ‖ B ‖ C ‖ ... by some more abstract model A′ ‖ B′ ‖
C′ ‖ ... for which checking of some property ϕ might be more tractable. The
simulation relation implies a trace inclusion
A ‖ B ‖ C ‖ ...  A′ ‖ B′ ‖ C′ ‖ ...
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and so the properties ϕ need to be universally quantified over times and paths
(of the form ∀ψ in CTL, for instance). Since we are dealing with timed
systems, this is not unduly restrictive. For instance, absence of deadlock can
be cast into an assertion that in every run, every state is non-deadlocking.
In particular, assume-guarantee theorems such as that of §7.4.2 allow one
to infer such a trace-inclusion relation between composite systems by ab-
stracting “component-wise”. An example of this was described in section
8.3. The premiss (b) of the assume-guarantee theorem 7.5.2 is a tough re-
quirement, however, and some creativity is required to devise models that
satisfy it. Useful further work includes a possible strengthening of the theo-
rem by some sort of relaxation of this premiss.
In the example just cited, the method was applied to a composite model
built in terms of timed automata; it can a fortiori be applied to bCANdle
models, as discussed in section 8.4. It is hoped that the results presented
here have wider applicability and interest than in systems employing CAN
networks; nevertheless these are an important class of embedded systems and
the present compositional formulation is a useful adjunct to bCANdle.
The models explored in chapter 8 were reasoned about by means of ab-
stractions which had the same timed-automaton structure as their more re-
fined, detailed counterparts, but weaker guards on some transitions. This
turned out to be a powerful way of obtaining the simulation relations use-
ful in compositional reasoning. One can verify a property of a (component
of a) system by exhibiting the system as a “more determined” version of
some abstract non-deterministic model (with the same locations and weaker
transition guards) which nevertheless has the required behaviour.
9.2 Model Checking More Generally
The compositional reasoning illustrated by the examples in chapter 8 is a
useful adjunct to any method that uses timed automata to model concurrent
real-time systems. Models of practical systems become intractable when
scaled up to “real-world” size because of the “state explosion” problem which
besets them. This was found, for instance, in early attempts by the present
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author to model a simple robotic manufacturing cell with a conveyor that
could stop and start. Compositional reasoning provides a way of dealing with
state explosion by allowing one to “divide and conquer” by using abstraction.
The models discussed in chapters 5, 6, 8 were models of systems employing
CAN, but were built directly using UPPAL-type timed automata. In fact
nothing in the present work implies that it has to apply only to these. In
fact the compositional reasoning illustrated in chapter 8 could apply to any
system modellable in UPPAAL, or indeed, with “plain” timed automata, in a
way which is compatible with the compositionality theorems. One could, for
instance, model distributed systems using a network technology other than
CAN, provided only that the network behaviour can be modelled as a timed
process.
9.3 Further Work
A number of papers, while not bearing directly on the work of this thesis, do
suggest avenues of future investigation.
Alexander Rabinovich [106] defines a generalised parallel product of which
many parallel compositions are special cases, and obtains positive results for
a compositional method based on it, at least for “basic propositional modal
logic”. G Frehse [57] has worked in a similar way to the present work, using
hybrid automata communicating using discrete events and without shared
variables; this work does not use UPPAAL or deal with CAN broadcasting
but offers some interesting future directions. Rodolfo Gmez [61] develops a
representation of urgent actions using timed automata with deadlines which
avoids “timelocks” and provides a compositional translation of these into
UPPAAL. A Gupta, K L McMillan and Z Fu [64] use a boolean satisfiability
solver in assume-guarantee reasoning which they say outperforms BDD-based
model checking. Junyan Qian, Lingzhong Zhao, Guoyong Cai and Tianlong
Gu [105] present formula-dependent abstraction for CTL which does not
preserve ACTL formulae as simulation does, so might be too coarse, but
does, they say, reduce the size of the Kripke structure; and they provide
an accompanying refinement method. Timothy Bourke and Arcot Sowmya
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[28] are interested in the fact that a deterministic τ -free timed automaton
can be transformed into a form where reachability analysis can decide trace-
inclusion in another automaton. They remark that manual transformation
is tedious and error-prone and provide a tool for automatically transforming
UPPAAL automata.
9.3.1 Counterexample-guided Abstraction Refinement
Section 3.5 described a method developed by E Clarke, O Grumberg, S Jha,
Y Lu and H Veith [44] for making and then refining abstractions of a model.
If a universally quantified property holds in the abstraction then it holds
also in the original model as execution traces of the original model are in-
cluded among traces of the abstraction. If the property does not hold in the
abstraction, the method produces a counterexample which either pulls back
to a counterexample in the original model or is spurious, in which case the
method suggests a refinement of the abstraction which eliminates at least
one element of spuriousness. The CEGAR approach is surveyed by Orna
Grumberg in [62].
This method was developed for automatic use in model-checking tools
for untimed systems specified by ACTL* formulae – indeed, the authors
describe how their algorithms are implemented using data structures such as
ordered binary decision diagrams (OBDD). However, their algorithms and
their reasoning are couched entirely in terms of states of a Kripke structure,
sets of states and transitions between states.
The timed transition systems of our models are in fact Kripke structures
whose states are vectors of variable values. Indeed, in §§7.2.1, 7.2.2 it was
shown how the structures of Kaynar, Lynch et al. [77, 78] subsume the timed
transition systems of our models. They are easily endowed with the Kripke
structure: they have a set of states (which are vectors of variable values),
an initial state subset (usually a singleton), a transition relation, and the
function L can be set in the same fashion as in Clarke et al. [44], mapping a
state to the set of “atoms”1 of the system true there.
1atomic subformulae of the guards of the system, and their negations; cf. §3.5.1
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A timed automaton (in our sense) can be seen as a “concurrent program”
in the sense of Clarke et al.: see §3.5.1, page 64. In the notation used there,
each variable vi is associated with an initialiser Ii derived from the automaton
and undergoes an update Aki when a guard C
k
i is satisfied. The A
k
i and C
k
i
are again derived from the guards and updates of the automaton. The timed
transition system of one of our models is thus, in effect, a Kripke structure
of the type constructed by Clarke et al.
The reasoning set out in §3.5.1 leading to the construction of an exis-
tential abstraction of the timed transition system based on an equivalence
relation between states extends in a straightforward way to the timed transi-
tion systems of our models. Thus we can envisage an existential abstraction
M′ of a model M of our type, such that M M′, M is simulated by M′.
Spurious counterexamples arise in these abstract models in the fashion
described in §3.5.3 and can in principle be detected by an algorithm like the
SplitPATH described in that section. Abstractions containing spurious coun-
terexamples can be refined using the procedures of Clarke et al. described in
§3.5.4.
This approach was developed by Clarke et al. for use in an automatic
(software) model-checking tool working with efficient representations of states
(using ordered binary decision diagrams) of the timed transition system of
the model. To apply it to our framework would similarly require detailed
examination of timed states: not suitable for working “by hand” but worth
incorporating in a software model-checking tool for our framework.
Chao Wang, Hyondeuk Kim, Aarti Gupta [113] present a hybrid method
combining CEGAR with variable-hiding methods to obtain abstraction meth-
ods which they claim perform better than previously existing ones.
Our approach has been to build models in a “macro” language which is
preprocessed by our CANGen into input to UPPAAL’s verifyta tool. It does
indeed seem a worthwhile future enterprise to streamline this process into
a single tool which will verify the model directly. Counterexample-guided
abstraction refinement will form a useful adjunct to this.
A number of more recent papers suggest a variety of novel approaches to
generating and refining abstractions and also assumptions for use in auto-
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mated assume guarantee reasoning, including use of machine learning, theo-
rem proving and syntactic transfomrations, and SAT solvers: J M Cobleigh,
G S Avrunin and L A Clarke [48]; R Ben Salah, M Bozga and O Maler
[107, 21]; N Sharygina, S Tonetta and A Tsitovich [108]; V D’Silva, S Son-
alkar and S Ramesh [52]; S Kundu, S Lerner and R Gupta [86]; B Finkbeiner,
H Peter, and S Schewe [55]; H Yao and H Zheng [116]; C Pasareanu and D
Giannakopoulou [103]; Y Meller, O Grumberg and S Shoham [96]; E Clarke,
M Talupur and H Veith [47]; B Finkbeiner, S Schewe and M Brill [56]; S
Bensalem, M Bozga, J Sifakis and Thanh-Hung Nguyen [24, 25]; W Nam, P
Madhusudan and R Alur [100, 18].
9.3.2 Stopwatch and Hybrid Automata
We have spent the most time in the world of timed automata; but early
invesigations of compositional model checking problems looked at linear hy-
brid automata (Cassez, Larsson [43], Alur et al. [3]). These are “classic”
timed automata extended with variables which vary at a constant rate in
time, may be updated in a mathematically linear fashion on discrete ac-
tions, and linear combinations of which may feature in guards. Special cases
include stopwatch automata, timed automata with clocks that can stop and
start. Hybrid automata have not figured explicitly in the later work here
as they are subsumed by UPPAAL, supporting as it does a rich set of data
types. Interestingly, stopwatches are also straightforward to model in UP-
PAAL, but models that incorporate them are notoriously difficult to check.
Compositional techniques may provide a way into this.
The linear hybrid systems of Thao Dang ([49]) are an altogether more
ambitious construction, incorporating as they do continuous variables whose
values evolve according to linear differential equations. Interestingly she has
worked with predicate abstraction, including counterexample-guided predi-
cate abstraction, in collaboration with Alur and F Ivancic [5, 6]. It would be
interesting to see if the framework developed in this thesis extends to them.
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9.3.3 Hybrid I/O Automata
These are a development by N Lynch, R Segala and F Vaandrager [94] of
their Timed I/O Automata, discussed in §§3.4.3, 7.2.2. The main innovation
is that their structures not only distinguish discrete internal and external
discrete actions, but also internal and external (continuous) variables. In
their hybrid I/O automaton the external variables are further partitioned
into input and output variables – essentially, variables which might be passed
into a process and which might return data from a process, respectively
(internal variables are local to a process). UPPAAL supports something like
this, as it provides reference parameters to a process; but we have gone to
quite a bit of trouble to avoid shared variables between processes in our
framework, so it is a moot point whether this will usefully extend it.
One possibility is that the compositionality theorems may be sharpened
to versions that do apply to systems with shared variables.
9.3.4 Separation Logic and Rely-Guarantee Reasoning
Rely-guarantee reasoning is an approach to verifying properties of concurrent
programs (see e.g. V Vafeiadis [110], Vafeiadis and Parkinson [111], Xu et
al. [115]) that is reminiscent of assume-guarantee reasoning.
Vafeiadis and Parkinson, for instance, deal with formulae of the form
PCQ in which P,Q are predicates on the program state and C a “command”,
some sort of processing. The formula’s intended meaning is then, “if P was
true of the program state immediately before C is issued, Q is true of the
state immediately after”. Formulae of this type can be compared with the
assume-guarantee formulae 〈ϕ〉M〈ψ〉 briefly discussed in §3.4.1.
Vafeiadis and Parkinson use the separation logic of Peter O’Hearn and his
collaborators [101, 102] which extends the syntax and semantics of P,Q by
adding to classical boolean logic a “separating conjunction” P ∗Q, true in a
state if the state separates into two disjoint states, one satisfying P and one
satisfying Q. There is also a “separating implication” P −∗Q true at a local
state s if any state disjoint from s and satisfying P results in a conjoined
state satisfying Q.
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O’Hearn et al. develop axioms and rules of inference for a separation logic
which allows them to “prove” a concurrent program by deriving formulae of
the form {P}C{Q} where C is a program command with pre-condition(s) P
and post-condition(s) Q. Vafeiadis and Parkinson extend this work in [111]
by carefully distinguishing the local state from the shared state of a process
and developing from this a notion of interference in a command C by its
environment. They define a formula
⊢ C sat(p,R,G, q)
in which p is a preconditon of command C, q a post-condition, and R,G
are sets of actions. The intended meaning is that if (1) the execution of C
from an initial state satisfying p and under interference ⊆ R (R forms a rely
condition) does not fault, and (2) this execution causes interference ⊆ G and,
and (3) it terminates, then the final state satisfies q. They develop a system of
proof rules by which a set of concurrent programs or processes may be proved
to satisfy such formulae, formalising the reliance of each command in each
process on a bound R on interference it suffers, and asserting a guaranteed
bound G on the interference it causes.
This work was motivated by the problem of proving correct a system
of concurrent processes sharing memory. The work of this thesis, on the
other hand, has addressed its problems by recasting them into a form in
which variables are not shared. Future work could to investigate possible
extensions to the theorems of chapter 7 to models with shared variables. If
this turns out to be useful, some analogue of separation logic may play a
useful role. Local rely-guarantee reasoning (X Feng, [53] may also prove an
interesting extension.
9.3.5 Practical Work
The bulk of the present work has been a theoretical exploration of compo-
sitional techniques for verifying properties of CAN-broadcasting embedded
systems. The main verification tool was UPPAAL, but a simple “front-end”
tool, CANGen, was developed to ease the task of defining models without
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shared variables. CANGen is rather crude – it needs upgrading if it is to
support more than one CAN channel, for instance, and its input “macro
language” could be developed. It is used in conjunction with UPPAAL’s
verifyta program.
A promising idea is to make an integrated tool which generates the model
from the CANGen input language or from a bCANdle specification, and does
the verification.
An interesting adjunct to such a tool would be support for counterexample-
guided abstraction refinement – see the discussion in §9.3.1. This would allow
us to evaluate the usefulness of this technique in the present framework.
9.3.6 Heuristics
As already mentioned, it transpired in course of exploring assume-guarantee
reasoning that a good approach was to obtain a model as a “concrete case”
with the same automaton structure and stronger guards, of a more abstract
non-deterministic model with desirable properties. What is required are more
case studies to uncover more heuristics of this kind.
9.3.7 Assume-Guarantee
As already mentioned, it would be useful to know whether theorem 7.5.2 can
be strengthened by admitting in place of its premiss (b) some weaker premiss.
At the moment, it seems that when multiple components participate in a
broadcasting synchronisation, they have to be consider together, indivisibly,
in any compositional reasoning.
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Appendix A
Glossary of Symbols
Here are summarised the symbols and notations introduced in the body of
the thesis. Here they are grouped by subject.
CTL*, Temporal Logic Syntax (§2.1.1)
ϕ, ψ, ρ, χ, ...: state, path formulae;
©ϕ: ϕ true next;
♦ϕ: ϕ now or eventually;
ϕ: ϕ true from now on;
ϕUψ: ψ eventually; meanwhile ϕ;
ϕWψ: ϕ now and until ψ;
ϕRψ: ψ until ϕ first true;
∀ρ: for all paths ρ ...
∃ρ: for some path ρ ...
Temporal Logic Semantics (§2.1.2)
〈S,R, L〉: a Kripke structure;
L(s): the set of atomic formulae true at s ∈ S;
〈s0, s1, s2, ...〉 or −→s : a path in the Kripke structure ((si, si+1) ∈ R);
s |= ϕ: ϕ is true at state s (s ∈ S);
〈Σ, σ0, A,→〉: a labelled transition system with initial state σ0;
σ1
λ→ σ2: transition from σ1 to σ2 labelled λ;
σ0
λ0→ σ1 λ1→ σ2 λ2→ ...: a run of the LTS;
215
216 APPENDIX A. GLOSSARY OF SYMBOLS
Timed Temporal Logics (§2.1)
♦≤mϕ: parametrised ♦: ϕ will be true in up to m time units;
≤mϕ: parametrised : ϕ will be true for at least m time units;
ϕU<mψ: ψ will be true less than m time units from now and in the mean
time, ϕ is true;
µ-Calculus (§2.1.3)
℘(S): set of predicates over states (power set of S);
f : ℘(S)→ ℘(S): a (monotonic) function;
µX.f(X): least fixed point of f ;
νX.f(X): greatest fixed point of f ;
Timed Automata (§2.2, §7.2)
(L, l0, A,H, E, I): a timed automaton with locations set L, action label al-
phabet A, initial location l0, clocks H, edges E, invariant function I;
I(l): invariant at location l;
ζ: a clock zone or constraint; a guard on an edge;
Z(H): the set of clock zones over H;
l
ζ,a,H−→ l′: an edge from l to l′ with guard ζ, label a, and set H of clocks to
reset;
A1 ‖ A2: composite of timed automata A1, A2;(§2.2.3)
Timed Automata Semantics (§2.2.2)
〈Σ, σ0, A ∪ R,→〉: timed transition system of the automaton;
Σ , L× RH;
σ = (l, v) ∈ Σ: a timed state at location l, with clock valuation v;
a(∈ A): a discrete action transition;
t(∈ R): a time-elapse transition;
v + t: clock valuation which gives h the value v(h) + t;
v[h := 0]: clock valuation like v except h has value 0;
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UPPAAL Semantics and Compositionality (§5.2.2, §7.5.1, §7.5.2)
(
−→
l , v): a timed state:
−→
l = (l1, ..., ln) is a vector of component process
“states” (locations) and v a valuation of variables;
(
−→
l , v)→ (−→l ′, v′): a transition;
(
−→
l , v)
d→ (−→l , v): a time-passage transition (d ∈ R, d ≥ 0);
lk
ζ,λ−→ l′k: an edge of one component with guard ζ, update λ and no synchro-
nisation label gives rise to an internal (interleaving) transition;
lj
ζj ,c!,λj−→ l′j and lk ζk,c?,λk−→ l′k: a pair of component edges with complementary
synchronisation labels c!, c? on channel c gives rise to a binary synchronisa-
tion transition;
lj
ζj ,c!,λj−→ l′j and inm (possibly 0) component processes k1, ..., km edges lkp
ζkp ,c?,λkp−→
l′kp (p = 1, ...,m): gives rise to the broadcast synchronisation on broadcast
channel c;
(v, (lki )i=1...n): a timed state of an UPPAAL system with valuation v, vector
of locations (lki )i=1...n (§7.5.1);
v + t: advance of timed valuation v by time t;
v[λ]: a timed valuation updated by λ;
v |= ∧mi=1 Ii(lki ): valuation v satisfies all the invariants of (lki )i=1...n;
v |= ζi ∧ ζj1 ∧ ... ∧ ζjm : v satisfies several guards;∏n
i=1Ai or A1 ‖ ... ‖ An: a parallel composite of UPPAAL process automata;
A  B: trace inclusion;
Symbolic Model Checking with OBDD (§2.3.2)
2: the two-element Boolean algebra;
fv : 2
n → 2: the boolean function determined at vertex v of a binary decision
diagram;
f , ¬f , f ∨ g, f ∧ g, ∃vf , ∀vf : QBF formulae (v a propositional variable);
σ |= f : with truth assignment σ, t evaluates to 1 (true);
Model Checking with Timed automata (§2.3.5)
v ≃ v′: clock-region-equivalence of two clock valuations;
ζ + t: clock zone ζ advanced by t;
ζ[H := 0]: clock zone like ζ but with clocks in H reset;
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Bisimulation and simulation (§2.4)
s1 ≃ s2: strong equivalence of states of a labelled transition system;
(S1, S
0
1 , A,→1)  (S2, S02 , A,→2): transition system 1 is simulated by transi-
tion system 2.
bCANdle Data Model (§4.1)
V, V ar,Ω,Γ: (sets of) data values, variables, operation names, predicate
names;
D = (type, op, pred, val): a data environment over V ar,Ω,Γ;
D′ = D[x := v]: D′ like D except D′.x = v;
D
ω−→d D′: data model transition relation: D evolves to D′ when ω has run;
D |= γ: predicate γ is true in data model D;
bCANdle Network Model (§4.2)
I, V : (sets of) message identifiers (type), data values;
(i, v) or i.v (i ∈ I, v ∈ V ): a message;
i 4 i′, m = (i, v) 4 (i′, v′) = m′: priority ordering of messages;
m ≺ m′: strict priority ordering;
δ(m) = (l, u, L, U): time bounds of preacceptance phase (l, u) and postac-
ceptance phase (L,U);
↓: channel state: free;
t1,t2
❀ m: channel in preacceptance phase of message m with time to comple-
tion bounded by t1, t2;
↑ m: channel at point of accepting message m;
m
t1,t2
❀ : channel in postacceptance phase of message m;
u: a message queue; m : u: a message queue with m at the head;
u" i.v: insertion of message i.v in queue u;
N : a network is an indexed set of channels Nk : k ∈ K;
Nk = (s, u): channel k is in state s with message queue = u;
k ❀ i.v: a network action: enter preacceptance phase of i.v on channel k;
k ↑ i.v: a network action: acceptance of i.v on channel k;
i.v ❀ k: a network action: enter postacceptance phase of i.v on channel k;
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k ↓: network action: channel k becomes free;
N
a−→n N ′: network model transition relation: N evolves to N ′ upon action
a;
(s, u) + t (where t ∈ R): effect of time elapse on channel state;
N
t−→n N ′: network model transition relation: N evolves to N ′ upon time
passage t;
bCANdle Process Term Syntax (§3.2.2, §4.3)
k!i.x: sending a message (payload x) of type i on channel k;
k?i.x: receiving a message of type i on channel k into x;
[ω : t1, t2]: a data operation ω with time bounds t1, t2;
γ → P : a process term P guarded by a predicate γ;
P ;Q, P + Q, P [> Q, P |Q: sequence, nondeterministic choice, interrupt,
parallel composite of process terms P,Q;
X: a process variable;
recX.P : the recursion construct;
(P,N,D): a bCANdle system;√
: “ideal” process term, denoting completion;
(P,N,D)
λ−→ (P ′, N ′, D′): a bCANdle transition;
λ may be a network action λn, a time passage t, or a process action arising
from a data model transition ω, validation of a predicate γ, a send action
k!i.v or a receive action k?i.v;
Compositional Model of bCANdle (§5.4)
k!i.x, k?i.x, [ω : t1, t2]
h, X: atomic clocked process terms,
γ → Qˆ, recX.Qˆ, Qˆ; Qˆ′, Qˆ+ Qˆ′, Qˆ[> Qˆ′: clocked process terms (§5.4.1);
A(Pˆ0, D0): the timed automaton modelling a clocked process term with data
environment (§5.4.2);
(Qˆ,D)
ζ,λ,H−→ (Qˆ′, D′): an edge with guard ζ, label λ, update set H;
bCANdle as a Parallel Product (§5.5)
‖ni=1 A(Pˆi, Di) ‖ (‖k∈K Nk): a parallel product with timed transition system
strongly equivalent to that (P,N,D) (Theorem 5.5.1);
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((Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m, (ηk)k∈K , v): a general state of the timed transition system
((ηk)k∈K is a vector of network channel automaton locations, v a valuation;
§5.5.2);
unclk(Qˆ): the unclk function on clocked process terms;
age(Qˆ, v): the age function on clocked process terms;
CAN Without Shared Variables (§6.1, figure 6.1)
nMsg[µ, ν]: a two-index family (µ ranges over message identifier/types, ν over
payload values) of UPPAAL urgent synchronisation channels;
M2S[µ, ν], PreAcc[µ, ν], PostAcc[µ, ν]: families of UPPAAL locations;
dMsg[µ, ν]: a family of UPPAAL broadcast synchronisation channels;
Timed I/O Automata (KLSV Structures) (§3.4.3, §7.2.1)
A = (X,Q,Θ, E,H,D, T ): a KLSV structure with variables X, states Q,
external and internal action labels E,H, discrete action relation D ⊆ Q ×
(E ∪H)×Q, and trajectories T ;
τ : J → Q: a trajectory (domain of J is of form [0, b] or [0, b) or [0,∞));
τ : [0, b]→ Q: a closed trajectory;
τ : [0, 0]→ Q: a point trajectory;
τ ≤ τ ′: τ is a prefix of τ ′;
τ D t (t ∈ dom(τ): suffix of a trajectory;
τ0 a τ1 a τ2 a ...: concatenation of trajectories;
τ0a1τ1a2τ2a3...: an infinite execution fragment (τi ∈ T , ai ∈ E ∪H);
τ0a1τ1a2τ2a3...τn: a finite infinite execution fragment;
A1 ‖ A2: composition (§7.2.3);
A1  A2: implementation, trace inclusion(§7.3.2);
Appendix B
Bisimulation Proof Details
Here are details of the proof that the mapping (5.5) is a strong bisimulation
up to strong equivalence of bCANdle systems with product timed automata
of the type constructed in section 5.4.
To see this one needs to check, for ((Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m, (ηk)k∈K , v) a general
timed state of the automaton, and
(|ni=1age(Qˆi, v), (age(ηk, v))k∈K ,⊔ni=1DQi) the bCANdle system to which it
maps,
1. ((Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m, (ηk)k∈K , v) ≈ (|ni=1age(Qˆi, v), (age(ηk, v))k∈K ,⊔ni=1DQi);
2. For every transition λ from (|ni=1age(Qˆi, v), (age(ηk, v))k∈K ,⊔ni=1DQi)
in the bCANdle timed transition system there is a transition with the
same label λ from ((Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m, (ηk)k∈K , v), and the targets are con-
text equivalent to states related by the mapping;
3. For every transition λ from ((Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m, (ηk)k∈K , v) there is a tran-
sition with the same label λ from (|ni=1age(Qˆi, v), (age(ηk, v))k∈K , ⊔ni=1DQi),
and the targets are context equivalent to states related by the mapping.
The first of these requirements is met by definition of context equivalence.
The second is established by considering a number cases and using induc-
tion on the computation of |ni=1age(Qˆi, v), as shown below.
The third is established in a way symmetrical with the second, again by
induction on the computation of |ni=1age(Qˆi, v). Further details are given
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below.
B.1 Lemmas
To assist with this a number of lemmas a presented. Versions of these appear
in Kendall [79], appendix B where they appear as lemma B1 and lemmas B3
– B8; they are adapted to work with the compositional timed-automaton
formalism for bCANdle presented in this thesis.
B.1.1 Lemma
If (P1, N,D1), (P2, N,D2) are two bCANdle systems with the same network
state N and (P1, N,D1)
λ−→ (P ′1, N ′, D′1) and (P2, N,D2) λ−→ (P ′2, N ′′, D′2)
are bCANdle timed transitions from these systems with the same label λ
then N ′ = N ′′, D′i = Di (i = 1, 2): the target network states agreed and
data environments are unchanged.
If, in addition, λ ∈ An, a discrete network action, then P ′i ≡ Pi.
This is a straightforward induction on the rule §4.3 that defines the tran-
sitions (behaviour) of bCANdle systems. This lemma needs no adaptation
from [79].
B.1.2 Lemma
Let A(Pˆ0, D0) as defined in §5.4.2 denote the timed automaton of a clocked
process term with its associated data environment. Let v be a clock valuation
defined on the clocks of the automaton, and H a set of clock variables ⊆ the
domain of v. Let (Qˆ,D) denote a location of A(Pˆ0, D0). If v |= I(Qˆ,D) then
v[H := 0] |= I(Qˆ,D).
If a location invariant is satisfied by a clock valuation, it is still satisfied
when some additional clocks are reset.
This is easily proven by induction on the definition of I in A(Pˆ0, D0) (see
§5.4.2.1). Remember the “urgent” clock hu is reset on every edge.
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B.1.3 Lemma
Let (Qˆ,D) denote a location of A(Pˆ0, D0) as in lemma B.1.2 above. Let v be
a clock valuation defined on the clocks of the automaton, and H a set of clock
variables ⊆ the domain of v. Provided hu ∈ H, for any data environment D′
compatible (ref §4.1) with D, v |= I(Qˆ,D) implies v[H := 0] |= I(Qˆ,D′).
Resetting some additional clocks satisfies the invariant in any compatible
environment, provided the urgent clock is reset.
Again this is easily seen by induction on the definition of I in A(Pˆ0, D0).
B.1.4 Lemma
Let Qˆ denote a clocked process term. Let v be a clock valuation defined on
the clocks of Qˆ, and H a set of clock variables ⊆ the domain of v. Recall
from §5.4.2.2 the set HQˆ of initial clock variables of Qˆ. Provided hu ∈ H and
HQˆ ⊆ H, for any data environment D, v[H := 0] |= I(Qˆ,D).
Again this follows by induction on the definition of I.
B.1.5 Lemma
1. Let K denote a set of network channel identifiers, ηk (k ∈ K) a vector
of network channel automata locations, and v a clock valuation defined
on all the clocks of the ηk; let age(η, v) be an abbreviation for the
network environment defined by (age(ηk, v))k∈K .
If v, v′ are two such clock valuations which agree on all the clocks in
the ηk, then age(η, v) = age(η, v
′) – that is (∀k ∈ K)age(ηk, v) =
age(ηk, v
′).
2. If Qˆ denotes a clocked process term and v, v′ are two clock valuations
which agree on all the clocks in HQˆ, then age(Qˆ, v) = age(Qˆ, v
′).
B.1.6 Lemma
Let Qˆ denote a clocked process term and v a valuation defined on all the
clocks of Qˆ, and H a set of clock variables ⊆ the domain of v. Let HQˆ denote
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the set of initial clock variables of Qˆ (§5.4.2.2) and unclk(Qˆ) be defined as
in 5.5.1.
If HQˆ ⊆ H, then age(Qˆ, v[H := 0]) ≃ unclk(Qˆ).
This proven by induction on the steps in the definition of age(.).
B.1.7 Lemma
Let η = (ηk)k∈K denote a vector of network channel automata locations, and
v a clock valuation defined on all its clocks, as above. Let I(η) ,
∧
k∈K(ηk).
Let t be a time increment. Let tcp(.) denote the maximum time progress
function on bCANdle network channel states defined in 4.2.
If v+ t |= I(η) then t ≤ tcp(age(η, v)); i.e., (∀k ∈ K)t ≤ tcp(age(ηk, v)).
If a clock valuation can be incremented by t while all the network channel
invariants continue to be satisfied, then the corresponding aged (bCANdle)
network allows passage of t time units.
This assertion follows in a straightforward way from the definition of
tcp(.) and the bCANdle network channel state rule (N5).
B.1.8 Lemma
This is Proposition B4 of [79]. If (P,N,D) ≃ (√, N,D) as bCANdle systems,
then P ≡ √. Only √ behaves like √.
B.2 The Bisimulation – Details
Further details of the bisimulation now follow. The sketches below contain
some abuse of notation: for instance k may denote a particular channel and
at the same time be employed as a dummy index over K, and v may denote
a valuation, part of a timed state in a timed transition system, and also value
payload of a message, as in k!i.v. The context should make the meanings
clear in these cases. A vector of channel automaton locations, (ηk)k∈K figures
frequently as part of the automaton state: it will be abbreviated simply η, and
age(η, v) will in this context abbreviate the vector (age(ηk, v))k∈K . Similarly,
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η′ abbreviates (η′k)k∈K and so forth. The symbol R when used to denote time
values will strictly mean {t ∈ R : t ≥ 0}.
The relation we aim to establish as a bisimulation is that given by the
mapping
((Qˆi, DQi)i=1...n, (ηk)k∈K , v)
(5.5)7−→ (|ni=1age(Qˆi, v), (age(ηk, v))k∈K ,⊔ni=1DQi)
which maps a timed state of the product automaton – a vector of A(Qˆi, DQi)
and ηk (channel automaton) locations and a clock valuation v – to a bCANdle
system constructed from these elements using the age function.
It is straightforward to check that the right hand side is a well-formed
bCANdle system and we have already noted that
((Qˆi, DQi)i=1...n, (ηk)k∈K , v) ≈ (|ni=1age(Qˆi, v), (age(ηk, v))k∈K ,⊔ni=1DQi) – the
two sides are are context-equivalent, by construction of the extended context-
equivalence relation.
It remains to check the proposed bisimulation relation
(5.5)7−→ respects timed
transitions in each direction, up to strong equivalence (≃).
B.3 A Transition in bCANdle is Simulated in
the TA Formalism
First, it is required that for every transition
(|mi=1age(Qˆi, v), (age(ηk, v))k∈K ,⊔mi=1DQi) λ−→ (Q′, N ′, D′) in the bCANdle
timed transition system there is a transition with the same label λ from
((Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m, (ηk)k∈K , v), and the targets are context equivalent to states
related by the mapping.
Since the age function is defined recursively on clocked process terms,
this will be proven by induction on the definition of age. To this end, it suits
us to prove a slightly stronger property: for every pair of timed states
((Qˆi, DQi)i=1...n, (ηk)k∈K , v)
(5.5)7−→ (|ni=1age(Qˆi, v), (age(ηk, v))k∈K ,⊔ni=1DQi) re-
lated by the mapping, for every transition
(|mi=1age(Qˆi, v), (age(ηk, v))k∈K ,⊔mi=1DQi) λ−→ (Q′, N ′, D′) in the bCANdle
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timed transition system there is a transition with the same label
((Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m, (ηk)k∈K , v)
λ−→ ((Qˆ′i, D′Qi)i=1...m′ , (η′k)k∈K , v′), where for some
clocked bCANdle terms, Qˆ′′i ≃ Qˆ′i, (i = 1...m′),
((Qˆ′′i , D
′
Qi)i=1...m′ , (η
′
k)k∈K , v)
(5.5)7−→ (|m′i=1age(Qˆ′′i , v), (age(η′k, v′))k∈K ,⊔m′i=1D′Qi)
and |m′i=1age(Qˆ′′i , v′) ≃ Q′ and N ′ = age(η′, v′) and D′ = ⊔m′i=1D′Qi.
Proof Here are the cases needing to be considered:
1. (Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m is a single term (k!i.x,DQ1) where k ∈ K, i ∈ I, x ∈
V ar. Then Q1 = age(Qˆ1, v) = k!i.x. λ can be one of three things:
(a) λ is k!i.v arising by rule (Snd1) of §4.3, where v = DQ1.x.
Then N ′ = age(η, v))[k := (s, u" i.v)] and D′ = DQ1, Q′ =
√
.
By rule (C Snd) (§5.4.2.2) there is an edge (k!i.x,DQ1) 1,k!i.v,{h
u}−→
(
√
, DQ1) in A(Qˆ1, DQ1) which synchronises with one of the tran-
sitions in ηk which inserts i.v into the queue for channel k. The
result is a transition
((Qˆ1, DQ1), η, v)
k!i.v−→ ((√, DQ1), (η′k)k∈K , v[hu := 0]) where the
η′k(k ∈ K) are like ηk except for the particular k which is the
subject of rule (Snd1) for which η′k is ηk with i.v inserted in the
queue (e.g. Q[i] := v).
It remains to check that
((
√
, DQ1), (η
′
k)k∈K , v[h
u := 0]) 7−→ (Q′, N ′, D′). We already have
Q′ =
√
, D′ = DQ1. Also, age(η
′, v) = N ′.
(b) λ arises from a network transition N
λn−→n N ′ on a particular
channel k, via §4.3(Snd 2). This is one of
• N k❀m−→n N ′ = N [k := (l(m),u(m)❀ m,u)] where Nk = (↓,m : u);
• N k↑m−→n N ′ = N [k := (↑ m,u)] where Nk = (0,t❀ m,u) for
some t;
• N m❀k−→n N ′ = N [k := (m L(m),U(m)❀ , u)] where Nk = (↑ m,u);
• N k↓−→n N ′ = N [k := (↓, u)] where Nk = (m 0,t❀, u) for some
t;
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In each of these cases we have age(k!i.x,DQ1) = k!i.x and N =
age(η, v) and (k!i.x,N,DQ1)
λ−→ (k!i.x,N ′, DQ1). The corre-
sponding transition in the timed-automaton formalism of §5.4.2
is
((Qˆ1, DQ1), η, v)
λ−→ ((Qˆ1, DQ1), (η′k)k∈K , v[hu := 0]) where λ is a
transition on the particular channel k:
ηk = Free⇒ η′k = PreAcc
ηk = PreAcc⇒ η′k = Acc
ηk = Acc⇒ η′k = PostAcc
ηk = PostAcc⇒ η′k = Free
It needs to be checked that age(η′, v) = (age(η′k, v))k∈K = N
′ but
the guards and invariants of the channel automaton have been
chosen to ensure this.
(c) λ = 0 : (k!i.x,N,DQ1) −→ (k!i.x,N,DQ1) by §4.3(Snd 3) with
N = age(η, v). This is mirrored in the timed-automaton formal-
ism by the transition
((k!i.x,DQ1), η, v)
0−→ ((k!i.x,DQ1), η, v) which is enabled assum-
ing v satisfies the invariants of the source state. Also,
((k!i.x,DQ1), η, v) 7−→ (k!i.x,N,DQ1) under the mapping (5.5)
because N = age(η, v) by hypothesis.
2. (Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m is a single term (k?i.x,DQ1) where k ∈ K, i ∈ I, x ∈
V ar. Q1 = age(Qˆ1, v) = k?i.x. Again, there are three possibilities for
(k?i.x, age(η, v), DQ1)
λ−→ (Q′, N ′, D′):
(a) λ = k?i.v by rule §4.3(Rcv 1). By hypothesis, Nk = (↑ i.v, u) (so
ηk = Acc), Q
′ =
√
, N ′ = age(η, v), D′ = DQ1[x := v].
To obtain the corresponding transition in the timed-automaton
formalism, C Rcv (§5.4.2.2) provides an edge
(k?i.x,DQ1)
1,k?i.v,hu−→ (√, DQ1[x := v]) in which k!i.v receives a
broadcast synchronisation with the channel automaton transition
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leaving location Acc. This results in the transition
((k?i.x,DQ1), η, v)
k?i.v−→ ((√, DQ1[x := v]), η, v[hu := 0]).
(b) λ is a network transition and bCANdle rule §4.3(Recv 2) is em-
ployed. Thus, λ = λn is a network transition on a channel k
′ 6= k,
or else on channel k but with Nk not at acceptance point. The
construction of a parallel transition in the timed-automaton for-
malism is as in the (Snd 2) case.
(c) λ = t ∈ R, a time delay to which §4.3 rule (Rcv 3) applies. The
parallel transition in the timed-automaton formalism is
((k?i.x,DQ1), η, v)
t−→ ((k?i.x,DQ1), η, v + t).
3. (Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m is a single term ([ω : t1, t2]
h, DQ1). age([ω : t1, t2]
h) =
[ω : t1
.− v(h), t2
.− v(h)] and so the mapping/relation (5.5) takes the
form
(([ω : t1, t2]
h, DQ1), η, v) 7−→ ([ω : t1
.− v(h), t2
.− v(h)], age(η, v), DQ1).
There are three sub-cases for
([ω : t1
.− v(h), t2
.− v(h)], age(η, v), DQ1) λ−→ (Q′, N ′, D′):
(a) ([ω : t1
.− v(h), t2
.− v(h)], N1, DQ1) ω−→ (√, N1, D′Q1) by §4.3 rule
(Comp 1), where t1
.− v(h) = 0, N1 = age(η, v), and D′Q1 is the
data model state after the operation ω, as determined by §5.4.2.2
rule (C Cmp).
In this case, construct the corresponding automaton transition
(([ω : t1, t2]
h, DQ1), η, v)
ω−→ ((√, D′Q1), η, v[hu := 0])
(b) λ is a network action, the transition arising via §4.3(Comp 2).
This case is handled similarly to the (Snd 2), (Rcv 2) cases.
(c) λ = t ∈ R via §4.3(Comp 3). This case is similar to the (Rcv 3)
case.
4. (Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m is a single term (Qˆ1, DQ1) where Qˆ1 = γ → Qˆ and
γ ∈ Γ is a predicate. The mapping relation (5.5) takes the form
((Qˆ1, DQ1), η, v) 7−→ (age(Qˆ1, v), age(η, v), DQ1); and age(Qˆ1, v) =
γ → unclk(Qˆ).
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(a) One sub-case is that in which DQ1 |= γ and a transition λ = γ is
inferred from §4.3 rule (Gu 1):
(γ → unclk(Qˆ), age(η, v), DQ1) γ−→ (unclk(Qˆ), age(η, v), DQ1).
In this case rule §5.4.2.2(C Gd) gives in the automaton formalism
an edge (γ → Qˆ,DQ1)
1,γ,{hu}∪H
Qˆ−→ (Qˆ,DQ1). Using lemmas B.1.2,
B.1.4, one can check that v[{hu} ∪ HQ := 0] |= I(Qˆ,DQ1) and
infer a timed transition
((γ → Qˆ,DQ1), η, v) γ−→ ((Qˆ,DQ1), η, v[{hu} ∪HQˆ := 0]) and the
case is completed by checking that by mapping (5.5),
((Qˆ,DQ1), η, v[{hu} ∪HQˆ := 0]) 7−→ (unclk(Qˆ), age(η, v), DQ1).
(b) (γ → unclk(Qˆ), age(η, v), DQ1) λn−→ (unclk(Qˆ), N ′, DQ1) by §4.3
(Gu 2) where λn : N = age(η, v) −→ N ′ is a discrete network
action on some channel k. In this case N ′ = (age(η′k′ , v))k′∈K =
age(η′, v) for short. ηk′ = η
′
k′ for all k
′ 6= k and η′k is the channel
automaton location following ηk. The rest of the details resemble
the (Snd 2) case.
(c) (γ → unclk(Qˆ), age(η, v), DQ1) t∈R−→ (unclk(Qˆ), N ′, DQ1) by §4.3
(Gu 3) where t = 0 or DQ1 2 γ, and N = age(η, v)
t−→ N ′ is a
time delay on the network. In these cases N ′ = age(η′, v+ t). The
case is completed in a fashion similar to the (Rcv 3), (Comp 3)
cases.
5. (Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m is a single term (Qˆ1, DQ1) where Qˆ1 = Qˆ11; Qˆ12, a se-
quence of two (clocked) process terms. The mapping relation (5.5)
takes the form ((Qˆ1, DQ1), η, v) 7−→ (age(Qˆ1, v), age(η, v), DQ1); and
age(Qˆ1, v) = age(Qˆ11; Qˆ12, v) = age(Qˆ11, v); unclk(Qˆ12).
(a) The first sub-case is that in which there is a transition inferred
by rule §4.3(Seq 1), (age(Qˆ11, v); unclk(Qˆ12), age(η, v), DQ1) λ−→
(Q′11; unclk(Qˆ12), N
′, D′) from (age(Qˆ11, v), age(η, v), DQ1)
λ−→
(Q′11, N
′, D′), where Q11 is not
√
and λ ∈ Ap ∪ An ∪ R.
By induction hypothesis, there is a timed transition in the au-
tomaton formalism, ((Qˆ11, DQ1), η, v)
λ−→ ((Qˆ′11, D′Q1), η′, v′) with
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Qˆ′11 ≃ Qˆ′′11, Q′11 ≃ Q′′11 and ((Qˆ′′11, D′Q1), η′, v′) 7−→ (Q′′11, N ′, D′) by
(5.5).
There are three “sub-sub-cases” to consider, depending on the
type of transition λ:
i. If λ ∈ Ap, a discrete process action, then there must be an
automaton edge (Qˆ11, DQ1)
ζ,λ,H−→ (Qˆ′11, D′Q1) with v |= ζ, v′ =
v[H := 0] |= I(Qˆ′11, D′Q1).
Now, §5.4.2.2 rule (C Seq 1) implies an edge
(Qˆ11; Qˆ12, DQ1)
ζ,λ,H−→ (Qˆ′11; Qˆ12, D′Q1) with
v |= ζ and v′ = v[H := 0] |= I(Qˆ′11; Qˆ12, D′Q1).
From this can be inferred a timed transition
((Qˆ11; Qˆ12, DQ1), η, v)
λ−→ ((Qˆ′11; Qˆ12, D′Q1), η′, v′) where λmay
synchronise with an edge of a channel automaton to make a
change of a network state.
Since ((Qˆ′′11, D
′
Q1), η
′, v′) 7−→ (Q′′11, N ′, D′), Qˆ′11 ≃ Qˆ′′11, Q′11 ≃
Q′′11, it follows that
Qˆ′11; Qˆ12 ≃ Qˆ′′11; Qˆ12, Q′11; unclk(Qˆ12) ≃ Q′′11; unclk(Qˆ12) and
((Qˆ′′11; Qˆ12, D
′
Q1), η
′, v′)
(5.5)7−→ (Q′′11; unclk(Qˆ12), N ′, D′) as re-
quired.
ii. If λ ∈ An, a discrete network action, then λ arises from an
edge of a channel automaton. The reasoning in this case is
similar to the previous case.
iii. If λ = t ∈ R, a time passage, then
∀t′ ∈ [0, t](v + t′) |= I(Qˆ11, DQ1) ∧
∧
k∈K I(ηk), whence
(v + t′) |= I(Qˆ11; Qˆ12, DQ1).
Also Qˆ11 = Qˆ
′
11, DQ1 = D
′
Q1, η = η
′, v′ = v + t. So
((Qˆ11; Qˆ12, DQ1), η, v)
t−→ ((Qˆ11; Qˆ12, DQ1), η, v + t).
By induction hypothesis, Qˆ′11 ≃ Qˆ′′11, Q′11 ≃ Q′′11, and
((Qˆ′′11, DQ1), η, v + t)
(5.5)7−→ (Q′′11, N ′, D′) whence
((Qˆ′′11; Qˆ12, D
′
Q1), η
′, v′)
(5.5)7−→ (Q′′11; unclk(Qˆ12), N ′, D′) as re-
quired.
(b) A transition inferred by rule §4.3(Seq 2),
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(age(Qˆ11, v); unclk(Qˆ12), age(η, v), DQ1)
λ−→ (unclk(Qˆ12), N ′, D′)
where
λ = λp ∈ Ap and (age(Qˆ11, v), age(η, v), DQ1) λp−→ (√, N ′, D′).
By induction hypothesis there is a timed transition in the automa-
ton formalism, ((Qˆ11, DQ1), η, v)
λp−→ ((Qˆ′11, D′Q1), η′, v′) with
(∃Qˆ′′11)Qˆ′11 ≃ Qˆ′′11, (∃Q′′11)Q′11 ≃ Q′′11 and
((Qˆ′′11, D
′
Q1), η
′, v′) 7−→ (Q′′11, N ′, D′) by mapping/relation (5.5).
From the definition of the age function and lemma B.1.8, Qˆ′′11 ≡√
, Qˆ′11 ≡
√
and Q′′11 ≡
√
.
Now, ((Qˆ11, DQ1), η, v)
λp−→ ((√, D′Q1), η′, v′) must arise from a
timed-automaton edge (Qˆ11, DQ1)
ζ,λp,H−→ (√, D′Q1) where v |= ζ
and v′ = v[H := 0] |= I(√, D′Q1). [There may be an additional
synchronisation with an edge ηk −→ η′k in which case additional
clock(s) are reset and v′ |= η′k too. Otherwise η′k = ηk.]
By §5.4.2.2(C Seq 2) there is a timed-automaton edge
(Qˆ11; Qˆ12, DQ1)
ζ,λp,H∪HQˆ12−→ (Qˆ12, D′Q1) (where HQˆ12 is the set of
initial clock variables of Qˆ12) which may also synchronise with
an edge of a network channel automaton. By lemmas B.1.2 and
B.1.4,
v′′ = v[H ∪HQˆ12 := 0] |= I(Qˆ12, D′Q1) ∧ I(η′k)
Hence, ((Qˆ11; Qˆ12, DQ1), η, v)
λp−→ ((Qˆ12, D′Q1), η′, v′′).
Since ((
√
, D′Q1), η
′, v′)
(5.5)7−→ (√, N ′, D′Q1) by induction hypothesis,
D′ = D′D1 and by lemma B.1.5, N
′ = age(η′, v′′). Define Q =
age(Qˆ, v′′). Then ((Qˆ12, D
′
Q1), η
′, v′′)
(5.5)7−→ (Q,N ′, D′). By lemma
B.1.6, unclk(Qˆ12) ≃ Q.
6. (Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m is a single term (Qˆ1, DQ1) where Qˆ1 = Qˆ11 + Qˆ12. This
case is similar to the following, which is worked through in more detail.
7. (Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m is a single term (Qˆ1, DQ1) where Qˆ1 = Qˆ11[> Qˆ12. In
this case, let Q1j = age(Qˆ1j, v), j = 1, 2. Then age(Qˆ11[> Qˆ12, v) =
Q11[> Q12 and we have
((Qˆ11[> Qˆ12, DQ1), η, v)
(5.5)7−→ (Q11[> Q12, N,DQ1)) whereN = age(η, v).
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There are now four sub-cases to consider.
(a) (Q11[> Q12, N,DQ1)
λp∈Ap−→ (Q′11[> Q12, N ′, D′Q1) inferred by rule
§4.3(Int 1), where (Q11, N,DQ1) λp∈Ap−→ (Q′11, N ′, D′Q1) and Q′11 is
not
√
.
By induction hypothesis, ((Qˆ11, DQ1), η, v)
λp−→ ((Qˆ′11, Dˆ′Q1), η′, v)
and ∃Qˆ′′11 ≃ Qˆ′11, Q′′11 ≃ Q′11 such that: ((Qˆ′′11, D′Q1), η′, v′)
(5.5)7−→
(Q′′11, N
′, D′Q1). This timed transition λp arises from an timed-
automaton edge (Qˆ11, DQ1)
ζ,λp,H−→ (Qˆ′11, Dˆ′Q1) (synchronising with
an edge ηk −→ η′k if some η′k 6= ηk) with ¬Qˆ′11 ≡
√
, v |= ζ and
v′ = v[H := 0] |= I(Qˆ′11, Dˆ′Q1). Also v′ |= the invariant of η′k if
appropriate; in this case a network clock is additionally reset.
So, by §5.4.2.2 (C Int 1), there is a timed-automaton edge
(Qˆ11[> Qˆ12, DQ1)
ζ,λp,H−→ (Qˆ′11[> Qˆ12, Dˆ′Q1) possibly synchronising
with a channel automaton edge.
Now v[H := 0] |= I(Qˆ′11, Dˆ′Q1){∧I(η′k)} and v |= I(Qˆ12, DQ1).
Since hu is reset at every edge we can appeal to lemmas B.1.2,
B.1.3 and infer v[H := 0] |= I(Qˆ12, Dˆ′Q1) whence
v[H := 0] |= I(Qˆ′11[> Qˆ12, Dˆ′Q1){∧I(η′k)}. Since also v |= ζ there
is a timed transition
((Qˆ11[> Qˆ12, DQ1), η, v)
λp−→ ((Qˆ′11[> Qˆ12, Dˆ′Q1), η′, v)
(H also includes a network channel clock to be reset, if necessary.)
Now, Qˆ′′11 ≃ Qˆ′11 and Q′′11 ≃ Q′11 so Qˆ′′11[> Qˆ12 ≃ Qˆ′11[> Qˆ12
and Q′′11[> Q12 ≃ Q′11[> Q12. Also Q′′11 = age(Qˆ′′11, v[H := 0])
by construction of the
(5.5)7−→ relation, and H ∩HQˆ12 = ∅ assuming
clocks are “safely allocated” so by lemma B.1.5,
Q = age(Qˆ12, v[H := 0]) and N
′ = age(η′, v[H := 0]).
Then, by construction of the mapping relation,
((Qˆ′′11[> Qˆ12, D
′
Q1), η
′, v[H := 0])
(5.5)7−→ (Q′′11[> Q12, N ′, D′Q1).
(b) (Q11[> Q12, N,DQ1)
λp∈Ap−→ (√, N ′, D′Q1) by rule §4.3(Int 2), where
(Q11, N,DQ1)
λp−→ (√, N ′, D′Q1). This case is handled similarly.
(c) (Q11[> Q12, N,DQ1)
λp∈Ap−→ (Q′12, N ′, D′Q1) by rule §4.3(Int 3), where
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(Q12, N,DQ1)
λp−→ (Q′12, N ′, D′Q1). This case is handled similarly.
(d) (Q11[> Q12, N,DQ1)
λnt∈An∪R−→ (Q′11[> Q′12, N ′, D′Q1) by §4.3(Int 4),
where (Q1j, N,DQ1)
λnt−→ (Q′1j, N ′, D′Q1) for j = 1, 2. There are
two sub-sub-cases.
i. λnt = λn ∈ An. By lemma B.1.1, Q11[> Q12 ≡ Q′11[> Q′12 and
DQ1 = D
′
Q1. By induction hypothesis,
((Qˆ1j, DQ1), η, v)
λn−→ ((Qˆ1j, DQ1), η′, v′) for j = 1, 2; and
∃Qˆ′′11 ≃ Qˆ′11, Qˆ′′12 ≃ Qˆ′12, Q′′11 ≃ Q′11, Q′′12 ≃ Q′12 such that
((Qˆ11, DQ1), η, v)
(5.5)7−→ (Q′′11, N ′, DQ1).
But ((Qˆ11, DQ1), η, v)
λn−→ ((Qˆ11, DQ1), η′, v′) must arise from
some edge ηk
ζ,λn,H−→ η′k. The same edge yields
((Qˆ11[> Qˆ12, DQ1), η, v)
λn−→ ((Qˆ11[> Qˆ12, DQ1), η′, v′).
ii. λnt = t ∈ R. In this case (∀k)ηk = η′k and v′ = v + t. Also,
(∀t′ ∈ [0, t])v+ t′ satisfies all the location invariants of the ηk.
The rest of the details are straightforward.
8. (Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m is a single term (Qˆ1, DQ1) where Qˆ1 = recX.Qˆ. So
((recX.Qˆ,DQ1), η, v)
(5.5)7−→ (age(recX.Qˆ, v), age(η, v), DQ1).
Now, age(recX.Qˆ, v) = age(Qˆ[recX.Qˆ/X], v). The expression on the
right hand side is “lower” in the recursive definition of age then the
left, so whenever there is a transition
(age(Qˆ[recX.Qˆ/X], v), age(η, v), DQ1)
λ−→ (Q′1, N ′, D′Q1)
we can infer by induction hypothesis
∃Qˆ′′1 ≃ Qˆ′1, Q′′1 ≃ Q′1 and a corresponding timed transition
((Qˆ[recX.Qˆ/X], DQ1), η, v)
λ−→ ((Qˆ′′1, D′Q1), η′, v′) with
((Qˆ′′1, D
′
Q1), η
′, v′)
(5.5)7−→ (Q′′1, N ′, D′Q1) (In particular, age(η′, v′) = N ′).
Two possible cases for λ need to be considered.
(a) A discrete action: λ ∈ Ap ∪ An. This is a discrete process action
or possibly and send or receive action synchronising with an edge
of a channel automaton. A discrete transition
((Qˆ[recX.Qˆ/X], DQ1), η, v)
λ−→ ((Qˆ′′1, D′Q1), η′, v′) must arise from
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an automaton edge (Qˆ[recX.Qˆ/X], DQ1)
ζ,λ,H−→ (Qˆ′′1, D′Q1) with v |=
ζ and v′ |= I(Qˆ′′1, D′Q1), possibly synchronising with a channel au-
tomaton edge. From §4.3 rule (Rec), there is an edge (recX.Qˆ,DQ1) ζ,λ,H−→
(Qˆ′′1, D
′
Q1), and hence the required timed transition.
(b) A time passage: λ = t ∈ R. Thus
((Qˆ[recX.Qˆ/X], DQ1), η, v)
t−→ ((Qˆ′′1, D′Q1), η′, v′) which must arise
from passage of time at a (vector of) automaton locations: v′ =
v + t, Qˆ′′1 = Qˆ[recX.Qˆ/X], D
′
Q1 = DQ1, η
′ = η and ∀t′ ∈
[0, t](v + t′) |= I(recX.Qˆ,DQ1).
Hence there is a timed transition
((recX.Qˆ,DQ1), η, v)
t−→ ((Qˆ′′1, D′Q1), η′, v′) as required to com-
plete the induction step.
9. (Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m is a vector (finite sequence) of clocked process terms.
Without loss of generality we consider just a pair (Qˆ1, DQ1), (Qˆ2, DQ2)
(this part of the proof generalises to m terms in a natural way). The
mapping relation (5.5) takes the form: ((Qˆ1, DQ1), (Qˆ2, DQ2), η, v) 7−→
(Q1|Q2, N,DQ1 ⊔ DQ2) where Qj = age(Qˆj, v) [j = 1, 2] and N =
age(η) = (age(ηk))k∈K . There are five sub-cases.
(a) (Q1|Q2, N,DQ1 ⊔DQ2) λp∈Ap−→ (Q′1|Q2, N ′, D′Q1 ⊔DQ2) by §4.3 rule
(Par 1), where (Q1, N,DQ1)
λp−→ (Q′1, N ′, D′Q1) and ¬Q′1 ≡
√
.
By induction hypothesis,
((Qˆ1, DQ1)(Qˆ2, DQ2), η, v)
λp−→ ((Qˆ′1, D′Q1)(Qˆ2, DQ2), η′, v′) and
∃Qˆ′′1 ≃ Qˆ′1, Q′′1 ≃ Q′1 such that
((Qˆ′′1, D
′
Q1)(Qˆ2, DQ2), η
′, v′)
λp7−→ (Q′′1|Q2, N ′, D′Q1 ⊔DQ2).
To complete this case, observe that Q′′1|Q2 ≃ Q′1|Q2.
(b) (Q1|Q2, N,DQ1⊔DQ2) λp∈Ap−→ (Q2, N ′, D′Q1⊔DQ2) by §4.3 rule (Par
2), where (Q1, N,DQ1)
λp−→ (√, N ′, D′Q1).
By induction hypothesis, ((Qˆ1, DQ1)(Qˆ2, DQ2), η, v)
λp−→
((
√
, D′Q1)(Qˆ2, DQ2), η
′, v′) ≃ ((Qˆ2, D′Q1 ⊔ DQ2), η′, v′) with N ′ =
age(η′, v′) and ∃Qˆ′′1 ≃ Qˆ′1 such that
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((Qˆ′′1, D
′
Q1)(Qˆ2, DQ2), η
′, v′)
λp7−→ (Q′′1|Q2, N ′, D′Q1 ⊔DQ2).
(c) (Q1|Q2, N,DQ1 ⊔DQ2) λp∈Ap−→ (Q1|Q′2, N ′, DQ1 ⊔D′Q2) by §4.3 rule
(Par 3), where (Q2, N,DQ2)
λp−→ (Q′2, N ′, D′Q2) and ¬Q′2 ≡
√
.
This is symmetrical to the (Par 1) case.
(d) (Q1|Q2, N,DQ1⊔DQ2) λp∈Ap−→ (Q1, N ′, D′Q1⊔DQ2) by §4.3 rule (Par
4), where (Q2, N,DQ2)
λp−→ (√, N ′, D′Q2). This is symmetrical to
the (Par 2) case.
(e) (Q1|Q2, N,DQ1 ⊔ DQ2) λnt∈An∪R−→ (Q′1|Q′2, N ′, DQ1 ⊔ DQ2) by §4.3
rule (Par 5), where (Qj, N,DQ1 ⊔DQ2) λnt−→ (Q′j, N ′, DQ1 ⊔DQ2),
j = 1, 2. Let D = DQ1 ⊔ DQ2 and recall Qj = age(Qˆj, v) and
N = age(η, v). By induction hypothesis,
((Qˆj, D), η, v)
λnt−→ ((Qˆ′j, D), η′, v′) and
∃Qˆ′′1 ≃ Qˆ′1, Q′′1 ≃ Q′1, Qˆ′′2 ≃ Qˆ′2, Q′′2 ≃ Q′2, such that
((Qˆ′′j , D), η
′, v)
(5.5)7−→ (Q′′j , N ′, D). The rest of the details are similar
to the cases involving network actions and/or time passage.
Remark – these cases generalise to a vector of parallel process terms
(Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m in a natural way.
B.4 A Transition in the TA Formalism is Sim-
ulated in bCANdle
The last part of the bisimulation proof is to show the reverse of the above:
that given a pair of related states,
((Qˆi, DQi)i=1...n, (ηk)k∈K , v)
(5.5)7−→ (|ni=1age(Qˆi, v), (age(ηk, v))k∈K ,⊔ni=1DQi), for
every transition in the timed-automaton formalism,
((Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m, (ηk)k∈K , v)
λ−→ ((Qˆ′i, D′Qi)i=1...m′ , (η′k)k∈K , v′) there is a tran-
sition with the same label λ from (|mi=1age(Qˆi, v), (age(ηk, v))k∈K ,⊔mi=1DQi)
in the bCANdle timed transition system, and the λ-targets are strongly (se-
mantically) equivalent to states related by the mapping.
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The proof of this similar, and symmetrical, to that given in the previous
section.
Again, this will be done by proving by induction on the recursive defini-
tion of the age function a slightly stronger property: for every pair of timed
states
((Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m, (ηk)k∈K , v)
(5.5)7−→ (|mi=1age(Qˆi, v), (age(ηk, v))k∈K ,⊔ni=1DQi) re-
lated by the mapping, for every transition
((Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m, (ηk)k∈K , v)
λ−→ ((Qˆ′i, D′Qi)i=1...m′ , (η′k)k∈K , v′) in the timed-
automaton formalism there is a transition with the same label
(|mi=1age(Qˆi, v), (age(ηk, v))k∈K ,⊔mi=1DQi) λ−→ (Q′, N ′, D′) in the bCANdle
timed transition system , where for some clocked bCANdle terms, Qˆ′′i ≃
Qˆ′i, (i = 1...m
′),
((Qˆ′′i , D
′
Qi)i=1...m′ , (η
′
k)k∈K , v)
(5.5)7−→ (|m′i=1age(Qˆ′′i , v), (age(η′k, v′))k∈K ,⊔m′i=1D′Qi)
and |m′i=1age(Qˆ′′i , v′) ≃ Q′ and N ′ = age(η′, v′) and D′ = ⊔m′i=1D′Qi.
Proof There are various cases to be considered: time passage with discrete
action, discrete action internal to a channel automaton, and discrete action
on a process term (several cases depending on (Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m). As before,
a vector of channel automaton locations is abbreviated by suppressing the
subscripts: (ηk)k∈K is abbreviated η, (age(ηk, v))k∈K is abbreviated age(η, v)
and so forth.
1. λ = t ∈ R. Then ((Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m, η, v) = ((Qˆ′i, D′Qi)i=1...m′ , η′, v′) –
m′ = m, v′ = v + t, and ∀k.η′k = ηk and ∀t′ ∈ [0, t].v + t′ |= I(ηk), and
∀i.Qˆ′i = Qˆi, D′Qi = DQi and ∀t′ ∈ [0, t].v + t′ |= I(Qˆi, DQi).
From this one can deduce a bCANdle network transition
age(η, v)
t−→ age(η, v+ t) by employing lemma B.1.7. To further infer
(|mi=1age(Qˆi, v), age(η, v),⊔ni=1DQi) t−→ (|mi=1age(Qˆi, v + t), age(η, v +
t),⊔ni=1DQi), as required, we make use of §4.3 rules (Snd 3), (Rcv 3),
(Comp 3), (Gu 3), (Ch 3), (Int 4), (Par 5).
2. λ = λn, an internal discrete action in just one of the channel automata,
say, ηk −→ η′k. Then v = v′, m = m′, ∀i.Qˆi = Qˆ′i, DQi = D′Qi, and
∀l 6= k.η′l = ηl. By construction of the age function, there is a network
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transition age(ηk, v)
λn−→ age(η′k, v), from which a timed transition
(|mi=1age(Qˆi, v), age(η, v),⊔ni=1DQi) t−→ (|mi=1age(Qˆi, v′), age(η, v′),⊔ni=1DQi)
may be inferred using §4.3 rules (Snd 2), (Rcv 2), (Comp 2), (Gu 2),
(Ch 3), (Int 4), (Par 5).
In the remaining cases actions λ arising as time passage or as network
actions are handled much as above; the cases below are those of discrete
actions on “process term” components arising via the rules of §5.4.2.2.
In these cases λ ∈ Ap.
3. (Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m is a single term (k!i.x,DQ1) where k ∈ K, i ∈ I, x ∈
V ar. λ must be ((Qˆ1, DQ1), η, v)
k!i.v−→ ((√, DQ1), η′, v[hu := 0]) arising
by rule §5.4.2.2(C Snd), where Qˆ1 = k!i.x, v = DQ1.x. A synchronous
action ηk −→ η′k in channel k adds message i.v to its queue; for l 6=
k, ηl = η
′
l.
By rule §4.3(Snd 1) there is a bCANdle transition
(k!i.x,N,DQ1)
k!i.v−→ (√, N [k := (s, u" i.v)], DQ1) where age(k!i.x, v) =
k!i.x and N = age(η, v), N [k := (s, u" i.v)] = age(η′, v).
4. (Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m is a single term (k?i.x,DQ1) where k ∈ K, i ∈ I, x ∈
V ar. λ must be ((Qˆ1, DQ1), η, v)
k?i.v−→ ((√, D′Q1), η′, v[hu := 0]) arising
by rule §5.4.2.2(C Rcv), where Qˆ1 = k?i.x, D′Q1 = DQ1[x := v]. η′l =
ηlforl 6= k and there is a transition ηk −→ η′k from the acceptance
point of channel k broadcasting a synchronisation to communicate the
data value.
By rule §4.3(Rcv 1) there is then a bCANdle transition
(k?i.x,N,DQ1)
k!i.v−→ (√, N ′, D′Q1) where age(k?i.x, v) = k?i.x and N =
age(η, v), N ′ = age(η′, v), D′Q1 = DQ1[x := v].
5. (Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m is a single term ([ω : t1, t2]
h, DQ1). A transition from
(([ω : t1, t2]
h, DQ1), η, v) must incorporate an edge from ([ω : t1, t2]
h, DQ1)
and this can only arise from rule §5.4.2.2(C Cmp). It follows that λ
is (([ω : t1, t2]
h, DQ1), η, v)
ω−→ ((√, D′Q1), η, v′) where DQ1 ω−→d D′Q1,
that is, D′Q1 is the state of DQ1 after the computation ω has run, and
v |= h ≥ t1, v′ = v[hu := 0].
238 APPENDIX B. BISIMULATION PROOF DETAILS
age([ω : t1, t2]
h) = [ω : t1
.− v(h), t2
.− v(h)] = [ω : 0, t2
.− v(h)] and so
the corresponding bCANdle transition takes the form
([ω : t1
.− v(h), t2
.− v(h)], age(η, v), DQ1) ω−→ (√, η,D′Q1) which exists
by virtue of §4.3 rule (Comp 1).
6. (Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m is a single term (Qˆ1, DQ1) where Qˆ1 ≡ γ → Qˆ. Recall
that age(γ → Qˆ) = γ → unclk(Qˆ). The timed transition
((γ → Qˆ,DQ1), η, v) λ−→ ((Qˆ′1, D′Q1), η′, v′) must arise via §5.4.2.2(C Gd)
from an edge (γ → Qˆ,DQ1)
1,γ,{hu}∪H
Qˆ−→ (Qˆ,DQ1) where DQ1 |= γ. Thus,
λ = γ, v′ = v[{hu} ∪HQˆ := 0], η′ = η, D′Q1 = DQ1 and Qˆ′1 = Qˆ.
By §4.3 rule (Gu 1) there is a bCANdle transition
(γ → unclk(Qˆ), age(η, v), DQ1) γ−→ (unclk(Qˆ), age(η, v), DQ1) which
provides the required corresponding bCANdle transition.
7. (Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m is a single term (Qˆ11; Qˆ12, DQ1). A timed transition λ
from ((Qˆ11; Qˆ12, DQ1), η, v) can arise in one of two ways.
(a) ((Qˆ11; Qˆ12, DQ1), η, v)
λ−→ ((Qˆ′11; Qˆ12, D′Q1), η, v′) arising from an
edge (Qˆ11; Qˆ12, DQ1)
ζ,λ,H−→ (Qˆ′11; Qˆ12, D′Q1) derived by rule (C Seq
1) of §5.4.2.2 from an edge (Qˆ11, DQ1) ζ,λ,H−→ (Qˆ′11, D′Q1) where Qˆ′11
is not
√
.
Thus, v |= ζ and v′ = v[H := 0] |= I(Qˆ′11; Qˆ12); so, v′ |= I(Qˆ′11)
and there is a timed transition
((Qˆ11, DQ1), η, v)
λ−→ ((Qˆ′11, D′Q1), η, v′).
By induction hypothesis, there is a bCANdle transition corre-
sponding to this under the bisimulation:
(age(Qˆ11, v), age(η, v), DQ1)
λ−→ (Q′′, age(η, v), D′Q1) where for
some Qˆ′′11 ≃ Qˆ′11, ((Qˆ′′11, D′Q1), η, v′)
(5.5)7−→ (age(Qˆ′′11, v′), age(η, v′), D′Q1)
with age(η, v) = age(η, v′) and Q′′ ≃ age(Qˆ′′11, v′).
§4.3 rule (Seq 1) implies a transition
(age(Qˆ11; Qˆ12, v), age(η, v), DQ1)
λ−→ (Q′′; unclk(Qˆ12), age(η, v), D′Q1)
(remember age(Qˆ11; Qˆ12, v) = age(Qˆ11, v); unclk(Qˆ12)) from which
the induction can be established.
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(b) ((Qˆ11; Qˆ12, DQ1), η, v)
λ−→ ((Qˆ12, D′Q1), η, v′) arising from an edge
(Qˆ11; Qˆ12, DQ1)
ζ,λ,H∪H
Qˆ12−→ (Qˆ12, D′Q1) derived by rule (C Seq 2) of
§5.4.2.2 from an edge (Qˆ11, DQ1) ζ,λ,H−→ (√, D′Q1).
Thus, v |= ζ and v′ = v[H ∪ HQˆ12 := 0] |= I(Qˆ12); so there
is a timed transition ((Qˆ11, DQ1), η, v)
λ−→ ((√, D′Q1), η, v′). The
rest of this part of the argument from the induction hypothesis is
similar to the previous part, but using §4.3 rule (Seq 2) in lieu of
(Seq 1).
8. (Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m is a single term (Qˆ11[> Qˆ12, DQ1). A timed transition
λ from ((Qˆ11[> Qˆ12, DQ1), η, v) can arise in one of three ways.
(a) ((Qˆ11[> Qˆ12, DQ1), η, v)
λ−→ ((Qˆ′11[> Qˆ12, D′Q1), η, v′) arising from
an edge (Qˆ11[> Qˆ12, DQ1)
ζ,λ,H−→ (Qˆ′11[> Qˆ12, D′Q1) derived by rule
(C Int 1) of §5.4.2.2 from an edge (Qˆ11, DQ1) ζ,λ,H−→ (Qˆ′11, D′Q1)
where Qˆ′11 is not
√
.
Thus, v |= ζ and v′ = v[H := 0] |= I(Qˆ′11[> Qˆ12); so, v′ |= I(Qˆ′11)
and there is a timed transition
((Qˆ11, DQ1), η, v)
λ−→ ((Qˆ′11, D′Q1), η, v′).
By induction hypothesis, there is a bCANdle transition corre-
sponding to this under the bisimulation:
(age(Qˆ11, v), age(η, v), DQ1)
λ−→ (Q′′, age(η, v), D′Q1) where for
some Qˆ′′11 ≃ Qˆ′11, ((Qˆ′′11, D′Q1), η, v′)
(5.5)7−→ (age(Qˆ′′11, v′), age(η, v′), D′Q1)
with age(η, v) = age(η, v′) and Q′′ ≃ age(Qˆ′′11, v′).
§4.3 rule (Int 1) implies a transition
(age(Qˆ11[> Qˆ12, v), age(η, v), DQ1)
λ−→ (Q′′[> age(Qˆ12, v), age(η, v), D′Q1)
(remember age(Qˆ11[> Qˆ12, v) = age(Qˆ11, v)[> age(Qˆ12, v)) from
which the induction can be established.
(b) ((Qˆ11[> Qˆ12, DQ1), η, v)
λ−→ ((√, D′Q1), η, v′) arising from an edge
(Qˆ11[> Qˆ12, DQ1)
ζ,λ,H−→ (√, D′Q1) derived by rule (C Int 2) of §5.4.2.2
from an edge (Qˆ11, DQ1)
ζ,λ,H−→ (√, D′Q1).
Thus, v |= ζ and v′ = v[H := 0]; there is a timed transition
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((Qˆ11, DQ1), η, v)
λ−→ ((√, D′Q1), η, v′). The rest of this part of
the argument from induction hypothesis is similar to the previous
part, but using §4.3 rule (Int 2) in lieu of (Int 1).
(c) ((Qˆ11[> Qˆ12, DQ1), η, v)
λ−→ ((Qˆ′12, D′Q1), η, v′) arising from an
edge (Qˆ11[> Qˆ12, DQ1)
ζ,λ,H−→ (Qˆ′12, D′Q1) derived by rule (C Int 3)
of §5.4.2.2 from an edge (Qˆ12, DQ1) ζ,λ,H−→ (Qˆ′12, D′Q1).
Thus, v |= ζ and v′ = v[H := 0] |= I(Qˆ′12); so there is a timed
transition ((Qˆ12, DQ1), η, v)
λ−→ ((Qˆ′12, D′Q1), η, v′). The rest of
this part of the argument from induction hypothesis is similar to
the previous part, using §4.3 rule (Int 3).
9. (Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m is a single term (Qˆ11 + Qˆ12, DQ1). A timed transition λ
from ((Qˆ11 + Qˆ12, DQ1), η, v) must arise either as
(a) ((Qˆ11+Qˆ12, DQ1), η, v)
λ−→ ((Qˆ′11, D′Q1), η, v′) arising from an edge
(Qˆ11 + Qˆ12, DQ1)
ζ,λ,H−→ (Qˆ′11, D′Q1) derived by rule §5.4.2.2 (C Ch
1) from an edge (Qˆ11, DQ1)
ζ,λ,H−→ (Qˆ′11, D′Q1). This is similar to the
previous two groups of cases.
(b) ((Qˆ11+Qˆ12, DQ1), η, v)
λ−→ ((Qˆ′12, D′Q1), η, v′) arising from an edge
(Qˆ11 + Qˆ12, DQ1)
ζ,λ,H−→ (Qˆ′12, D′Q1) derived by rule §5.4.2.2 (C Ch
2) from an edge (Qˆ12, DQ1)
ζ,λ,H−→ (Qˆ′12, D′Q1). This is symmetrical
to the previous case.
10. (Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m is a single term (recX.Qˆ,DQ1).
((recX.Qˆ,DQ1), η, v)
λ−→ ((Qˆ′, D′Q1), η, v′) must arise from an edge
(recX.Qˆ,DQ1)
ζ,λ,H−→ (Qˆ′, D′Q1) derived by rule §5.4.2.2 (C Rec) from
an edge (Qˆ[recX.Qˆ/X], DQ1)
ζ,λ,H−→ (Qˆ′, D′Q1). We have v |= ζ and
v′ = v[H := 0] |= I(Qˆ′, D′Q1), and hence a timed transition
((Qˆ[recX.Qˆ/X], DQ1), η, v)
λ−→ ((Qˆ′, D′Q1), η, v′).
By induction hypothesis there is a bCANdle transition
(age(Qˆ[recX.Qˆ/X], v), age(η, v), DQ1)
λ−→ (Q′′, age(η, v), D′Q1) where
for some Qˆ′′ ≃ Qˆ′, ((Qˆ′′, D′Q1), η, v′)
(5.5)7−→ (age(Qˆ′′, v′), age(η, v′), D′Q1)
with age(η, v) = age(η, v′) and Q′′ ≃ age(Qˆ′′, v′).
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§4.3 rule (Rec) implies a bCANdle transition
(age(recX.Qˆ, v), age(η, v), DQ1)
λ−→ (Q′′, age(η, v), D′Q1) which, be-
cause (age(recX.Qˆ, v) ≡ (age(Qˆ[recX.Qˆ/X], v), establishes the induc-
tion.
11. (Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m is a pair (Qˆi, DQi)i=1,2 of parallel process terms and
((Qˆi, DQi)i=1,2, η, v)
λ−→ (Qˆ′i, D′Qi)i=1,2, η′, v′) is a discrete transition on
one of the precess terms.
(a) λ arises from an edge
(Qˆ1, DQ1)
ζ,λ,H−→ (Qˆ′1, D′Q1) and Qˆ′1 is not
√
but Qˆ′2 ≡ Qˆ2. Then,
v |= ζ and v′ = v[H := 0] |= I(Qˆ′1, D′Q1)∧I(Qˆ′2, D′Q2)∧
∧
k∈K I(ηk).
In this case the required (age(Qˆ1, v)|age(Qˆ2, v), age(η, v), DQ1 ⊔
DQ2)
λ−→ (age(Qˆ′1, v′)|age(Qˆ′2, v′), age(η′, v′), D′Q1 ⊔D′Q2) may be
inferred from
(age(Qˆ1, v), age(η, v), DQ1)
λ−→ (age(Qˆ′1, v′), age(η′, v′), D′Q1) us-
ing §4.3 rule (Par 1).
(b) λ arises from an edge
(Qˆ1, DQ1)
ζ,λ,H−→ (√, D′Q1). The reasoning is similar to the previous
case, but uses §4.3 rule (Par 2).
(c) λ arises from an edge
(Qˆ2, DQ2)
ζ,λ,H−→ (Qˆ′2, D′Q2). The two cases (whether or not Qˆ′2 is√
) are symmetrical with the previous two cases and employ §4.3
rules (Par 3), (Par 4).
(d) Cases in which (Qˆi, DQi)i=1...m is several parallel process terms
generalise on these cases in a natural way.
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Appendix C
CANGen Generated Code for a
CAN Channel
process Channel(const int l, const int u, const int L, const int U,
urgent chan & nMsg_000_000, urgent chan & nMsg_000_001,
urgent chan & nMsg_000_002, urgent chan & nMsg_000_003,
urgent chan & nMsg_001_000, urgent chan & nMsg_001_001,
urgent chan & nMsg_001_002, urgent chan & nMsg_001_003,
urgent chan & nMsg_002_000, urgent chan & nMsg_002_001,
urgent chan & nMsg_002_002, urgent chan & nMsg_002_003,
broadcast chan & dMsg_000_000, broadcast chan & dMsg_000_001,
broadcast chan & dMsg_000_002, broadcast chan & dMsg_000_003,
broadcast chan & dMsg_001_000, broadcast chan & dMsg_001_001,
broadcast chan & dMsg_001_002, broadcast chan & dMsg_001_003,
broadcast chan & dMsg_002_000, broadcast chan & dMsg_002_001,
broadcast chan & dMsg_002_002, broadcast chan & dMsg_002_003) {
clock h;
int[0,3] ip;
int[0,3] vp;
int[-1,3] Q[3];
state
Init, Free,
M2S_000_000, M2S_000_001, M2S_000_002, M2S_000_003, M2S_001_000,
M2S_001_001, M2S_001_002, M2S_001_003, M2S_002_000, M2S_002_001,
M2S_002_002, M2S_002_003,
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PreAcc_000_000, PreAcc_000_001, PreAcc_000_002, PreAcc_000_003,
PreAcc_001_000, PreAcc_001_001, PreAcc_001_002, PreAcc_001_003,
PreAcc_002_000, PreAcc_002_001, PreAcc_002_002, PreAcc_002_003,
Acc_000_000, Acc_000_001, Acc_000_002, Acc_000_003, Acc_001_000,
Acc_001_001, Acc_001_002, Acc_001_003, Acc_002_000, Acc_002_001,
Acc_002_002, Acc_002_003,
PostAcc_000_000, PostAcc_000_001, PostAcc_000_002, PostAcc_000_003,
PostAcc_001_000, PostAcc_001_001, PostAcc_001_002, PostAcc_001_003,
PostAcc_002_000, PostAcc_002_001, PostAcc_002_002, PostAcc_002_003,
PreAcc{h<=u}, Acc, PostAcc{h<=U},
PostChk_000, PostChk_001, PostChk_002;
commit
Init,
M2S_000_000, M2S_000_001, M2S_000_002, M2S_000_003, M2S_001_000,
M2S_001_001, M2S_001_002, M2S_001_003, M2S_002_000, M2S_002_001,
M2S_002_002, M2S_002_003,
PreAcc_000_000, PreAcc_000_001, PreAcc_000_002, PreAcc_000_003,
PreAcc_001_000, PreAcc_001_001, PreAcc_001_002, PreAcc_001_003,
PreAcc_002_000, PreAcc_002_001, PreAcc_002_002, PreAcc_002_003,
Acc_000_000, Acc_000_001, Acc_000_002, Acc_000_003, Acc_001_000,
Acc_001_001, Acc_001_002, Acc_001_003, Acc_002_000, Acc_002_001,
Acc_002_002, Acc_002_003,
PostAcc_000_000, PostAcc_000_001, PostAcc_000_002, PostAcc_000_003,
PostAcc_001_000, PostAcc_001_001, PostAcc_001_002, PostAcc_001_003,
PostAcc_002_000, PostAcc_002_001, PostAcc_002_002, PostAcc_002_003,
PostChk_000, PostChk_001, PostChk_002;
urgent
Acc;
init
Init;
trans
Init -> Init {
guard ip < 3;
assign Q[ip] = -1, ip++, h = 0;
},
Init -> Free { guard ip == 3; assign h = 0; },
Free -> M2S_000_000 { sync nMsg_000_000?; },
Free -> M2S_000_001 { sync nMsg_000_001?; },
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Free -> M2S_000_002 { sync nMsg_000_002?; },
Free -> M2S_000_003 { sync nMsg_000_003?; },
Free -> M2S_001_000 { sync nMsg_001_000?; },
Free -> M2S_001_001 { sync nMsg_001_001?; },
Free -> M2S_001_002 { sync nMsg_001_002?; },
Free -> M2S_001_003 { sync nMsg_001_003?; },
Free -> M2S_002_000 { sync nMsg_002_000?; },
Free -> M2S_002_001 { sync nMsg_002_001?; },
Free -> M2S_002_002 { sync nMsg_002_002?; },
Free -> M2S_002_003 { sync nMsg_002_003?; },
M2S_000_000 -> PreAcc { assign ip=0, vp=0, h = 0; },
M2S_000_001 -> PreAcc { assign ip=0, vp=1, h = 0; },
M2S_000_002 -> PreAcc { assign ip=0, vp=2, h = 0; },
M2S_000_003 -> PreAcc { assign ip=0, vp=3, h = 0; },
M2S_001_000 -> PreAcc { assign ip=1, vp=0, h = 0; },
M2S_001_001 -> PreAcc { assign ip=1, vp=1, h = 0; },
M2S_001_002 -> PreAcc { assign ip=1, vp=2, h = 0; },
M2S_001_003 -> PreAcc { assign ip=1, vp=3, h = 0; },
M2S_002_000 -> PreAcc { assign ip=2, vp=0, h = 0; },
M2S_002_001 -> PreAcc { assign ip=2, vp=1, h = 0; },
M2S_002_002 -> PreAcc { assign ip=2, vp=2, h = 0; },
M2S_002_003 -> PreAcc { assign ip=2, vp=3, h = 0; },
PreAcc -> PreAcc_000_000 { sync nMsg_000_000?; },
PreAcc -> PreAcc_000_001 { sync nMsg_000_001?; },
PreAcc -> PreAcc_000_002 { sync nMsg_000_002?; },
PreAcc -> PreAcc_000_003 { sync nMsg_000_003?; },
PreAcc -> PreAcc_001_000 { sync nMsg_001_000?; },
PreAcc -> PreAcc_001_001 { sync nMsg_001_001?; },
PreAcc -> PreAcc_001_002 { sync nMsg_001_002?; },
PreAcc -> PreAcc_001_003 { sync nMsg_001_003?; },
PreAcc -> PreAcc_002_000 { sync nMsg_002_000?; },
PreAcc -> PreAcc_002_001 { sync nMsg_002_001?; },
PreAcc -> PreAcc_002_002 { sync nMsg_002_002?; },
PreAcc -> PreAcc_002_003 { sync nMsg_002_003?; },
PreAcc_000_000 -> PreAcc { assign Q[0] = 0; },
PreAcc_000_001 -> PreAcc { assign Q[0] = 1; },
PreAcc_000_002 -> PreAcc { assign Q[0] = 2; },
PreAcc_000_003 -> PreAcc { assign Q[0] = 3; },
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PreAcc_001_000 -> PreAcc { assign Q[1] = 0; },
PreAcc_001_001 -> PreAcc { assign Q[1] = 1; },
PreAcc_001_002 -> PreAcc { assign Q[1] = 2; },
PreAcc_001_003 -> PreAcc { assign Q[1] = 3; },
PreAcc_002_000 -> PreAcc { assign Q[2] = 0; },
PreAcc_002_001 -> PreAcc { assign Q[2] = 1; },
PreAcc_002_002 -> PreAcc { assign Q[2] = 2; },
PreAcc_002_003 -> PreAcc { assign Q[2] = 3; },
PreAcc -> Acc { guard h >= l; assign h = 0; },
Acc -> Acc_000_000 { guard ip == 0 && vp == 0; },
Acc -> Acc_000_001 { guard ip == 0 && vp == 1; },
Acc -> Acc_000_002 { guard ip == 0 && vp == 2; },
Acc -> Acc_000_003 { guard ip == 0 && vp == 3; },
Acc -> Acc_001_000 { guard ip == 1 && vp == 0; },
Acc -> Acc_001_001 { guard ip == 1 && vp == 1; },
Acc -> Acc_001_002 { guard ip == 1 && vp == 2; },
Acc -> Acc_001_003 { guard ip == 1 && vp == 3; },
Acc -> Acc_002_000 { guard ip == 2 && vp == 0; },
Acc -> Acc_002_001 { guard ip == 2 && vp == 1; },
Acc -> Acc_002_002 { guard ip == 2 && vp == 2; },
Acc -> Acc_002_003 { guard ip == 2 && vp == 3; },
Acc_000_000 -> PostAcc {sync dMsg_000_000!; },
Acc_000_001 -> PostAcc {sync dMsg_000_001!; },
Acc_000_002 -> PostAcc {sync dMsg_000_002!; },
Acc_000_003 -> PostAcc {sync dMsg_000_003!; },
Acc_001_000 -> PostAcc {sync dMsg_001_000!; },
Acc_001_001 -> PostAcc {sync dMsg_001_001!; },
Acc_001_002 -> PostAcc {sync dMsg_001_002!; },
Acc_001_003 -> PostAcc {sync dMsg_001_003!; },
Acc_002_000 -> PostAcc {sync dMsg_002_000!; },
Acc_002_001 -> PostAcc {sync dMsg_002_001!; },
Acc_002_002 -> PostAcc {sync dMsg_002_002!; },
Acc_002_003 -> PostAcc {sync dMsg_002_003!; },
PostAcc -> PostAcc_000_000 { sync nMsg_000_000?; },
PostAcc -> PostAcc_000_001 { sync nMsg_000_001?; },
PostAcc -> PostAcc_000_002 { sync nMsg_000_002?; },
PostAcc -> PostAcc_000_003 { sync nMsg_000_003?; },
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PostAcc -> PostAcc_001_000 { sync nMsg_001_000?; },
PostAcc -> PostAcc_001_001 { sync nMsg_001_001?; },
PostAcc -> PostAcc_001_002 { sync nMsg_001_002?; },
PostAcc -> PostAcc_001_003 { sync nMsg_001_003?; },
PostAcc -> PostAcc_002_000 { sync nMsg_002_000?; },
PostAcc -> PostAcc_002_001 { sync nMsg_002_001?; },
PostAcc -> PostAcc_002_002 { sync nMsg_002_002?; },
PostAcc -> PostAcc_002_003 { sync nMsg_002_003?; },
PostAcc_000_000 -> PostAcc { assign Q[0] = 0; },
PostAcc_000_001 -> PostAcc { assign Q[0] = 1; },
PostAcc_000_002 -> PostAcc { assign Q[0] = 2; },
PostAcc_000_003 -> PostAcc { assign Q[0] = 3; },
PostAcc_001_000 -> PostAcc { assign Q[1] = 0; },
PostAcc_001_001 -> PostAcc { assign Q[1] = 1; },
PostAcc_001_002 -> PostAcc { assign Q[1] = 2; },
PostAcc_001_003 -> PostAcc { assign Q[1] = 3; },
PostAcc_002_000 -> PostAcc { assign Q[2] = 0; },
PostAcc_002_001 -> PostAcc { assign Q[2] = 1; },
PostAcc_002_002 -> PostAcc { assign Q[2] = 2; },
PostAcc_002_003 -> PostAcc { assign Q[2] = 3; },
PostAcc -> PostChk_000 { guard h >= L; },
PostChk_000 -> PostChk_001 {guard Q[0] == -1;},
PostChk_001 -> PostChk_002 {guard Q[1] == -1;},
PostChk_002 -> Free {guard Q[2] == -1;},
PostChk_000 -> M2S_000_000 {guard Q[0] == 0; assign Q[0] = -1;},
PostChk_000 -> M2S_000_001 {guard Q[0] == 1; assign Q[0] = -1;},
PostChk_000 -> M2S_000_002 {guard Q[0] == 2; assign Q[0] = -1;},
PostChk_000 -> M2S_000_003 {guard Q[0] == 3; assign Q[0] = -1;},
PostChk_001 -> M2S_001_000 {guard Q[1] == 0; assign Q[1] = -1;},
PostChk_001 -> M2S_001_001 {guard Q[1] == 1; assign Q[1] = -1;},
PostChk_001 -> M2S_001_002 {guard Q[1] == 2; assign Q[1] = -1;},
PostChk_001 -> M2S_001_003 {guard Q[1] == 3; assign Q[1] = -1;},
PostChk_002 -> M2S_002_000 {guard Q[2] == 0; assign Q[2] = -1;},
PostChk_002 -> M2S_002_001 {guard Q[2] == 1; assign Q[2] = -1;},
PostChk_002 -> M2S_002_002 {guard Q[2] == 2; assign Q[2] = -1;},
PostChk_002 -> M2S_002_003 {guard Q[2] == 3; assign Q[2] = -1;};
}
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Appendix D
Using CANGen
D.1 Usage
java CANGen <input file>
or java -jar CANGen.jar <input file>
or CANGen <input file>
D.2 Input Syntax
The first 3 lines should be
#numTypes ... [the number of message types to be supported]
#numVals ... [the number of message payload values to be supported]
#channel .,.,.,. [the four channel parameters in a comma-separated list]
After this, there are instances of each of the following (in no
particular order); there may be more than one instance and there
should be at least one of (b - e) -
(a) the directive
#fanoutTypes
on a line by itself.
This generates the process template for fanning an urgent
synchronisation out over all types. There need only be one
instance of this. The template signature is
249
250 APPENDIX D. USING CANGEN
process FanoutTypes(urgent chan & syn,
urgent chan & syn000, urgent chan & syn001, urgent chan & syn002 ...)
(b) the directive
#globals
on a line by itself, followed by lines consisting of valid Uppaal
global variable declarations
(c) the directive
#processes
on a line by itself, followed by lines consisting of valid Uppaal
process (template) definitions
(d) the directive
#procInstances
on a line by itself, followed by lines consisting of valid Uppaal
process instantiations
(e) the directive
#sysDef
on a line by itself, followed by a valid Uppaal system definition
There will normally be only one of (e) although there may be multiple
instances of (b-d).
Apart from these directives, CANGen input is ordinary UPPAAL .xta
sources, but there are two special syntactic construct for multiplying
elements (channel, variable declarations, locations, edges,...) over
message types and message payload values:
FORType(t) ... token|t|... ROF
FORVal(v) ... token|v|... ROF
CANGen expands FORType(t) ... token|t|... ROF into a comma or semicolon
-separated list ... token000 ... , token001 ... , token002 ...
and so on up to (m-1). Every instance of |t| is replaced by a sequence
number 000, 001, ... up to (m-1); all other tokens are replicated
without substitution.
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There may be several occurrences of |t| within the construct - i.e.,
between FORType(t) and ROF. A metavariable other than t may be used
but it has to match the one in FORType(.). A construct may stretch over
several lines.
UPPAAL syntax sometimes requires the multiple instances to be separated
by commas and sometimes by semicolons. CAN does whichever is suggested
by the context to be appropriate -- admittedly this is something of a
kludge.
Similarly, CANGen expands FORVal(v) ... token|v|... ROF into a comma or
semicolon-separated list ... token000 ... , token001 ... , token002 ...
and so on up to (n-1). Every instance of |v| is replaced by a sequence
number 000, 001, ... up to (n-1); all other tokens are replicated
without substitution.
The two constructs may be nested inside each other, for instance,
FORType(t) FORVal(v) ... token|t|_|v| ... tokenB|t| ROF ROF
replicates m X n times:
... token000_000 ... tokenB000, ... token000_001 ... tokenB000,
..... ,
... token001_000 ... tokenB001, ... token001_001 ... tokenB001,
..... and so on.
D.3 Example
D.3.1 Input File
This is the input file for the UPPAAL system used in §6.2 to show the no-
free-variables CAN channel model weakly bisimilar to the original model, in
the case m = 3 n = 4.
#numTypes 3
#numVals 4
#channel 15, 25, 10, 15
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#processes
process Sender(FORtype(t)FORval(v) urgent chan & nMsg|t|_|v|
ROFROF) {
state Init, FORtype(t)FORval(v) S|t|_|v| ROFROF;
init Init;
trans
FORtype(t)FORval(v)
Init -> S|t|_|v| { },
S|t|_|v| -> Init {
sync nMsg;
} ROFROF;
}
process Receiver(FORtype(t)FORval(v) broadcast chan & dMsg|t|_|v|
ROFROF) {
state Init, FORtype(t)FORval(v) R|t|_|v| ROFROF;
init Init;
trans
FORtype(t)FORval(v)
Init -> S|t|_|v| {
sync dMsg;
},
S|t|_|v| -> Init { } ROFROF;
}
#procInstances
sender = Sender(FORtype(t)FORval(k)newMsg_|t|_|k| ROFROF);
receiver = Receiver(FORtype(t)FORval(k)dlvrMsg_|t|_|k| ROFROF);
#sysDef
system channel, sender, receiver;
D.3.2 Generated UPPAAL Code
This is the code generated from the input file above for the UPPAAL sys-
tem used in §6.2 to show the no-free-variables CAN channel model weakly
bisimilar to the original model, in the case m = 3 n = 4.
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const int NUMTYPES = 3;
const int NUMVALS = 4;
urgent chan
nMsg_000_000, nMsg_000_001, nMsg_000_002, nMsg_000_003,
nMsg_001_000, nMsg_001_001, nMsg_001_002, nMsg_001_003,
nMsg_002_000, nMsg_002_001, nMsg_002_002, nMsg_002_003;
broadcast chan
dMsg_000_000, dMsg_000_001, dMsg_000_002, dMsg_000_003,
dMsg_001_000, dMsg_001_001, dMsg_001_002, dMsg_001_003,
dMsg_002_000, dMsg_002_001, dMsg_002_002, dMsg_002_003;
process Channel(const int l, const int u,
const int L, const int U,
......This code is exactly as in appendix C.....
process Sender(
urgent chan & nMsg000_000 , urgent chan & nMsg000_001 ,
urgent chan & nMsg000_002 , urgent chan & nMsg000_003 ,
urgent chan & nMsg001_000 , urgent chan & nMsg001_001 ,
urgent chan & nMsg001_002 , urgent chan & nMsg001_003 ,
urgent chan & nMsg002_000 , urgent chan & nMsg002_001 ,
urgent chan & nMsg002_002 , urgent chan & nMsg002_003 ) {
state Init, S000_000 , S000_001 , S000_002 , S000_003 ,
S001_000 , S001_001 , S001_002 , S001_003 , S002_000 ,
S002_001 , S002_002 , S002_003 ;
init Init;
trans
Init -> S000_000 { },
S000_000 -> Init {
sync nMsg;
} ,
Init -> S000_001 { },
S000_001 -> Init {
sync nMsg;
} ,
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Init -> S000_002 { },
S000_002 -> Init {
sync nMsg;
} ,
.....abridged........
Init -> S002_003 { },
S002_003 -> Init {
sync nMsg;
} ;
}
process Receiver(
broadcast chan & dMsg000_000 , broadcast chan & dMsg000_001 ,
broadcast chan & dMsg000_002 , broadcast chan & dMsg000_003 ,
broadcast chan & dMsg001_000 , broadcast chan & dMsg001_001 ,
broadcast chan & dMsg001_002 , broadcast chan & dMsg001_003 ,
broadcast chan & dMsg002_000 , broadcast chan & dMsg002_001 ,
broadcast chan & dMsg002_002 , broadcast chan & dMsg002_003 ) {
state Init, R000_000 , R000_001 , R000_002 , R000_003 ,
R001_000 , R001_001 , R001_002 , R001_003 , R002_000 ,
R002_001 , R002_002 , R002_003 ;
init Init;
trans
Init -> S000_000 {
sync dMsg;
},
S000_000 -> Init { } ,
Init -> S000_001 {
sync dMsg;
},
S000_001 -> Init { } ,
Init -> S000_002 {
sync dMsg;
},
.....abridged........
Init -> S002_003 {
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sync dMsg;
},
S002_003 -> Init { } ;
}
channel = Channel(15, 25, 10, 15,
nMsg_000_000, nMsg_000_001, nMsg_000_002, nMsg_000_003,
nMsg_001_000, nMsg_001_001, nMsg_001_002, nMsg_001_003,
nMsg_002_000, nMsg_002_001, nMsg_002_002, nMsg_002_003,
dMsg_000_000, dMsg_000_001, dMsg_000_002, dMsg_000_003,
dMsg_001_000, dMsg_001_001, dMsg_001_002, dMsg_001_003,
dMsg_002_000, dMsg_002_001, dMsg_002_002, dMsg_002_003);
sender = Sender(newMsg_000_000 , newMsg_000_001 ,
newMsg_000_002 , newMsg_000_003 , newMsg_001_000,
newMsg_001_001 , newMsg_001_002 , newMsg_001_003,
newMsg_002_000 , newMsg_002_001 , newMsg_002_002,
newMsg_002_003 );
receiver = Receiver(dlvrMsg_000_000 , dlvrMsg_000_001,
dlvrMsg_000_002 , dlvrMsg_000_003 , dlvrMsg_001_000 ,
dlvrMsg_001_001 , dlvrMsg_001_002 , dlvrMsg_001_003 ,
dlvrMsg_002_000 , dlvrMsg_002_001 , dlvrMsg_002_002 ,
dlvrMsg_002_003 );
system channel, sender, receiver;
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Appendix E
A First Example – source
E.1 System with a single sensor
#numTypes 3
#numVals 40
#channel 15, 25, 10, 15
#processes
process PlantSensor(int p,
broadcast chan & swOff, broadcast chan & swOn, broadcast chan & rq,
FORval(k) urgent chan &rdg|k|ROF) {
clock g, h;
bool on;
int[0,50] v;
state ini, p1{h <= p}, rqstd, FORval(k)val|k|ROF;
urgent ini, rqstd, FORval(k)val|k|ROF;
init ini;
trans
ini -> p1 {
assign g = 0, h = 0, v = NUMVALS/2, on = false;
},
p1 -> p1 {
sync swOn?;
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assign on = true;
},
p1 -> p1 {
sync swOff?;
assign on = false;
},
p1 -> p1 {
guard h >= p/2 && on;
assign v ++, h = 0;
},
p1 -> p1 {
guard h >= p/2 && !on;
assign v --, h = 0;
},
p1 -> rqstd {
sync rq?;
},
rqstd -> rqstd {
sync swOn?;
assign on = true;
},
rqstd -> rqstd {
sync swOff?;
assign on = false;
},
FORval(k)
rqstd -> val|k| {
guard v == |k|;
},
val|k| -> val|k| {
sync swOn?;
assign on = true;
},
val|k| -> val|k| {
sync swOff?;
assign on = false;
},
val|k| -> p1 {
sync rdg|k|!;
}ROF;
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}
process Controller(int hi, int lo, int dly, int dly2,
urgent chan & swOff, urgent chan & swOn, urgent chan & rq,
FORval(k) broadcast chan &rdg|k|ROF) {
clock g, h;
int[0,50] n, vAv;
state
ini, rqstVal{h<=dly}, rqstd, getVals{h<=dly2},
sndOn{h<=dly2}, sndOff{h<=dly2},
FORval(k)got|k|ROF;
urgent ini, rqstd,
FORval(k)got|k|ROF;
init ini;
trans
ini -> rqstVal {
assign vAv = 0, g = 0, h=0;
},
rqstVal -> rqstd {
guard h >= dly;
assign h = 0;
},
rqstd -> getVals {
sync rq!;
assign h=0;
},
FORval(k)
getVals -> got|k| {
sync rdg|k|?;
assign vAv = |k|;
},
got|k| -> rqstVal {
guard vAv <= hi && vAv >= lo;
assign h = 0;
},
got|k| -> sndOff {
guard vAv > hi;
assign h = 0;
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},
got|k| -> sndOn {
guard vAv < lo;
assign h = 0;
}ROF,
sndOn -> rqstVal {
sync swOn!;
assign h = 0;
},
sndOff -> rqstVal {
sync swOff!;
assign h = 0;
},
getVals -> getVals {
guard h >= dly2;
assign h=0;
};
}
#procInstances
plantSensor = PlantSensor(2000, dMsg_001_000, dMsg_001_001,
dMsg_002_000, FORval(k)nMsg_000_|k| ROF);
controller = Controller(21, 19, 5, 5, nMsg_001_000, nMsg_001_001,
nMsg_002_000, FORval(k)dMsg_000_|k| ROF);
#sysDef
system channel, plantSensor, controller;
E.2 System which averages two sensors
This is identical to the 1-sensor version (globals, network specification, con-
troller process, sensor process signature, process instantiation, system spec-
ification) except for the definition of the sensor process, which now carries
two sensed variables and averages them:
process PlantSensor(int p,
urgent chan & swOff, urgent chan & swOn, urgent chan & rq,
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FORval(k) urgent chan &rdg|k|ROF) {
clock g, h;
bool on;
int[0,50] v1, v2;
state ini, p1{h <= p}, rqstd, FORval(k)val|k|ROF;
urgent ini, rqstd, FORval(k)val|k|ROF;
init ini;
trans
ini -> p1 {
assign g = 0, h = 0, v1 = NUMVALS/2, v2 = NUMVALS/2,
on = false;
},
p1 -> p1 {
sync swOn?;
assign on = true;
},
p1 -> p1 {
sync swOff?;
assign on = false;
},
p1 -> p1 {
guard h >= p/2 && on;
assign v1 ++, h = 0;
},
p1 -> p1 {
guard h >= p/2 && on;
assign v2 ++, h = 0;
},
p1 -> p1 {
guard h >= p/2 && !on;
assign v1 --, h = 0;
},
p1 -> p1 {
guard h >= p/2 && !on;
assign v2 --, h = 0;
},
p1 -> rqstd {
sync rq?;
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},
rqstd -> rqstd {
sync swOn?;
assign on = true;
},
rqstd -> rqstd {
sync swOff?;
assign on = false;
},
FORval(k)
rqstd -> val|k| {
guard (v1+v2)/2 == |k|;
},
val|k| -> val|k| {
sync swOn?;
assign on = true;
},
val|k| -> val|k| {
sync swOff?;
assign on = false;
},
val|k| -> p1 {
sync rdg|k|!;
}ROF;
}
Appendix F
Using Assume-Guarantee –
sources
F.1 The concrete system model
#numTypes 3
#numVals 40
#channel 15, 25, 10, 15
#processes
process PlantSensor(int p, int in,
broadcast chan & swOff, broadcast chan & swOn,
broadcast chan & rq,
FORval(k) urgent chan &rdg|k|ROF) {
clock g, h;
bool on;
int[0,50] v;
state ini, p1{h <= p}, rqstd, FORval(k)val|k|ROF;
urgent ini, rqstd, FORval(k)val|k|ROF;
init ini;
trans
ini -> p1 {
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assign g = 0, h = 0, v = NUMVALS/2, on = false;
},
p1 -> p1 {
sync swOn?;
assign on = true, g = 0;
},
p1 -> p1 {
sync swOff?;
assign on = false, g = 0;
},
p1 -> p1 {
guard h >= p/2 && on && g > in;
assign v ++, h = 0;
},
p1 -> p1 {
guard h >= p/2 && !on && g > in;
assign v --, h = 0;
},
p1 -> p1 {
guard h >= p/2 && g <= in;
assign h = 0;
},
p1 -> rqstd {
sync rq?;
},
rqstd -> rqstd {
sync swOn?;
assign on = true, g = 0;
},
rqstd -> rqstd {
sync swOff?;
assign on = false, g = 0;
},
FORval(k)
rqstd -> val|k| {
guard v == |k|;
},
val|k| -> val|k| {
sync swOn?;
assign on = true, g = 0;
},
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val|k| -> val|k| {
sync swOff?;
assign on = false, g = 0;
},
val|k| -> p1 {
sync rdg|k|!;
}ROF;
}
process Controller(int hi, int lo, int e, int dly, int dly2,
int inert, urgent chan & swOff, urgent chan & swOn,
urgent chan & rq, FORval(k) broadcast chan &rdg|k|ROF) {
clock g, h;
int[0,50] vAv;
state
ini, rqstVal{h<=dly}, rqstd, getVals,
sndOn, sndOff,
FORval(k)got|k|{h<=dly2}ROF;
urgent ini;
init ini;
trans
ini -> rqstVal {
assign vAv = NUMVALS/2, h=0, g=0;
},
rqstVal -> rqstd {
guard h >= dly;
assign h = 0;
},
rqstd -> getVals {
sync rq!;
assign h=0;
},
FORval(k)
getVals -> got|k| {
sync rdg|k|?;
assign vAv = |k|, h = 0;
},
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got|k| -> rqstVal {
guard (vAv <= hi && vAv >= lo) || (g <= inert
&& (vAv <= hi+e && vAv >= lo-e));
assign h = 0;
},
got|k| -> sndOff {
guard (vAv > hi && g > inert) || vAv > hi+e;
assign h = 0;
},
got|k| -> sndOn {
guard (vAv < lo && g > inert) || vAv < lo-e;
assign h = 0;
}ROF,
sndOn -> rqstVal {
sync swOn!;
assign h = 0, g = 0;
},
sndOff -> rqstVal {
sync swOff!;
assign h = 0, g = 0;
};
}
#procInstances
plantSensor = PlantSensor(10000, 50, dMsg_001_000, dMsg_001_001,
dMsg_002_000, FORval(k)nMsg_000_|k| ROF);
controller = Controller(21, 19, 2, 5, 5, 100, nMsg_001_000,
nMsg_001_001, nMsg_002_000, FORval(k)dMsg_000_|k| ROF);
#sysDef
system channel, plantSensor, controller;
F.2 The abstraction
................
process PlantSensor(int p,
broadcast chan & swOff, broadcast chan & swOn,
F.2. THE ABSTRACTION 267
broadcast chan & rq,
FORval(k) urgent chan &rdg|k|ROF) {
clock h;
bool on;
int[0,50] v;
state ini, p1{h <= p}, rqstd, FORval(k)val|k|ROF;
urgent ini, rqstd, FORval(k)val|k|ROF;
init ini;
trans
ini -> p1 {
assign h = 0, v = NUMVALS/2, on = false;
},
p1 -> p1 {
sync swOn?;
assign on = true;
},
p1 -> p1 {
sync swOff?;
assign on = false;
},
p1 -> p1 {
guard h >= p/2 && on;
assign v ++, h = 0;
},
p1 -> p1 {
guard h >= p/2 && !on;
assign v --, h = 0;
},
p1 -> p1 {
guard h >= p/2;
assign h = 0;
},
p1 -> rqstd {
sync rq?;
},
rqstd -> rqstd {
sync swOn?;
assign on = true;
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},
rqstd -> rqstd {
sync swOff?;
assign on = false;
},
FORval(k)
rqstd -> val|k| {
guard v == |k|;
},
val|k| -> val|k| {
sync swOn?;
assign on = true;
},
val|k| -> val|k| {
sync swOff?;
assign on = false;
},
val|k| -> p1 {
sync rdg|k|!;
}ROF;
}
process Controller(int hi, int lo, int e, int dly, int dly2,
urgent chan & swOff, urgent chan & swOn, urgent chan & rq,
FORval(k) broadcast chan &rdg|k|ROF) {
clock h;
int[0,50] vAv;
state
ini, rqstVal{h<=dly}, rqstd, getVals,
sndOn, sndOff,
FORval(k)got|k|{h<=dly2}ROF;
urgent ini;
init ini;
trans
ini -> rqstVal {
assign vAv = NUMVALS/2, h=0;
},
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rqstVal -> rqstd {
guard h >= dly;
assign h = 0;
},
rqstd -> getVals {
sync rq!;
assign h=0;
},
FORval(k)
getVals -> got|k| {
sync rdg|k|?;
assign vAv = |k|, h = 0;
},
got|k| -> rqstVal {
guard vAv <= hi+e && vAv >= lo-e;
assign h = 0;
},
got|k| -> sndOff {
guard vAv > hi;
assign h = 0;
},
got|k| -> sndOn {
guard vAv < lo;
assign h = 0;
}ROF,
sndOn -> rqstVal {
sync swOn!;
assign h = 0;
},
sndOff -> rqstVal {
sync swOff!;
assign h = 0;
};
}
#procInstances
plantSensor = PlantSensor(10000, dMsg_001_000, dMsg_001_001,
dMsg_002_000, FORval(k)nMsg_000_|k| ROF);
controller = Controller(21, 19, 2, 5, 5, nMsg_001_000,
nMsg_001_001, nMsg_002_000, FORval(k)dMsg_000_|k| ROF);
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#sysDef
system channel, plantSensor, controller;
